


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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

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***KOMMUNIST***

No 3, February 1989

# Soviet Union KOMMUNIST

No 3, February 1989


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## KOMMUNIST

No 3, February 1989

### Political Reform and Social Science

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[Article by Vladimir Nikolayevich Kudryavtsev, USSR  
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[Text]

#### I

Scale and depth are important factors in determining the comprehensive nature of the process of socialist renovation. The interdependence between economic and politics, law and social relations and national psychology and traditions of daily life is so great, disparate and conflicting that underestimating, in the course of perestroika, the significance of any of the elements of social life, misunderstanding its development trends could seriously hinder it or substantially change the expected results. The sole guarantees against such errors are the thorough study of reality and reliance on science which, in principle, can objectively assess a historical situation and earmark alternate choices in a weighed-out policy. Certain procedures must also be observed, thus ensuring the democratic and efficient way of discussing options and making optimal decisions.

Is our social science ready to perform this role? How did it manifest itself under the difficult historical circumstances marking the contemporary restructuring of society? What is its assumed and real potential? The answers to such questions are not simple, to begin with, because social science itself is heterogeneous and multi-variant and, the popular opinion notwithstanding, includes a number of schools and various trends. Second, it is necessary to take into consideration the dynamics of the development of the science: today the social scientists are no longer what they were only 2 or 3 years ago. Third, the role of social science knowledge varies according to the viewpoint of its application, not to mention the content and direction of the so-called "social instruction," assuming that such exists. This makes it all the more important to determine the extent to which science influences the political practice precisely today, when most important changes in our social life are taking place.

The focal point of these changes is the radical reform of the political system, the first stage of which includes, in particular, the reorganization of the higher state authorities, democratization of the electoral system and strengthening the independence of the courts. Amendments to the USSR Constitution, adopted at the Extraordinary 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, are already being implemented.

The elections for people's deputies of the USSR, based on democratic procedures, will be completed with the creation of new authorities: The Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which not only territorial and national formations but also social organizations, with their specific interests and views, will be extensively represented. Changes in the structure and procedure of activities of the superior representative authorities will create a constitutional foundation for significantly improving legislative work, the open and democratic management of governmental affairs and the solution of the most important social problems, taking into consideration the variety of social interests; they will strengthen the legal guarantees against abuse of power and authoritarianism. The initial but very important step in establishing a socialist state of law and surmounting the former ossified state management system has been taken.

In the course of perestroika we fully realized the fact that the command-administrative system had totally exhausted its possibilities on the economic, social, internal and foreign-political levels. The statification of virtually all areas of life, excessive management centralization and bureaucratization triggered a number of major adverse consequences. This included, first of all, the lowering of efficiency and overall standards of management and reproduction, and the gradual prevalence of incompetence on different management levels and, consequently, a primitive attitude toward science. Second, the abundance of reinsurance, write-offs, and violations of the law with impunity and, hence, decline of responsibility for assignments. Third, inevitably, there were grave errors in making a number of important governmental domestic and foreign policy decisions. The democratic institutions which were part of our political structure, were emasculated and, essentially, only simulated active efforts.

The situation of stagnation and dogmatism in social science hindered the totally frank and responsible study of negative phenomena and the formulation of their impartial assessments. This neither existed nor could exist at that time. Nonetheless, surreptitiously, scientific thinking prepared perestroika and, in this connection, we could indicate at least three basic trends along which there occurred a gradual, a so to say latent development of new political thinking and the development of a potential for new ideas.

First of all, this involves the study of the problem of social contradictions. Against the background of glossing over reality and the prevalence of the "theory of conflict-free development," by the turn of the 1980s many philosophers, economists and sociologists addressed themselves to the question of contradictions within socialism. In particular, some monographs, articles and debates in journals discussed contradictions between our economic base and political superstructure, and between production forces and production relations, as well as differences in the interests of different strata in Soviet



society. We know that many studies in this direction were blocked and their authors were subjected to rather coarse criticism. Nonetheless, the very formulation of the question of real contradictions within socialism was an important theoretical embryo of a more general thought concerning the fact that not only the stagnant economic but also the political system was beginning to outlive its usefulness and had to be reformed and made consistent with the objective needs of our time.

The second trend was that of scientifically criticizing the condition of state management of the economy and the other areas of social life. In this area economists and jurists were most active, having published a number of works on problems of optimizing management and the democratization of political institutions. Such works contained entirely specific recommendations, many of which met with support and were developed in the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and, subsequently, the 19th Party Conference.

Third and perhaps most important was the sum total of scientific ideas, the leitmotif of which was humanizing our entire life and enhancing universal human values. This trend was focused on asserting the dignity of the individual and his rights and legitimate interests, surmounting callousness and a technocratic attitude, and the revival of spiritual culture. The influence of this extensive moral-political trend on the development of the ideas of the democratization of society and on preparations for a radical reform in the political system was substantial. All political changes today are imbued with the spirit of humanizing and the enhanced role of the citizen in the management of governmental and social affairs and with the ideas of the renovation of socialism.

The new moral and political thinking was not immediately crystallized in specific forms of governmental changes. Let us recall that the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress only raised the question of improving existing political and legal institutions. The main emphasis was put on the formulation and implementation of the party's economic strategy.

However, life proved quite quickly that an economic upsurge was impossible without restructuring the social area. After a while, the 19th Party Conference noted that "...Today priority is given to a radical reform of the political system." This evolution of political decisions is entirely natural. Better than any kind of statement, it confirms the fact that perestroika is a self-developing process. It is a revolutionary process with a tremendous growing potential.

Life imperatively demanded radical changes in political institutions. But what about science? Curiously enough, after ideologically preparing, albeit in a most general manner, some major steps in that direction, most social scientists turned unprepared to undertake the specific

implementation of many of their own progressive ideas. This was influenced by the gap between scientific theory and real practice, which had developed in the course of years and decades.

Following are a few examples: although Soviet experts in government had studied at length political structures, they nonetheless were unable to submit specific suggestions on the most efficient ways of updating the structure and functions of the superior state authorities. This was accomplished by the 19th Party Conference.

The social scientists were dangerously behind in the development of the national problem. When that problem broke out quite sharply in life, neither philosophers nor sociologists or political experts were able to suggest efficient way to solve it. All of this had to be dealt with through political practices, through the trial and error method.

Another problem which should have been obvious was that of the way to follow in the struggle against bureaucracy. Let us point out, however, that the only domestic monograph on this topic had been published in Moscow in 1906. During the entire Soviet period no single serious specialized study of this problem had been made.

These are only isolated illustrations of the real condition which we must note in the area of research, related to the first stage in the reform of the political system. A consideration of a more general order can be expressed as well. The point is that any economic, social or political problem cannot be solved satisfactorily outside a specific historical context, without taking into consideration the characteristics of the mentality of the people, their political feelings, the deployment of class and social forces and numerous other circumstances within which any decision can be implemented. The description of this historical context and the study of the circumstances we mentioned are the tasks of specialized social scientists. In this respect, they are quite unlike the tasks of the natural scientists (physicists, for instance) who are also involved in the analysis of various objects within a specific external environment. The latter, however, is much stabler in terms of space and time than is the area of research by the scientists working in the humanities, who are dealing not only with social life but with human consciousness as well.

What practical results were achieved in the formulation of the first stage of the political reform? Its historical context was poorly emphasized. It is true that a number of positive elements, triggered by perestroika and contributing to the implementation of the reform, were quite obvious. This includes the growth of the political activeness of the people, the extensive support of democratic changes on the part of various social strata, and an increased feeling of civic-mindedness and responsibility for the future of our society and of socialism.

Nonetheless, a number of annoying errors were made in understanding the actual sociopolitical and moral-psychological situation. The main one was the exaggerated and insufficiently differentiated evaluation of the state of social awareness (the direct consequence of the "theory of no-conflict" was the embellishment of reality). No clear understanding existed of the fact that some stipulations in the draft amendments of the USSR Constitution and the electoral laws would not meet with the exclusive approval of the population but result in at least two more initially polarized reactions: the displeasure expressed by the conservative strata of the fast changes in governmental structures, on the one hand, and the disappointment of radical groups, including nationalistic ones, on the other. The level of the political and legal awareness of the broad population masses was clearly overestimated; there also were naive views to the effect that democracy will begin to develop "by itself." Against this background we also felt the impact of the insufficiently energetic explanatory work on the various drafts, both on the part of the drafters—the personnel of the party and soviet apparatus—as well as the general press. Nor should we fail to mention legal defects included in the drafts, many of the stipulations of which were unclear and contradictory. By no means were social scientists involved in drafting them, to the fullest extent of their forces.

In summing up the results of the discussion of the draft new laws at the Extraordinary 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M.S. Gorbachev said: "Why conceal it, the center was taught a good lesson. I believe that all of you learned it from your experience in discussing the problems of the first stage of the reform." Unquestionably, such a lesson was taught to the social scientists as well. The discussion of the drafts clearly indicated the weaknesses of our social science, which includes more unsolved than solved problems, and a great deal of scholastic and speculative elaborations and criticisms but few "functional" concepts.

The reasons for this are obvious and have already been sufficiently discussed. For many years the social scientists operated only on the basis of **normative** knowledge (it would be better to describe it as concepts) and correspondingly developed only normative concepts. In other words, they dealt more not with that which existed but what had to exist and, furthermore, which was frequently illusory and alienated from real historical grounds. This particularly affected sciences such as philosophy, law, ethics and, partially, economics. Lacking proper training, the young cadres of social scientists fell greatly behind global standards in terms of their knowledge and general standards. Their outlook was framed by narrow dogmatic systems. Independent thinking was not encouraged. Therefore, no respect for the opinions of others could be developed. When perestroika came, the new requirements concerning social science confused some scientists; lack of preparedness for a meaningful analysis of social life was felt. The vacuum in science

began to be filled by political journalism, which was frequently progressive, sharp and practical but also, occasionally, superficial and irrelevant.

Today, in the 4th year of perestroika, positive and quite profound changes are taking place. In January 1989 the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium passed a resolution on the creation of an all-Union interdepartmental center for the sciences of man, and an institute of man as part of that center. A general comprehensive academic program "Man, Science, Society" was approved. The scientific research efforts of philosophers, economists, sociologists, jurists, and historians are being enhanced. Creative discussions and theory seminars have become more frequent. Nonetheless, still obvious is the incompleteness of the acquired knowledge, weaknesses in scientific method and the still unformed or already lost habit of objectively comparing various views, looking for options and engaging in the comprehensive study of the existing tremendous historical experience in sociopolitical development throughout the world.

## II

In order to lead social science out of its stagnation we need, above all, a radical reassessment of a number of concepts of fundamental significance. This applies, above all, to understanding the nature of the socialist social system and assessing its place in the contemporary world.

In reviewing concepts of socialism, obviously the main feature must be a transition from a simplistic one-dimensional model to a multidimensional and comprehensive understanding. The primitive and essentially erroneous concept that the socioeconomic and political reality reached by our society at the start of the 1980s was just about the ideal of social development should yield to historically substantiated concepts of the multi-variant, of the variety of "models" of socialist development in terms of space and time and the multiple aspects of each one of them. In other words, contemporary socialism must be studied as a complex, heterogeneous and conflicting society, whose economic and political forms are still far from being perfect. The task of the social scientists is to formulate a scientific concept of contemporary socialism and to earmark positive guidelines which will define the ways and means of taking social practice closer to socialist ideals. In this case we cannot be limited merely to the study of objective reality. We also need a synthesis and sufficiently developed concepts of the objectives toward which we aspire, whether in the areas of economics, politics, law or the spiritual life of society.

The elimination of dogmatic concepts of socialism and the development of its new vision, in terms of image, model and system, is directly related to all social sciences. In political economy, for example, we must definitively abandon state management of all economic activities. The experience of perestroika has indicated that

under socialism a variety of forms of ownership can be efficiently used: social, private, state, and cooperative, as well as mixed, providing that they serve man and do not lead to exploitation, depersonalization and alienation. The social division of labor and uneven nature of scientific and technical development trigger the need for a specific mixed socialist national economy, in which large state production associations, cooperatives, individual labor activity and leasing become equally useful. It is not the separation of all such forms but the study of their economic, social, legal and psychological features that constitutes one of the topical tasks in the social sciences.

Or else let us consider the problems of the social structure of our society. Long and persistent state control of the economy was closely linked to the persistent idea of the standardization of social life and the accelerated elimination not only of class but also of other social differences. This deadened the social activeness of the people and an extremely poor ideological concept was promoted about the civilian society as an amorphous mass of people, among which the still remaining differences in interests, views and cultural standards were allegedly of no serious scientific or practical significance. In any case, these problems were poorly studied, as a result of which, to this day we lack a clear idea of the real breakdown of the population in terms of indicators, such as various forms of ownership, political views and preferences, conceptual views, personal ideals, plans for life, attitude toward religion and many others. "Blank spots" remain in many areas of social psychology, such as social mores and feelings, mass forms of behavior, formal and informal leadership, national features and stereotypes of behavior of people of different age groups and professions, and so on. The re-evaluation of obsolete views in this area of ideology and science is closely related to the acknowledgment not only of the admissibility of socialist pluralism of views and interests but, above all, its usefulness and need for the full development of both society and the individual.

The road from the primacy of the administrative system to the supremacy of popular rule is a one to walk in science, for which reason it requires a revision of a number of durable postulates and ordinary stereotypes. For example, what is higher: the public interest or the individual? Is everything permitted (in the absence of a prohibition) not only from the legal but also the moral viewpoint? What are the initial prerequisites and axioms of communist morality and what is their correlation with universal human morality? These are only a few of the questions reduced to a single "center of gravity," the problem of the correlation among universal, class, national, group and individual values. This problem is not simple. It affects ethics and psychology, domestic and foreign policy, human rights and social priorities.

Scientific work on said problem, as one may see, is the direct extension of the type of humanistic trend focused on man, in the broadest possible meaning of the term,

the **social man**. Hence we have the problems of democracy, social activeness of the individual, his status in society, his protection and social justice. We see socialism as a system of true and real humanism in which man is truly the "measure of all things," as was said at the 19th Party Conference. The reform of the political system in the country makes sense precisely on this level: it is being done to enhance man as a political activist and a citizen.

It would also be pertinent to mention that many concepts in the field of historical science have been revived. Even from the strictly pragmatic viewpoint, it is obvious that the reform of the political system will not be effective unless we are able, on the basis of our historical experience, realistically to imagine the path which will be followed by the Soviet state, the Communist Party and the entire socialist society in its further development, and the changes in its economic, social, political and spiritual life. However, scientifically no work has been done on such developments; a great deal of our history had been falsified and distorted. Yet we must not only become familiar with the real events of the past but also visualize the comprehensive and most complex mechanisms through which the past influences the present: predict what expects us in the future and what should be the overall strategy of development of socialism.

On this level, we need the fastest possible development of Marxist political science, an area which in our country, until recently, was not considered a science to begin with. It was only through the efforts of a few enthusiasts that a few years ago this scientific trend started its revival. Basic research in political science is needed for the study of nature and the structure of power, the analysis of decision making mechanisms, and the formulation of a variety of models of correlation between political and social forces which exist in contemporary socialist society. The obvious lagging of political science behind world standards is seriously hindering the solution of practical-political problems; in its theoretical aspect, this greatly impoverishes our concepts of the functioning of society. The reform of the political system updates the political problems and requires the development of scientific research and a substantial expansion in the training of specialist cadres in this area.

The study of the law as well requires a revision of the old dogmas. The establishment of a socialist state of law presumes the acknowledgment and systematic assertion of the supremacy of the law, the reciprocal responsibility of the state and its citizens, the equality of everyone in the eyes of the law, the independence of the courts, the presumption of innocence and the implementation of a number of other principles which reflect the general democratic gains of human civilization. Freedom and responsibility, democracy and power, persuasion and coercion, permission and prohibition and the interests of the state and the rights of the individual are merely part of the problems which require a profound scientific analysis, a new vision and a broad social discussion.



The new political thinking opened the road to radical practical changes in foreign policy and improved the international climate. Suffice it to note such essential conceptual changes as abandoning the "image of the enemy," or the vision of the world as consisting of two conflicting forces; the acknowledgment not only of the inevitability but of the usefulness of interaction among different social systems within the framework of a single civilization; reliance on the internationalization of inter-governmental relations, including the broader utilization, for the purpose of common interests, of institutions such as the United Nations and the World Court. Various forms of international cooperation and dialogue are being developed, based on reciprocal trust and respect, and the humanizing and democratization of international relations. This was convincingly confirmed by the Vienna meeting of representatives of participants in the Conference On Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The new political and moral values lay an ideological foundation for perestroika in our country. They are also, and to a no lesser extent, factors in domestic policy. Furthermore, openness and glasnost in foreign policy are even the consequence of similar phenomena within the country. Also, the rejection of the "image of the enemy" is directly coordinated with the elimination of the former suspicion and practice of "labeling."

Change in the "ideology of social science" or, one could say in the philosophy of domestic and international life, is a fundamental task. It has many aspects and is refracted differently in the individual sciences. Its most immediate practical result should also be reflected in the political, socioeconomic and legal decisions which must be made during the second stage of the reform. What are the main trends in their implementation? They are several.

The further democratization of the work of soviets on all levels, and upgrading the role of social organizations and agencies of social activity are matters of prime importance. We must formulate an extensive system of steps for the exercise by the soviets on all levels of their rights and opportunities in solving all problems of local life. Many of them will be reflected in the draft law on local self-management and the local economy. The 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet called for drafting and adopting a provisional regulation on the presidiums and chairmen of local soviets and for taking other steps needed for independent and initiative-minded work under the new conditions, by the permanent commissions of the soviets, the groups of deputies, the people's deputies and the executive committees.

The problems of the further development of the Soviet Federation, the streamlining of relations among nationalities on a democratic basis, and the revival and intensification of the Leninist principles will be extensively discussed during the second stage of the political reform. It is a question of a clear decentralization in their

reciprocal relations and establishing harmonious relations among nationalities. Closely related to this is the draft project of general principles for restructuring economic management and the social area in Union republics on the basis of self-management and self-financing. It is a question of establishing a qualitatively new mechanism for territorial management, which would organically combine the interests of each republic with those of the country and its needs.

The shaping of a socialist state of law at the forthcoming stage in the reform means the creation of reliable mechanisms for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the citizens and ensuring that everyone fulfill his obligations and responsibilities to society. This presumes the creation of political and legal guarantees for glasnost, the efficient functioning of mass information media and the increased participation of all population strata in governmental decision-making. Correspondingly, draft bills must be prepared for all such problems and for the reorganization of the judicial and prosecutorial system, the investigative machinery and the corrective labor establishments. A draft Foundations of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics has already been submitted to nationwide discussion. It is based on the principles of legality, democracy and inevitability of responsibility and equality of citizens in the eyes of the law, justice, humanism and respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual.

Understandably, the efficiency of the second stage of the reform of the political system will be determined not by the number of new laws or their names, but by their essence, aim and practical implementation. They must be drafted in a profoundly democratic spirit. It is precisely at this point that we must update concepts and introduce fresh scientific ideas and views. It is also obvious that the democratization of the content of the laws largely depends on the extent to which the procedure for their drafting, discussion and adoption will be democratic. The first stage in the political reform provides the necessary prerequisites to this effect: a permanently functioning Supreme Soviet, a new electoral system, constitutional supervision, and accountability of executive authorities to the people.

The new political thinking encompasses domestic law. It presumes that legislative standards must be drafted and coordinated and, in many cases, redrafted in the light of international-legal principles and standards developed by progressive mankind and found in resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations and in international conventions, treaties and agreements to which our country is a signatory. In this area as well there are a number of new features. Let us note, for example, that in the draft Foundations of Criminal Legislation which we mentioned it is stipulated that (Article 1) "criminal legislation of the USSR and Union republics must be made consistent with the stipulations of the international treaties signed by the USSR." The draft law on invention activities in the USSR, which is also being

offered for nationwide discussion states even more categorically (Article 63) that "if rules set by the USSR in the areas of inventions differ from those of international treaties, the rules of the international treaties shall prevail." These stipulations clearly indicate the priority of general agreements achieved by all or several countries, compared to the local rules of a separate country. Such general agreements, adopted voluntarily and without discrimination and coercion, do not harm in the least the interests of the sides; conversely, they contribute to the satisfaction of such interests through reciprocally coordinated efforts.

### III

The tasks which face the social scientists require a certain perestroika in what one could describe as the "technology" of scientific research.

Obviously, any study must begin with a knowledge of the object, i.e., essentially with obtaining the necessary information. In the social sciences this is a very specific stage. To begin with, the facts which are studied by the social scientists are initially obtained, as a rule, not by themselves: the main sources of information of interest to them are governmental and departmental statistics, public opinion, official documents, and the press. Second, such information, even prior to a comprehensive and objective study, may already be (and usually is) interpreted by someone such as, for example, the mass information media. Third, most of the thus obtained information on social phenomena and processes is of shorter duration, in the sense that life change rapidly and existing concepts regarding the economic, social and political situation become obsolete not in a matter of days but hours. Such difficulties can be surmounted through contemporary developments in the methodology and method of scientific research which, in sociology for instance, have become quite advanced. However, a great deal of organizational lack of coordination and obstacles exists which, for the time being, are preventing us from achieving reliable scientific results in the social sciences.

The first difficult step is to obtain objective information. It is hardly necessary to repeat that a substantial array of governmental and departmental statistics remains inaccessible to the social scientists. This was pointed out by 82.4 percent of scientific associates in a survey conducted among the scientists of five Moscow social science institutes in the summer of 1988. Let us quote a single example. The resolution of the 19th Party Conference "On Glasnost" stipulates that "we must systematically publish... statistical information on the condition of criminality and measures for its prevention." Obviously, the resolutions of the conference must be obeyed. Therefore, the collection "*Sotsialnoye Razvitiye SSSR*" [Social Development of the USSR] (Moscow, 1988) came out, in which two pages (out of 264) deal with the condition and dynamics of criminality. Not very many

figures were included, and most of them were not provided in absolute indicators but as percentages compared to the 2 previous years (data of which were not published). Try then to understand what is the real situation with crime in the country! And that is being done at a time when draft bills are being submitted for nationwide discussion, precisely aimed at the struggle against this antisocial phenomenon.

For comparison's sake let us say that collections on criminal statistics, which were published in the country until the end of the 1920s, contained a detailed analysis of all the necessary information. The last statistical collections we know on crime in the United States is a thick volume of 450 pages.

Difficulties in obtaining full and objective social information, encountered by the Moscow institutes, are substantially great in the case of scientists in Union republics. They have no direct access to prime sources, which are in Moscow; they receive books and other publications with delays. Accessibility of foreign publications is extremely low. Furthermore, the publishing facilities for social scientists in Union republics are exceptionally weak.

The gap in governmental statistics and other official information could be filled with the help of social sociological studies. In order to make a profound and objective study of the society in which we live we must, in particular, conduct regular surveys among various population groups and strata. However, the network of interviewers for the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion On Socioeconomic Problems of the AUCCTU and the USSR State Committee for Labor (headed by Academician T.I. Zaslavskaya) has still not been developed, although both scientific programs are available, specialists have been trained, and there even is the necessary equipment. Alas, there is a small hindrance: there are no premises, as a result of which the entire work is at a standstill....

Naturally, it would be erroneous to explain shortcomings in the social sciences merely as a result of the scant amount of basic information or organizational difficulties. Many of our weaknesses are based on the superficial study of already obtained facts, hasty summations and conclusions not founded on the consideration of all variants and alternatives, particularly those of a forecasting nature. Single-mindedness, simplification and, occasionally, naivete in judgments are the result of dogmatism and scholasticism and the underdevelopment of so-called middle-level theories, as well as the lack of open and creative discussions, arguments, "brainstorming," "business games" and other methodical ways and means, which are quite commonplace in global practices. The ways to surmount such shortcomings are familiar: encouraging the freedom of creativity, upgrading exigency concerning end results, and supporting new and progressive ideas.

The democratization of relations among scientists is particularly important. This applies to management (and self-management) in scientific collectives, the creation of an atmosphere of openness, respect for the ideas and suggestions made by others and the existence of a variety of scientific schools and trends. In this case it would be also useful to rely on global experience and, particularly, to take into consideration the recommendations of UNESCO on the status of the scientific worker and his role in contemporary society.

The final link in the "technological process" is the implementation of conclusions and recommendations reached by the individual scientist or the scientific collective. In this area the situation is improving sluggishly.

Usually analytical reports and recommendations on economic, sociopolitical, legal and psychological problems, drafted by scientific collectives on the basis of their studies, are sent to party and soviet agencies, ministries and departments. Essentially, none of these institutions is responsible in the least for the study of the suggestions made by science, not putting them to practical social use. The process of application, generally speaking, is limited to publishing books and articles and drafting VUZ programs by philosophers, historians and literary workers.

This method is extremely inefficient. We need a precise, a legally established mechanism for the discussion, evaluation and application of scientific recommendations in the areas of economics, politics, law and social life, and for the renovation of socialism. This includes the implementation of the political reform, which is not a matter of personal interest of an enthusiastic scientist or creative scientific collective but something affecting all of us. How can the success of perestroika be secured if we ignore the opinion of specialists and their advice, forecasts, doubts and suggestions!

We must point out that today, at the second stage of the reform in the political system, greater possibilities appear for strengthening the ties between science and political practice. Two circumstances should be particularly emphasized.

First of all, recently the CPSU Central Committee set up commissions on basic trends in domestic and foreign policy. They should become the binding link among scientists and political leaderships and store all useful ideas and suggestions provided by science and social thought for the purpose of making major economic, social, domestic and foreign political decisions.

The second is the new Supreme Soviet, which will be open to expressing the views and interests of all population strata, including those of the scientific workers. The possibility of electing deputies by the social organization significantly upgrades their role in the formulation of

draft laws and other governmental decisions. This is further assisted by the right granted the USSR Academy of Sciences to initiate legislation.

Already at the first stage in its existence, the political reform substantially enhanced the work of scientific institutions in the humanities. The survey to which we referred proved that the majority of social scientists show a noticeable unity of views on the state of the social sciences and the ways to restructure them. These ways are significantly linked to the continuation and intensification of the processes of democratization, glasnost and humanizing of our society. This brings to light the close reciprocal tie among political trends noted in the country and the contemporary development of social science. The political reform will be optimal and effective only if it is implemented on the basis of objective data of scientific theory. At the same time, it is precisely the political reform and, above all, the democratization of all aspects of our life, that create conditions and incentives for eliminating stagnation in theoretical thinking and trigger the need and necessity for the further development of the social sciences.

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#### **The Army: Discussion of Vital Issues**

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[Interview with Army General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy]

[Text] One year has passed since the publication of the roundtable materials on army life in the journals *KOMMUNIST* and *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* (see *KOMMUNIST* No 3, 1988). This was a year saturated with events and difficult and stressed efforts for the intensification of perestroika. What were the salient points during this dynamic time for the Soviet Armed Forces?

The editors' questions are answered by Army General A.D. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

[Editors] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, our Armed Forces have a heroic history. What is the dialectics of continuity and new development, traditions and a creative search in securing the country's defense, and how is it expressed?

[Lizichev] In the year which has passed since the *KOMMUNIST* roundtable I have had the occasion to visit a number of garrisons, including some in most remote areas. Hundreds of meetings and talks were held. They were interesting and meaningful. The people remember everything, and judge everything on the basis of high moral standards. It is particularly gratifying that the present generation of defenders of the homeland are well



acquainted with the "genealogy," and carefully preserve the memory of the heroes of Pskov, Narva, Khasan, Khalkhin-Gol, Stalingrad and the battles of Kursk, Königsberg and Berlin, as well as the legendary military leaders Frunze and Zhukov, the tragic losses in the Great Patriotic War and the total joy of the long-awaited victory.

Another inspiring fact is that to the modern soldier and officer our military history not only means honoring the past. It is also a powerful incentive for accomplishments today. It is said that the gates to the future are not opened with a single key but with many, turned at the same time. History is, probably, a passkey. In the Army and the Navy, in the academies and the schools, on the basis of acquired experience, our people are persistently learning the difficult military science.

The work in the Army and Navy is focused on strengthening the combat and mobilization readiness of the Army and the Navy and upgrading their standards of organization and discipline. Under circumstances in which, in accordance with the new political thinking, a turn is being made from the practice of super armament to the principle of sensible defense sufficiency, and when the USSR is unilaterally reducing the size of its Armed Forces by 500,000 men, we are trying to instill a new meaning in our old but right rule, to learn how to act not on the basis of numbers but skill. This is still a restless world. Of late, the trend toward disarmament, even after receiving a very strong impetus, has still not become irreversible. The movement toward a nuclear-free world is also encountering opposition. The legacy and inertia of the past have not been eliminated. Profound contradictions and the roots of many conflicts remain. We shall support the country's defense capability on the level of sensible and reliable sufficiency, so that no one would be tempted to encroach on the security of the USSR and its allies.

[Editors] In your view, what is the status of the Armed Forces in society?

[Lizichev] A general answer to this question may be found in Articles 31 and 32 of the USSR Constitution. The Armed Forces are one of the most important instruments of Soviet governmental power. They were created for the defense of the socialist gains and the peaceful toil of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country. That is the purpose of universal military service. The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is reliably to defend the socialist fatherland and to be in a state of constant combat readiness. In accordance with the Constitution, the state ensures the safety and defense capability of the country and supplies the Armed Forces with everything they need.

The problem has its internal aspect as well: the function of the army as a school for developing civic responsibility, courage, idea-mindedness, patriotism and physical

training. As was emphasized at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, service in the Armed Forces must also become a real school of internationalism.

Let us also note the following aspect: in addition to their direct duty, which is round-the-clock combat watch, and intensive combat training, as the most mobile and disciplined instrument of the state, all services, the Armed Forces, also must deal with unexpectedly arising tasks, sometimes under extreme circumstances. Let us recall Chernobyl, the railroad accidents and the tremendous hardship which befell on Armenia.... In all of these cases the army was the first to help. The troops are constantly involved in the implementation of major national economic programs, in harvesting the crops, and so on.

[Editors] The publication of the roundtable materials met with a broad response by the readers. The people would like to know the way in which perestroika in the army is taking place in practical terms. What changes have been made in the Armed Forces over the past year?

[Lizichev] The main idea of perestroika in the Army and Navy was formulated quite meaningfully in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference: the efficiency of Soviet military building must be determined primarily in terms of quality parameters, in terms of equipment, military science and the Armed Forces personnel.

Extensive work has been done to observe the stipulations of military doctrine in defense building and in improving the Army and Navy. Programs for the development of weapons and ordnance have been reviewed and refined. At the same time, major organizational steps are being taken. A study was made of an experimental structure for motorized infantry and tank divisions which, after a substantial removal of tanks, become simply defensive. The readers know that our Armed Forces will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft.

Steps were taken to upgrade the reliability and quality of performing military obligations and combat service in PVO, RVSN, the Air Force and the land forces. The entire office corps admitted to combat duty was recertified.

Deadlines were set for the organized withdrawal of 50 percent of the troops from the limited contingent in Afghanistan. By the time that the readers of KOMMUNIST will be reading this interview, the second stage of the withdrawal of those forces should be completed. This is the implementation of a new political thinking in action.

We are completing the redrafting of all statutory documents, above all general military regulations, which include new stipulations based on the defensive nature



of our military doctrine, acquired experience and facts related to the development of glasnost and democracy under the conditions of the Armed Forces.

Party political work as well is acquiring new features. At the past party conferences, for the first time in the entire history of the armed forces, the activities of the political organs were rated, as is being done at rayon and oblast party conferences. Currently all commanders and deputy political officers, regardless of official position, are made answerable to the primary party organization. The accountability and election campaign indicated the increased exigency toward party members in the Armed Forces. Let me cite a typical case: the recently adopted resolutions name more than 50,000 members of the CPSU toward whom the party organizations had some claims. This is higher by a factor of 15 compared to the accountability and election campaign on the eve of the 27th Party Congress. Consequently, exigency has become more specific and, therefore, more efficient. The party members expressed 320,000 critical remarks and suggestions.

Now we have somewhat fewer "excellent" units but also the number of "failed" units and subunits has been reduced significantly. Improved results in personnel training became apparent in the course of the exercises and final examinations in the Belorussian and Far Eastern military districts, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Central Group of Forces, the Northern and Black Sea fleets and many large units of the RVSN and the Air Force. A great deal is being done to enhance military science and to develop the troop control, support and equipment systems.

However, perestroika in the Army and Navy is not developing at the same pace everywhere. Instead, it shows omissions, shortcomings and contrasts. It has still not affected all areas of the Armed Forces and the command-political personnel of a number of large units, units and subunits. Some local commanders, political organs and staffs have not as yet clearly defined their own position in perestroika and have not determined how it should be implemented in their division, regiment or ship. There have also been cases of subjective evaluations of the state of affairs: low exigency, bureaucratic work methods, simplifications and weakening in combat training, gaps between words and actions, replacing specific organizational activities with assertions and conferences and ineffective investigations.

[Editors] Today two different approaches to the changes in the armed forces have developed in the social consciousness: the first presumes improving the existing system. The second is oriented toward changing the basic principles of army structure. In your view, what is preferable?

[Lizichev] Indeed, such opinions do exist. The press has published materials which speak of the allegedly pressing need to convert to structuring the army on the basis of

the militia-territorial principle; others have called for creating a professional army. We have also heard statements to the effect that each Union republic should feel free to have its own armed forces and national military formations.

It would be pertinent in this case to recall the following: as early as the summer of 1918, taking into consideration the objective circumstances accompanying the creation of the new socialist army in a multinational country, V.I. Lenin emphasized that we need a strictly international army which must be trained in a spirit of brotherhood among all working people.

In the more than 70 years of their existence, our Armed Forces tried the militia-territorial system, extraterritorial and international (mixed) staffing of the forces and national military formations within a unified army. Having tried all of this in practice, and frequently acting through the method of trial and error, the army began to be structured on the basis of the currently adopted system of military organization developed by the party. This system withstood the test of war. The enemy was strong and fierce. However, the army prevailed and won. This is the main argument in defense of the existing principles of military building.

Our army is international in terms of its origin and sociopolitical status. It was created for the defense of the revolutionary gains which embodied the interests of all nations and ethnic groups in the country. An army of the working class and its party, internationalist in its very essence, was established. Its purpose, means of staffing, specific nature of tasks and the defense of the interests of the federative state—a state of equal republics—determines the international nature of the Armed Forces. This is the second argument.

The third, the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress justifiably emphasized that "no single Soviet republic taken separately could consider itself protected from economic exhaustion and military defeat..." An impartial scientific analysis proves that to this day no single one of our republics could separately create and maintain a modern army, for it lacks the necessary economic and manpower potential to this effect.

The Soviet army is international in terms of its spiritual foundations. A single ideology, the interaction and interpenetration of cultures, the population's migrations throughout the territory of the country, the reciprocal enrichment of popular traditions, customs and family-marital relations and many other factors contribute to the internationalization of relations among members of the Armed Forces, making the army truly international.

Finally, our army must be precisely such also because, together with the armies of the fraternal countries, it is called upon to defend the gains of world socialism.

Socialism and peace are international phenomena and can be protected and preserved only through the joint efforts of the peoples. This cannot be ignored.

Improving the existing system of military building is a different matter. Tremendous work remains to be done in this area. The main thing here is to reject what has become obsolete and to show governmental concern for the more economical management of military affairs without harming the country's defense capability. The formulation of the concept for the development of the Armed Forces during the 13th 5-year period and in the more distant future was initiated in accordance with the principle of defense sufficiency.

[Editors] To what extent are the changes under way supported by science? Do we have today scientific support for the new quality parameters of defense building in terms of equipment, military science and composition of the Armed Forces?

[Lizichev] The primary task of scientific development was to substantiate the extent and sequence in the unilateral reduction of armaments carried out by the Soviet Union and the position of the Soviet side at the talks on reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe and the 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments, and steps to prevent the proliferation of weapons in outer space.

The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff formulated sufficiently clear concepts on the specific meaning of the term "quality parameters," as applicable to each of the areas of defense building listed in the documents of the 19th Party Conference: armaments and military equipment, military science and structure of the Armed Forces.

In terms of armaments and military equipment, the task is to ensure the transition from the "evolutionary" way of improving models of armaments (in the course of which in replacing a generation of any given weapon the plans call for no more than improving combat characteristics) to a qualitative status, with essentially new combat possibilities). This transition will be based on the more extensive use of the results of basic research and applied studies. This approach enables us to formulate new production technologies and ensures for our weapons a high level of reliability and technical perfection. At this stage it is important to enhance the activities of scientific research institutions in this area.

As to military science, it is a question of formulating new concepts of the art of war in accordance with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. In this case scientists working in the higher educational institutions and scientific research institutes of the Ministry of Defense are making a major contribution.

Quality improvements in the Armed Forces, from the viewpoint of their composition, are based on the formulation of an organizational structure which, with fewer economic outlays, would provide the required defense sufficiency. Scientific developments in this area make it possible to ensure the balanced development of the various arms and branches of the Armed Forces and to upgrade the quality of troop management.

The conversion to quality parameters in defense building involves intensive creative work. This is a lengthy and difficult process. The extent of scientific work in one area or another, in terms of quality changes, differs. As a whole, the conclusion may be drawn that today we have scientifically substantiated planned quality parameters in defense building.

[Editors] How is the drafting of the new documents on military service proceeding? Could you give us a preliminary idea of their nature?

[Lizichev] Changes in statutes, instructions and regulations, management, programs and courses for troop training influence the conditions of military service. Changes in its order will be forthcoming. It would be premature to discuss them in detail at this point. Initial outlines are not in themselves a legislative act. All I can tell you is that all of these documents take into consideration everything that is new, that is created in the course of perestroika and that is most consistent with the contemporary stage in the building and development of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the interests and expectations of the Soviet people.

[Editors] As you pointed out, the present of the Armed Forces is inseparable from its history. What is being done to intensify military historical research and to eliminate the "blank spots?"

[Lizichev] The "blank spots" in our military history could be explained by the desire to depict not the objective and full picture of past events but only the most successful ones. Particularly noticeable are elements of such a circumstantial approach in interpreting the history of the Great Patriotic War, when some events which were in some cases important and essential to the course and outcome of the war were reflected schematically or not even mentioned, while others which sometime were of no strategically decisive significance were excessively embellished and praised. Naturally, this does not diminish in any way the exploits of the soldiers which fought in those sectors of the front. Wherever it may be, war is war. However, history does not tolerate conjectures. In the final account, time puts everything in its proper place.

As to the immediate tasks facing military history science, its efforts are focused now on the study of problems, such as the possibilities which existed for the prevention of World War II and the efforts of the Soviet Union to create a system of collective security in the 1930s. The

first and most difficult period of the Patriotic War requires a deeper study. It is necessary to analyze the influence of the Stalinist repressions on the combat capability of the Red Army and on the course of the armed struggle. The public has also raised the question of determining the precise figure of the losses suffered by the Soviet people in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany—at the fronts, in the partisan detachments, in concentration camps, in fascist slavery and among the civilian population in occupied territory. This is a difficult problem and its solution, as work already under way indicates, will be extremely hard. However, this task must absolutely be carried out. This will enable us to invalidate a number of different interpretations which have been published in the press.

Based on the new political thinking, and rejecting the customary clichés and stereotypes, the military, political, economic and ideological processes which were taking place on the eve of and during the war must be studied. Exhaustive conclusions must be drawn from its harsh and cruel lessons, not only for the sake of the present but the future as well. History must help one and all to determine how to change a nuclear world, which carries the threat of a new war, into a safe, nuclear-free world, and a world twisted by violence, wars and conflicts into a nonviolent world; how, on the basis of political means but with the mandatory support of the Armed Forces on the level of defense sufficiency, not to come to the brink of military confrontation but also how to prevent the forces of militarism and aggression from prevailing. These are vitally important tasks facing our society, including the Soviet Armed Forces.

Work is currently under way on the 10-volume "*History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People*," and a second edition of the 8-volume "*Soviet Military Encyclopedia*" is being prepared. Despite a certain delay, our scientists and specialists have undertaken the study and summation of the experience of the Soviet forces in providing international aid to the people of Afghanistan. In this case it is important to avoid extremes, dogmatic conclusions and superficial recommendations.

[Editors] Let us now talk about questions which are relatively isolated but exceptionally painful, those which largely shape the attitude toward the army. The first among them is that of nonstatutory relations and, particularly, their most distorted manifestation—"old soldiers' privileges." Until recently it was considered an achievement, the fact that the existence of this phenomenon had been acknowledged and, having been acknowledged, had been condemned. What are currently the results of the efforts to abolish this "privilege? Have real successes been achieved in this matter?

[Lizichev] Nonstatutory relations are not a new phenomenon in the army. They were mentioned as early as the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Workers which took place in the summer of 1961. Unfortunately, we were unable to solve that problem either then or later. Rather

stiff measures were taken, including court martials. However, violations based on antistatutory relations continued. It would be probably right to say also that such "old soldiers' privileges" are a social phenomenon and, to a certain extent, are a reflection of the negative processes which intensified in society during the period of stagnation. In any case, young people entered army service, familiar both with the diktat of their seniors and illegalities or official arbitrariness.

The Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate formulated the question as follows: it is we, and only we—commanders and political workers—who are responsible for the "old soldiers' privilege" both to the people and to our own conscience.

Currently the situation in military collectives is changing for the better. The spiritual ties and interests linking soldiers, seamen and officers have become closer. The moral climate in the soldiers' barracks and seamen's quarters has become cleaner and the moral atmosphere has improved. In the period after 1985 the number of gross violations related to nonstatutory relations declined substantially. The number of military servicemen sentenced for such violations declined by one-half. Cases of "old soldiers' privileges" have virtually disappeared in most subunits. In a number of divisions as well no such violations have been committed. In 1988 alone in all the branches of the Armed Forces, the military districts and groups of forces and the Navy the number of gross disciplinary violations declined by 17 to 30 percent.

Here is an example: there was a time when the X Motorized Infantry Regiment of the Far Eastern Military District was literally feverish from occurrences of "old soldier's privileges." For the past 2 years, however, no such violations have occurred. Thanks to glasnost and the struggle against the "show-offs," against those who were unwilling to clean up their act and to the strict requirements set for commanders and political workers, the unification of the officer corps and reliance on public opinion. Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel R. Aushev, the regimental commander, and the party committee were able to turn the situation around and assume control over it. The regiment achieved excellent rating and ranked best in its district.

An end was also put to nonstatutory relations in the large military collectives headed by officers V. Dovzhenko, V. Yankov, V. Tereshchenko, V. Kozlov, A. Leontyev, V. Rodionov, and Ye. Melnikov. In short, today the struggle against such privileges is being actively waged in a number of areas. This process is intensifying. This is guaranteed by the entire present activities in the Armed Forces and party-political work in the Army and Navy, which carries an effective antidote against violations of discipline, the mentality of social dependency, and political and moral passiveness of the young people who are at the start of their army service. We demand of every commander, political worker and party and Komsomol



activist not to grumble or despair if something is not achieved at first but, surmounting difficulties and relying on public opinion in the military collectives, to persistently eliminate negative phenomena.

We also see it as our duty and obligation to enhance in every person wearing a military uniform his dignity, courage and honor. In order to achieve this, we try to encourage in the present members of the Army and Navy the aspiration to know and multiply combat traditions and to develop a feeling of comradeship. The ancients said that, above all, one must not lose one's self-respect. This is quite accurate. The task we have set ourselves is to teach every military serviceman to have self-respect.

However, we have not been able to eliminate nonstatutory relations entirely. We therefore take strictly to task commanders and political workers who fail to take decisive steps to block such distorted and shameful phenomena and fail to use available educational opportunities as well as their full power. We expel them from the party and the Komsomol. We also hold accountable the political authorities which have not properly mobilized in the struggle against this evil the party and Komsomol organizations and the Army and Navy public.

We must preserve and enhance respect for the army and the prestige of army service. The CPSU Central Committee has earmarked an efficient practical line for further work aimed at strengthening military discipline in the Army and Navy. It is our duty to implement it. It is said that persistence is the guarantee for success. We shall be persistent in surmounting negative phenomena. We shall be patient and consistent in our efforts to unite the military collectives and enhance their discipline on a qualitatively new standard, consistent with the requirements of perestroika.

[Editors] Another question, about officers. It is obvious that perestroika in the Armed Forces depends, above all, on the officer corps. Judging by our mail, the most difficult problems remain those of the discharge or promotion of officers, the elimination of favoritism and ensuring normal cultural and living conditions. How are such problems being solved?

[Lizichev] In undertaking perestroika in the Army and Navy, we realized that it would be hardly possible to expect any particular changes without radical improvements in all cadre work. In short, we had to begin with the people, above all with officer cadres and with restructuring their way of thinking, mentality and work style and methods. A profound study was necessary of the condition of our cadre potential. We needed to upgrade the level of its political awareness, overall standards and professional competence. However, this was not enough.

We had to eliminate from cadre work favoritism, lateness for work and subservience and establish Leninist principle-mindedness, social justice and honesty as the main features governing relations between superiors and subordinates.

Under the Soviet system a powerful and skilled cadre potential was developed in the Army and Navy. It plays a primary role in maintaining the combat readiness and combat capability of the Army and Navy at the proper level, and in shaping the political and moral features of the personnel. All quality indicators of the Soviet corps have improved in recent years. Judge for yourselves: today 81.8 percent of all officers have higher education and 76 percent are party members or candidate members. Our officer corps is young: 83 percent of officers are under 40.

However, something else is known as well. The influx of new leading cadres has diminished and many generals and officers have served out their time in the upper echelons of military command. Here and there we see stagnation in cadres while elsewhere, conversely, they are being frequently replaced, particularly on the level of company, battalion and regimental commanders. Cases of favoritism have become more frequent. Some important sectors were headed by leaders who did not ensure the implementation of assignments. There also were those who had neglected their work and failed to cope with their service obligations but knew, as the saying goes, to throw sand in the eyes of others and there were those who served only in the large cultural centers in the country while others only in the most remote garrisons. Cases of abuse of official position on the part of officials were also noted.

Painstaking and persistent work had to be done to ensure perestroika in the officer corps. We charted a course of supporting officers, generals and admirals who were initiative-minded, thinking and energetic and were able to achieve success. We try to create in each military collective and party organization an atmosphere of intolerance of shortcomings, routine, indifference and passiveness and, above all, to restore comprehensively the pure and honest image of the military leader-party member.

The process of cadre restructuring is difficult and, sometimes, painful. It affects the lives of people. Here justice must be the only standard in specific actions.

Major personnel decisions were made on the level of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate. We parted in good terms with those who had served the length of time stipulated in the USSR Law on Universal Military Service. Proper warnings were issued to others and others again were transferred. Permanent certification commissions were set up in all military formations, units and establishments, which solve democratically problems related to promotions and transfers of or awards to cadres. A wide range of measures has been

contemplated, aimed at strengthening the cadre potential and its timely reinforcement with fresh forces, improving the training and use of specialists, and perfecting the system for upgrading the skills of leading cadres. Radical changes are also being made within the military school system.

Therefore, we are seeking new approaches and methods of work with officer cadres. To a certain extent we have been able to formulate a purposeful program in this area. It is based on concentrating on the individual approach in working with officers. This enables us, on the one hand, to make their upbringing and training maximally specific and, on the other, to have a personal evaluation of everyone, based on the end results he has achieved in his assigned sector.

However, many distortions are taking place in this area. We still come across in our life of cases of gross pressure, and unwillingness or inability to organize properly the service and the leisure time. Lack of human attention, the extreme gravity of the housing problem and the frequent service transfers and, with them, the problem of the school attendance of children and many other features in the organization of officer life affect the officers' mood. We are concerned by reports submitted by young officers concerning their unwillingness to serve in the Army and Navy.

Currently the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the Main Political Directorate are actively dealing with these problems. Democratic guarantees are being formulated, which could prevent abuses of power. In particular, work is nearly complete on the new Regulation on the Service of Officers, the Officer Meeting and the Court of Honor. This year the officer corps will be subject to certification. This is considered particularly important in view of the forthcoming reduction in the Armed Forces. We must do everything possible to approach all cadre transfers and the discharge of some officers in a considered and objective manner, guided above all by the interests of the country's defense and the principles of social justice.

[Editors] The political organs have always been the most important link in the Soviet Armed Forces. What type of political workers do we have today, and how are the Army and Navy party members participating in the renovation processes?

[Lizichev] To a certain extent I have already answered this question, for all perestroika processes in the Army and Navy are headed by party members. Today the Armed Forces have a huge party potential. The share of party members in them is close to 20 percent. In our entire postwar history there has never been such a powerful party nucleus in our country.

In discussing the qualities of the professional party worker, Lenin invariably singled out boundless loyalty to the cause of the revolution, closest possible ties with the masses, competence, the ability to deal with people and the art to organize. All of this fully applies to today's political workers.

Such, for example, is Major General A. Zakharov, the last chief political officer of our forces in Afghanistan. His firmness was one of a special kind. It was a blend of powerful spiritual energy with a winning moral maximalism in which one can always sense and see the noble cast of the scrupulousness of the commissar. To him party political work is not merely service obligation but a lifetime vocation to which he has entirely dedicated himself. Within the shortest possible time Zakharov was able to enhance the standard of party-political work within the limited contingent of forces and, together with Army Commander Lieutenant General B. Gromov, to do everything possible for each combat operation to be effective and with minimal casualties, and ideologically and organizationally to ensure the successful withdrawal of the troops from the territory of friendly Afghanistan. Zakharov was always among the troops: he met with people, addressed big and small audiences under open skies, in helicopters and armored troop carriers, in staff tents, in mountains, dugouts and trenches, every single day.

We have trained and tempered highly educated, skilled political cadres, loyal to the party. The veterans respect them for their experience and warmth. The young see in them elder comrades who are attentive like fathers, who are strict and responsive. They go to them for advice and share with them their most intimate thoughts.

The political workers have a great deal of assignments. Perestroika faces them with ever new problems which require quick decisions. By no means is everything taking place smoothly and efficiently always and with all of them. There are plenty of problems. However, the main thing here is not to become confused and always to find a way to establish spiritual contact with the people, to be able to hear them out, make decisions and give prompt assistance. Today the political worker operates in a complex ideological situation. However, this should only add to his ability to engage in a competent dialogue with the people, to persuade them with arguments and facts, to provide mature political comments to the personnel, to make the truth clear to them without ignoring a single question or doubt.

Frequently both political workers and commanders describe our party members as leaders. They are the leading party collectives. This imposes a great deal of obligations, for the chain begins with the leader, with the first line.

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**Why Are Costs and Prices in Agriculture Rising?**  
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[Article by Ivan Illarionovich Lukinov, academician,  
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[Text] The gravity of the food problem and the population's real income, on the one hand, and the price level and price setting mechanism, and the dynamics of production costs, on the other, are in a complex correlation. This requires a sober and convincing analysis, the results of which may differ from subjective wishes. Thus, from the viewpoint of the consumer, it would be best to lower or, perhaps, maintain the stability of food retail prices. However, during the first postwar decade the "wise Stalinist policy" of reducing prices was applied at the expense of virtually free requisitioning of products from sovkhozes and kolkhozes, which thus found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. The peasants received virtually nothing for their work in the public farm and, given the unbearable taxes imposed on their personal auxiliary farms, were forced to leave the countryside. From producers they turned into consumers of food-stuffs. There was no compensation for the draining of labor resources through intensive factors. The scarcity on the food market became increasingly bad. To this day we are experiencing the fatal consequences of such "wisdom." Today as well the solution of the food problem is largely based on the unsolved problems of price equivalency and the economic incentives of the working people to produce more, at a lower cost and better.

The problem of prices is by no means reduced to raising or lowering commodity prices. It is question of radically reviewing the entire price system on a balanced basis. We must radically improve the price mechanism itself, making it more flexible and adaptable to the fast changes in the economic situation. We must anticipate with suitable clarity the immediate and more distant consequences of the price reform and carry it out not blindly, as has frequently been the case in the past. This requires comprehensive and considered computations of alternatives in terms of the dynamics of prices of individual commodities in their overall interaction.

The focal point of attention must be the forecast of the direction in which the prices will begin to change after the implementation of the price reform: Will there be a price stabilization, shall we enter into the latest spiral of rising prices or, finally, shall we be able to achieve their real reduction on a healthy economic base? In this case everything depends on the speed with which we shall be able to surmount stagnation phenomena and achieve radical changes in resource conservation and returns, and truly revive post-reform economic life. Arbitrary methods for lowering or keeping unchanged previously lowered prices are no longer suitable. On the other hand, general assertions about the inadmissibility of lowering the living standard of the population, not to mention the need for its steady growth, are insufficient. They must be

set on a firm economic foundation, the main support of which must be a real increase in the national per capita income and the volume and structural balance between production and consumer demand.

In this case it is a question both of developing anti-outlay incentives and motivations as well as finding financial and technical means of developing resource-conserving technologies. We need a broad restructuring of operating and creating new production facilities on a contemporary scientific and technical level. This process must cover by no means individual enterprises or groups of enterprises but entire sectors, from the extraction of raw materials and fuels to the production of finished consumer goods, i.e., it must apply to the entire cycle of the public economic turnover. This applies, above all, to the APK. At the same time, we need more radical changes in the sectorial structure and means of ensuring its flexible balance. For the time being, it continues to be absolutely rigid, taking shape under the pressure of stereotypes of equidimensional planned increases without the necessary economic maneuverability and flexibility relative to changing consumer demand.

Presently we lack adequate reliable data which would make it possible to gain an accurate idea of future price dynamics. The long-range computations we made indicate that the trend of price increases will remain. However, this forecast is based on trends which have been developing over the past quarter of a century. They provide no grounds for optimism. The entire hope is that perestroika will bring about a turn in economic interests and acceleration of scientific and technical progress in resource conservation and quality improvements. Unless this takes place our forecast will prove accurate and therefore the situation will become worse than expected.

One of the most important reasons for a great deal of confusion is the simplistic understanding of the origin of prices. Existing prices are conceived as something given and not as the result of all previous economic development and, above all, the processes of the shaping and dynamics of value, production cost, price and profitability.

Prices are the most sensitive nerve fibers of socioeconomic life. By reflecting the profound value changes, price changes express contradictions in the economic interests between producers and consumers but also, partially, help them to agree. All producers are interested in selling their goods at a higher price. However, as a consumer the producer becomes interested in purchasing at a lower cost. It is the conflict between such interests that determines the level of economic stability and intensiveness of reproduction.

The new economic management principles and the expansion of the arsenal of instruments which affect various types of unstable prices radically change the overall price situation as well. Its precise evaluation and



determination of factors and formation and implementation of efficient steps for their elimination become particularly important. The period of stagnation was characterized by a faster pace of printing money without proper commodity backing. This became the most important reason for the overall increase in prices and the violation of price parities in related areas.

Our studies of long-term dynamics of costs and production outlays and of wholesale and purchase prices and profitability of various types of items in an entire range of interrelated sectors, from the fuel-raw material area to the production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, revealed the steady increase in cost indicators with different changes in profitability shown in different sectors, areas and groups of enterprises.

The effect of price-increasing factors spread over the essentially entire economy between 1965 and 1987. According to our computations, the cost of petroleum extraction increased within that time by a factor of 5.3-7.5, while actual wholesale prices increased, respectively, by a factor of 5.8 and 7.6. The cost of extraction of iron ore increased by a factor of 2.3; of manganese, 2.2; and chromium 7.2, while respective wholesale price increases rose, respectively, by a factor of 3.6, 3.5 and 6.4. To a greater or lesser extent, the outlay mechanism was characteristic of the entire extracting area, although natural conditions did not by any means worsen in all sectors. What was felt above all was the lack of economic interest on the part of labor collectives in lowering costs. Even production costs per ton of sand for construction increased by a factor of 2.4 while prices rose by a factor of 2.5! Within the period under study we failed to find a single extracting sector in which there had been no price increases.

A trend toward higher prices in the course of technical retooling of enterprises also assumed a stable nature. Scientific and technical progress, in its departmental management aspect, not only did not turn into a cost-reducing factor but, conversely, became a structural unit of the outlay mechanism.

Characteristically, in most types of resources in which prices rose, the growth of wholesale prices outstripped the pace of increases in production costs, thus leading to increased cost accounting income for the producers. This increases the cost of all subsequent stages in the processing and reprocessing of raw material resources. The belief that the finished product, particularly in agriculture and the light and food industries, becomes more costly as a result of the inefficient work in these sectors alone, while in all preceding stages things are doing well, is totally groundless. This conceals the true sources and factors for price increases, occasionally leading to confusing cause with effect. The growth of costs and prices of consumer goods and services produced in the final stages of the overall economic circulation is determined

primarily by the higher cost of processes occurring during the preceding stages, in the course of which, unquestionably, there is a ubiquitous lack of anti-outlay measures.

Now, when full cost accounting leads the consumer actively to influence the producer and to demand of him to supply the market with high quality and inexpensive goods, the situation should change for the better. The aspiration to compensate the trend toward higher raw material costs by increasing output prices conflicts, in the final account, with the economic interests of the producers themselves. All of them find themselves in a kind of "magic circle" in which they show greater profit in their sales and losses in their purchases.

By following the entire chain of public production we can easily determine the behavior of changing cost and price indicators of processed goods. Thus, the cost of electric power increased by a factor of 1.5; the cost of thermal power more than doubled and that of pig iron increased by a factor of 2.7; of steel, by a factor of 3.5 and kerosene by a factor of 3.2.

Equally affected are goods produced by the machine-building industry. Here the cost increases in terms of units of output and of efficiency. This holds back increased efficiency as a result of the technical updating of production facilities. For example, in ferrous metallurgy and petroleum refining in the Ukraine, the share of physically obsolete equipment has reached 55 percent. Every year industry writes off only 4 but installs about 8 percent of the active share of production assets, i.e., more than one-half of such assets increase capacities which find themselves not entirely backed by raw materials and manpower. Reconstruction and modernization based on higher costs and use of imperfect technology, in turn, turn out to be undereffective.

The increased production costs and prices of agricultural commodities are based essentially on the higher prices of purchased means of production. In 1965 the country's kolkhozes spend 39 kopeks per ruble of gross output; the figure rose to 84 kopeks in 1987, i.e., production costs increased by a factor of 2.15. Purchase prices, which were under stricter governmental control, increased substantially less. As a result, by 1983 farm profitability found itself reduced to zero. In order to provide kolkhozes and sovkhozes with the possibility of internal accumulations, a new round of purchase prices increases, which became a heavy burden on the financial system, had to be initiated. However, a trend toward reduced profitability reappeared, caused by nonequivalent trade. Most accumulations and investments in the farms are used to compensate for the outflow of manpower from the countryside and, in areas where arable land is scarce, for land. A relatively small share of investments goes into accelerating the pace of development and the updating of the farms. Low crops and livestock productivity, with higher outlays, increase production costs. The cost per unit of output has not accelerated by an iota the pace



of increased costs in said industrial sectors. Therefore, the root of the problem of subsidies in agriculture goes deeper than is frequently believed. Such subsidies follow the entire chain of related sectors and only end in agriculture.

For the time being, we see no signs that radical changes will take place in the future. The concept of the price reform, as drafted by the USSR State Committee for Prices, presumes another round of increases in wholesale prices, particularly those of fuel-raw material and energy resources and construction materials. As of 1 January 1990 wholesale prices will increase by a factor of 1.9 for coal, 2 for natural gas, 2.2 for crude oil and 2.3 for petroleum and diesel fuel. The rates for electric and thermal power will increase, respectively, by 40-45 and 60-65 percent. This seems to be an essentially right orientation of the consumers toward energy conservation and toward bringing our wholesale prices closer to those on the world market. At the same time, wholesale prices of ferrous and nonferrous metals will be increased by 35 percent; of round timber, by 60-65 percent; and of construction materials, by 25-30 percent. Rates for haulage by rail and river will increase by 30-35 percent; by truck, by 20-25 percent; and by sea, by 35-40 percent. This means that price changes will not be selective in the least. Essentially, it will be a reproduction of the same old trends of comprehensive price changes which have occurred over the past 20 years. Yet, with the exception of the coal industry, a sufficiently high cost accounting profitability has been achieved in the extracting sectors.

The overall level of prices of goods produced by the machine-building industry will be retained although, unquestionably, that industry has great possibilities of lowering resource-intensiveness. However, even such stability is unlikely given such an increase in prices of basic components.

Therefore, the adopted concept of the price reform is aimed at drastically increasing the prices of initial resources and does not promise any reduction of costs down all subsequent links in the chain. It is more likely that it will drag the entire chain toward higher prices with it.

The existing price system is inconsistent with the principles of full cost accounting. Cost accounting relations are, once again, being subjected to the administrative methods of direct distribution. Now, however, this is accomplished in a new way, through the differentiated rates of arbitrary appropriation and equalizing redistribution of financial resources. Underprofitable and losing sectors coexist along with highly profitable ones, not to mention the existence of a substantial differentiation among the levels of profitability of various groups of enterprises and parts of the country. The aspiration of department managers to intensify at all cost the "gross output" and to compensate for unsolved production and

circulation problems by increasing prices and nonfulfillment of cash plans, leads to the printing of money and depreciation of the ruble. This violates the effect of price and financial-credit instruments.

It is impossible to correct distortions, which took decades to accumulate, merely by increasing prices. Comprehensive steps must be taken to lower production costs at each enterprise. This is related to the reorganization of the system of economic relations, making the working people the real owners of socialist production facilities and converting the latter to cost accounting and leasing. A declining trend in the dynamics of costs and production outlays and prices can and must be achieved on a firm economic basis.

As our computations and initial experience indicate, in order for enterprises to work on the basis of self-financing, their level of profitability (the correlation between profit and fixed and working assets) should be no less than 15 percent. Yet, the actual level of profitability in 1987 was 12.6 percent for industrial enterprises and 6.4 percent for kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

A characteristic paradox appears in the case of under-profitable (not to mention losing) enterprises: in order drastically to improve the efficiency of economic management and lower resource-intensiveness and production costs, they must be immediately converted to full cost accounting. However, in order actually to accomplish this, corresponding initial prerequisites are needed, above all a normal level of return on production resources and current outlays. Therefore, the economic methods applied in managing groups of sectors and enterprises should be flexible and chosen on the basis of their economic and technological standards. It is necessary, particularly during the initial periods of converting to self-support, to proceed from specifically developing situations by formulating and implementing, in each specific case, a set of efficient steps aimed at eliminating losses and low profitability.

The essence of the economic reform conflicts with retaining artificially reduced state retail prices of food products. In this case, to begin with, incentive to increase output and thus to eliminate the deficit declines; second, the funds find their way not in the state treasury but in the hands of speculators, whose reaction to the aggravation of scarcity is simple; third, the working people, whose interests may appear to be consistent with reduced prices, are forced to pay triple prices on the black market or else to do altogether without a scarce commodity, which triggers justified discontent.

On the other hand fears have been justifiably expressed that increased state retail prices of scarce foodstuffs may become the catalyst of yet another increase in food market prices. Most important, will the trend of increased production costs of agricultural commodities make it necessary, several years down the line, to start a new round of price increases?

In order to prevent this, along with price changes we must make progress in the production, processing, transportation and storing of foodstuffs. Thus, extensive processing of goods on the spot substantially reduces losses and improves end results. The radical solution of this problem depends on whether the new production relations and new economic forms, such as contracting, leasing and small cooperatives, ensure a truly drastic and comprehensive increase in the efficiency of agricultural production.

Numerous examples indicate that leasing has a positive influence on the dynamics of production costs. However, major difficulties and problems exist as well. Unfortunately, the trend toward price increases in means of production and fuel and energy resources increase production costs and outlays sometimes despite the successful activities of rural labor collectives. The trend toward higher costs, as we already pointed out, must be surmounted along the entire chain, starting with the initial point—fuel and raw material extraction.

Nor should we ignore the fact that a certain type of farm has taken shape, with its specific amount of land, crop rotation, equipment and technology. Leasing all such facilities to individual families or groups is no simple matter. So far industry remains oriented toward the production of technical facilities for large farms. The infrastructure must be changed in accordance with the increased variety of types and dimensions of farms.

On the other hand, the creation of large and medium-sized animal husbandry complexes and livestock farms, in which substantial one-time investments have already been made, must also be exploited at full capacity. If cost accounting methods of contracting and leasing are applied in the internal farm system of labor organization, this could prove to be as efficient as the creation of new small livestock farms, something which would require additional large-scale investments.

We must take into consideration the fact that the country's kolkhozes and sovkhozes owe 150 billion rubles and that their cost accounting income is very low. Many of them barely make ends meet. In our estimates, only about one-third of all farms (showing a profitability in excess of 10 percent) could operate today without any financial contribution from the outside on the basis of self-support and self-financing. Particularly important, under such circumstances, is the need seriously to improve precisely the economics of kolkhozes and sovkhozes with the help of cost accounting and leasing.

An efficient price policy should exclude the existence of different price levels for identical commodities, for this not only leads to structural distortions but also creates grounds for social erosion. Price differentials between the levels of state and market prices of meat, potatoes, vegetables, fruits and other food products, which may be double, quadruple or, sometimes, even much higher, stimulate speculations and a variety of abuses. The

increased prices of vodka without changing the low prices of sugar led to an outburst of illegal moonshine with profits increasing by a factor of 15. Numerous conflicts develop on the grounds of the disparity between wholesale and retail prices in the meat-dairy and cotton ginning industries.

A reliable economic obstacle to this could be obtained only if goods and services are marketed according to their real value. The moment the state retail price of one commodity or another is artificially reduced as compared to the real value of cooperative and market prices, the temptation to profit from this differential appears immediately.

The price reform also directly affects foreign trade. Exports and imports are profitable only when the result is an economy in socially necessary labor outlays. Purchasing commodities abroad, which could be locally produced at lower cost, is economically unjustified. Also entirely inefficient and wasteful is the trading of nonrecoverable natural resources for recoverable ones, as is the case, for example, with grain imports and petroleum and natural gas exports.

During the 11th 5-year period the Soviet Union purchased on the world markets some 40 million tons of grain and soybean annually, at \$150 per ton, excluding foreign exchange outlays for freight and penalties. State purchases within the country totaled 67 million tons at 140 rubles per ton and, in the main grain producing area, 100 rubles per ton. The purchase power of the dollar for consumer goods is approximately quadruple that of the ruble. This makes obvious the profitability of additionally stimulating domestic grain production. By paying our own producers a price which could come closer to the real cost of imports, the problem of grain shortages, it seems to us, would be solved.

As a whole, the price setting mechanism must be based on a consideration of the contradictory interaction among reducing, stabilizing or cost increasing factors (sectorial and regional features of reproduction and commodity turnover, seasonal and long-term fluctuations in market demand, and increased production diversification). In this case we must establish flexible control over price levels in order to maintain a constant balance in trade and not allow any gap between the price system and changed economic circumstances, as was the case during the period of stagnation. Spasmodic "revolutionary" reforms in planned prices are by no means the best method for their control, for the artificial holding back of prices during the "period between reforms" keeps them stable, while production costs and value and the correlation between supply and demand become entirely different. This can only worsen stagnation phenomena and threaten, in the final account, to lead to a degradation of the economy. We need a reliable mechanism for a more efficient price control and for maintaining parity.

The implementation of these principles is a necessary prerequisite for meeting the market's demand with food and other consumer goods without major disproportions in real income or harming the economic interests of the people

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### **It Is Still Not Too Late: Monetary-Financial Improvements In the System of Anti-Crisis Measures**

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[Text] In 1988 there were successes in terms of opportunities. Nonetheless, quite obvious difficulties appeared as their consequences, such as a drastic aggravation in the commodity-monetary balance. The reform is seriously threatened.

The threat was anticipated and was taken into consideration in the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum instruction to the various authorities, calling for the "formulation of a special program for financial improvements in the national economy." Alas, it is as though this instruction has been forgotten. New forms of economic management, which limited or excluded centralized control over income appeared, under the conditions, furthermore, of a disturbed fiscal economy. Money is the foundation of a market-oriented economy and if such a foundation is weak, the efficiency of economic methods for production management remains low; the cost accounting self-organization of the economy assumes shapes which society does not need. The reform was initiated and is developing without the decisive prerequisite of an anti-outlay economic management: "hard" money, money which would be in short supply as much as is its commodity equivalent.

#### **I**

Following are some familiar (or, perhaps, not entirely familiar) figures: the amount of money in circulation (cash) increased by a factor of 3.1 between 1971 and 1985, whereas consumer goods production merely doubled. Similar processes took place in cashless trade. The working capital of production sectors tripled within that time and bank loan carry-overs increased by a factor of 4.1; the gross national output, the dynamics of which services this amount of money doubled (in current prices). Let us point out the unusual credit activeness of the banking system, which is increasing twice as fast as the growth of money in circulation. Following are another couple of comparisons: in 1965 the population's income kept in savings accounts (19 billion rubles)

accounted for one-half of commodity stocks in trade (36 billion). In 1985, a total of 221 billion rubles in savings were backed by 98 billion rubles worth of commodity stocks.

It is being said that this is a natural process. As prosperity rises, people begin to save money for expensive goods and for all kinds of "consumer investments." In principle, this is an unquestionable consideration, but let us look at the figures.... There are those who are saving to buy a car but there are also those who are currently purchasing one, those who have not as yet saved the necessary amount for laying the foundations of a house but are already up to their neck in construction and have no longer any savings. According to logic, consumer savings should not increase at a pace higher than spending on durable goods. How much of the 220 billion (and presently 298 billion) is needed to purchase a car, while the trade union committee keeps "determining" how many people are ready to build a house but are not issued a plot or given a sufficient amount of timber and bricks?

Such a seemingly sophistic problem may have a solution. Even in the West, where the market is balanced and the people are subjected on a daily basis to the temptation to buy this or that, workers, small businessmen or business sharks do not spend all their money. They too save. For a variety of reasons, the share of savings in the growth of income ("maximal tendency to save") is of critically important significance. This volume is closely monitored by macroanalysts and practical money market officials. Generally speaking, it is quite flexible, running in cycles. However, the **standard** is considered to range between one-quarter and one-third.

It is unclear why the Soviet person should practice a stricter system of saving compared to his Western contemporary. Until 1965 our "maximal tendency to save" fluctuated within a sensible range, between 16 and 28 percent; starting with 1966, it reached the limits appropriate for a poor nation, rising to 40 percent; since 1969 (this, readers, is a significant year, for that autumn people began to buy meat by the bag load and meat products disappeared from the shelves of provincial stores) it steadily exceeded the 50 percent mark and was followed by something mind boggling: in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979, in 1984 and 1985 and, naturally, in subsequent years, the share of savings in the growth of monetary income exceeded 100 percent (whereas, for example, in 1979 the total monetary income of the population (after taxes) increased by 13 billion rubles, the balance kept in savings accounts increased by 15.1 billion. Well-being was improving only in an abstract monetary form.

Therefore, within the sum total of savings, 65 to 70 percent should be considered savings which have become **forced** by the scarcity of commodities and services in demand. Such savings could be instantly thrown at the market, the moment something worth buying appears. Their lack of support with commodities makes



such money meaningless and having a purely nominal existence. Meanwhile, the banking system looks at such funds as a valuable credit resource, used to dilute the already scandalously increased cashless trade.

Could the mechanism of a cost accounting self-organization productively function under conditions of such a crowded monetary circulation? Free trade in means of production is inconceivable: there is more money in the economy than resources to back it up with commodities. Opening financing for construction is much easier than procuring the necessary contracting facilities, materials and equipment, which leads to the increased dispersal of capital investments. Converting enterprise development funds into some kind of material assets is even more difficult than completing a new construction project. Deprived of the actual freedom to improve the efficiency of their production activities (the best possible combination of production factors and enriched variety of output), the economic units can find only speculative ways of satisfying cost accounting interests: overt and covert (changing labels) price increases and varietal tricks. It is a natural development: individuals and members of cooperatives, competing with the state sector, make use of their natural advantage: free price setting.

The stimulating role of earnings is declining. Naturally, no one is indifferent to what a given job pays. What is more important, nonetheless, is what kind of cafeteria does the enterprise have, can one order substantive and regularly available food, is the trade union committee efficient in procuring scarce consumer goods, and are garden plots allocated? Even winning the lottery is no longer important in terms of "dumping" cash on the open market. What one needs are connections, reliable sources of information, luck, the art of converting one thing into another, and the impeccable observance of constantly refined rituals. A tremendous deal of people's efforts is wasted in hopelessly confused procedures to procure something, and what nerves, inventiveness and application are consumed by such sterile competition among consumers! What kind of "human factor," so to say, develops in the professional grumbler and petitioner?

Two general economic conditions are needed for the cost accounting aspirations and motivations to find their productive and totally useful manifestations. First, the freedom of economic units in formulating their production programs and their volume and varietal structure, and the choice of technology and determination of the most advantageous correlations among youth production factors. Second, we need a certain differentiation among prices, in which the positions of the purchaser would be sufficiently strong to force the producers to ensure reciprocal control over the level of outlays, quality and varietal fullness of goods supplied to the market.

There is an element of subordination in such conditions. The lifting (or easing off) of administrative restrictions in formulating the plan or making economic decisions

can yield nothing if the overall status of the market forces the purchaser to depend on those ahead of him in the waiting line, humbly waiting for "whatever they are giving today." By initiating a system of cost accounting economic management without improving the financial circulation we violated the necessary sequence of steps; chess players know that even the most brilliant set of moves can turn into a flop if the sequence of the moves has been disrupted. Luckily, the situation can still be corrected if it is soberly assessed and if steps which would restore the firmness of the positions are taken without delay. We should forget about any accelerated benefits.

## II

We already acknowledged that the socialist economy, in terms of the modification of the monetary system and its problems, must be discussed in adequate terms, using proper theoretical systems and a conceptual apparatus. For understandable reasons, our country does not have a financial or credit-monetary science and, furthermore, the dynamics of Western thinking has long blended the "specifically financial" disciplines within a general economic theory. The essentially "monetary" economists, such as K. Vixell, R. Howtry, J.M. Keynes and M. Friedman, are the authors of an economic theory which generated landmark works on the development of political economy (and economic policy). Their theoretical elaborations are not entirely consistent with the realities of socialist economic management. However, we have no time to invent our own theories. We have no scientific foundation other than the works of Western classics, the more so since the principles of the contemporary version of the quantitative theory of money are simple, clear and irrefutable.

The macroeconomic balance is based on the equality between the savings of the population (all strata and financial conditions) and capital investments deemed expedient by business. The national income functions, on the one hand, as the sum total of primary income—wages, profits and dividends, which develop at all stages in the production of finished goods and in all sectors and areas and, on the other, as the full value of all objects which form the material consumption and accumulation stocks. The population's consumer expenditures are equal to the volume of marketed consumer objects. The automatic coincidence between savings and capital investments is not guaranteed: some people save while others invest. If the total income which the population has saved coincides with the amounts of capital investments deemed suitable by business, the economic system is balanced.

Said equality between savings and investments must not be disrupted: the question is the extent to which the **voluntary** intentions of the sides coincide. If the population saves more than business intends to invest the balance is restored by force, through forced investments into stocks of unsold consumer goods. This means a

drop, a recession which (this has happened) could be accompanied by deflation as well. The state must intervene by promoting "efficient demand" through its own expenditures or by tightening up "motivation to invest" through fiscal and monetary policy. However, this set of problems, which is the nucleus of Keinsian diagnoses and prescriptions is not for us.

What is of interest to us is the opposite case: the economy invests more than the population intends to save. This imbalance is eliminated by promoting forced savings. This represents active inflationary processes of various kinds.

In itself, the "inflation of demand" (the array of forced savings) is not mandatorily manifested in prices. It could be suppressed by rationing and waiting lines, which force the purchasers to put some of their earnings in their savings accounts. The classical spiral of rounds of prices and nominal income is formed by the "inflation of costs," with demands for higher wages following price increases and anticipated further increase in living costs. Price increases intensify pressures on wages exerted by working people, trade unions, the liberal public and, under our circumstances, also the economic administrations of enterprises and sectors. Stopping this stupid sequence of reasons and consequences becomes the more difficult the more closely wages become tied to nominal earnings and profits.

Once established, naturally, any macroeconomic imbalance cannot be eliminated through prices. We must not be tempted by the illusion that our old and unhealthy fiscal economy can be cured by swallowing a very big and very bitter pill: large one-time (multiple, if necessary) general price increases. Any increase in prices directly means that someone's income (that of the state, the enterprise, the working people or the speculators) has increased, so that the imbalance will be reproduced again and again with a diminishing scale of prices and income. Mass price increases convert the "inflation of demand" into a self-supporting continuous "inflation of expenditures," and nothing else.

### III

Starting with the end of the 1920s, the economic history of the USSR has followed a system of permanent over-accumulation. From time to time it has been only relative: capital investments took away from society some of its income which the people would have liked to use for consumption. In the past 20 years it became absolute: capital investments were made not for any specific purpose but, let us say, by virtue of the need to load up construction capacities which had developed somewhere in the country; a new type of investments developed as well, which did not even claim the appearance of any kind of productivity: the accumulation of excessive industrial stocks.

The great transition in reproduction proportions of 1929-1931 would have ended with an unparalleled collapse of the fiscal system and state finances had it not been paralleled by strict restrictive measures and even by the prevention of forced savings, which included a drastic increase in the share of unskilled agricultural labor (at construction sites), the enslavement of kolkhoz members and their conversion to a system of supplies-in-kind from their private plots, and the establishment of "special contingents" of free labor. All of this ensured the fast growth of industrial employment without any comparable increase in consumer demand. Rationing (open or concealed) means actual discrimination against the purchasing power of equal-size income of different origins. Let us mention loans as one of the means of particular monetary nature. All of this ensured the relative stability of the monetary system, although the tremendous stress caused by accelerated industrialization increased phenomenally the price and income levels. Thus, during the 2nd 5-year period the wage fund of workers and employees increased by a factor of 2.5 although the planned increase was 55 percent; retail prices did not drop but increased rapidly. After the 1947 monetary reform inflationary processes were even turned back. This was helped by the strict restrictions imposed on the income of the bulk of the population, highly efficient recovery capital investments, reduction in military expenditures, and reparations paid by the defeated powers.

Agricultural policies were reviewed immediately after Stalin's death. This led to a fast growth in the income of the kolkhoz members. The scope of free labor was reduced. Drastic changes in the policy of income required respective structural compensations: a reduction in capital investments (many already initiated construction projects were frozen) and in state expenditures (reduction of the Armed Forces, and efforts to cut down on the administrative apparatus). Nonetheless, by the end of the "Khrushchev era" the symptoms of the development of surplus demand began to appear. A new element appeared among the macroeconomic indicators worthy of attention: the sum of the population's savings (between 1951 and 1965 it had increased by a factor of 10). Nonetheless, the 1947-1965 period will remain in our history as a window through which one could see the light of macroeconomic balance (which, naturally, did not exclude structural inconsistencies, such as scarcity and overloading of specific commodity markets).

A dramatic situation developed after 1965. Structural policy adopted the worst stereotypes of the 1930s: generous budget financing of projects the effect of which was very remote in time from the outlays, or else the financing of totally unproductive projects. Naturally, it was inconceivable to compensate for such expenditures with the old methods of the time of industrialization. The new methods were not working well at all. Furthermore, the 1965 price reform tied (although poorly) earnings and bonuses to the price volumes of output, thus causing inflationary outlays.

Today adverse processes in the fiscal area have become substantially aggravated with the introduction of the new economic mechanism and the spreading of forms of economic organizations, such as the second model of cost accounting, contracting in nonagricultural activities and industrial-cooperative enterprise. All of this accelerated the monetary income circulation and disturbed the swamp of savings, thus creating additional channels for monetary demand and increases in the nominal income. The money of the cooperative farmers and of individuals is intensifying the wage pressure in the state sector.

The increase in income is not accompanied by visible structural changes in reorganization. As in the past, unjustified, wasteful and unconsidered capital investments are being made. As a result, in the time of perestroika the growth rates of monetary savings of the population increased. Their average annual increase between 1981 and 1985 was 13 billion rubles; by 1986 it jumped to 22 billion and in 1987 to 24 billion, reaching 30 billion in 1988. For the first time in our entire history (excluding the war years) commodity stocks of consumer goods began to decline. The past year was marked by an unparalleled increase in trade, which is sometimes considered as a feature of the success of the reform. The enhancement of trade was stimulated, however, not by the fact that commodities were filling the market but the reduced confidence in money, which assumed the form of "demand stir." The people purchased jewelry knick-knacks, mole-eaten carpets, poor-quality television sets, electric household appliances, refrigerators and anything else which could be put to durable use.

These changes in consumer behavior as well should not be ascribed to the "unconscientiousness of the backward segment of the working people." In recent years the natural common sense of the people has frequently put to shame speculative economic elaborations. The increased prices of alcohol were considered detrimental to the people's health. This is consistent with the economic theory according to which if prices of alcoholic beverages increase the people eat less (or take less money home). The great dreams of a free meat market, at the cost of 5 to 6 rubles per kilogram were laughed away in waiting lines and streetcars, as they should have, for in the absence of rich substitutes of animal husbandry products in our food rations, obviously, the Giffen paradox would appear: low-income families either limit or eliminate from their diet not meat but fruits, berries, garden crops and even beer. This was assumed by the "unconscientious popular masses," but, obviously, was not anticipated by the economic authorities. The introduction of cost accounting under the conditions of the omnipotence of sectorial monopolies and an aggravating commodity-monetary imbalance leads to limiting production procurement and deliveries, higher prices, inter-ministerial pursuit of income in order to supply "their own" personnel with a stable share of a shrinking public pie. The panic flight away from money began precisely in anticipation of this prospect.

In the social perception, this situation is reflected with a delay. This reflection is one-sided and, occasionally, irresponsibly distorted. The warning tone of the article "Can We Afford Those Outlays?" (KOMMUNIST, No 17, 1988) was more than justified. However, the recommendation of reducing the outlay part of the state budget, despite the obvious substantiation of it, does not go, it seems to me, to the root of the problem. However, some reactions to this topical problem have been, unfortunately, quite incompetent. According to them inflation existed, exists and will exist and all that is necessary is to give it proper forms and acceleration for, as a popular weekly wrote, the "real living standard of the people is defined not only and exclusively in terms of the "physical volume" of consumption but also the speed of turnover of current and accumulation income." So there: it is not a matter of feeding and clothing the people but of making the people happy by comprehensively participating in speculative gambles. However, this has already occurred. There was a benefactor named John Low, who toured the world and, according to history textbooks (and the particularly colorful memoirs of eyewitnesses and contemporaries), described the destructive results of his actions. French agriculture was able to withstand it, for at that time, in the 18th century, it was still not a money-based economy, while crafts and trade were simply drowned in paper money....

A stir is created as a result of irresponsible statements concerning the future of the monetary reform. A fiscal reform is impossible! We must choose: either the state will control the fiscal system or, resorting once every 40 years to annulling money, the state (the state and not the government!) will proclaim its bankruptcy in front of its own people and the world.

Another economist in a respectable journal calls for "structuring... our economic future... on the ruble, on the firm full-value ruble," which would oppose the power of the authorities: "It is either the power or the ruble." But how can this paper ruble acquire strength without skillful use of power? Such questions are not even asked.

#### IV

A discussion of problems of finances and the state budget should not bypass questions about solving them with the help of a "general state loan fund." At least two questions arise: Is a loan fund available to the government or to society? Who is its owner: the Ministry of Finance or the higher state authorities accountable to the people? The second is the following: How does the banking system manage to increase its lending activities twice as fast as the increased amount of output and, furthermore, systematically to subsidize the state budget?

Our credit system is so structured that it can never be short of a "loan fund." Enterprises and economic authorities must keep their funds in bank accounts; the



allowed cash has been steadily reduced to a strict minimum and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to zero. The moment the bank makes a loan to someone, that very second someone's deposit has been increased by that same amount. However much credit investments may increase, the bank resources do not dry out. Credit may be refused because of improperly filled documents or violations of any given planning instruction but in no case can bank assets be exhausted. The credit expansion is infinite! That is the origin of the monetary tsunami which bogged the economy down.

For the sake of accuracy, let us nonetheless point out that the credit extension is not entirely limitless. Some bank loans go into payrolls and are converted into cash and a certain percentage do not come back (through trade or the savings bank) at the time of the latest bank deposit. The ratio between the amounts of cash surplus of the population and the overall size of active bank operations is the denominator of the multiplier which characterizes the capacity of the credit expansion. Individual-cooperative enterprise, naturally, increased the available cash in circulation. This was one of the reasons for the increased load carried by the printing capacities of the Goznak in recent years.

The existence of cashless turnover is also widespread in the Western world. Cashless forms of paying for purchases are used even in consumer expenditures. The use of cash by customers is an insignificant percentage of bank trade. Why have they not become bogged down in such a wide "national loan fund?"

The reason is that their banking system is equipped with mechanisms which restrict and regulate the scale of credit expansion. The crediting system has been functionally broken down into a central bank, which is responsible for the strength of the currency, and the commercial network, which operates at its own risk and peril with money deposits, with a view to increasing its own capital. Regardless of the temperament of the manager of a commercial bank and his readiness to risk a certain percentage of his assets, he **must** have a cash reserve kept in the central bank (in the United States that institution is known as the Federal Reserve System). If the legitimate amount of the reserve is, let us say, 20 percent, increases in bank liability by, shall we say, \$1,000 can in no circumstance be consistent with extending total bank loans by more than \$5,000. The reserve rate may fluctuate within legislatively stipulated limits, by decision of the central bank. Its increase by a couple of percentage points is an effective (and even quite strict) means of restricting bank turnover. Let us consider that 20 percent of the money is a static capital sitting in the cash reserves of the central bank. What is there in common between this wise strategy and the irresponsible appeals for increasing monetary circulation?

The central bank grants loans to commerce and the interest rate or the promissory notes naturally affect the conditions for granting loans by commercial banks to

their customers. We must understand the main feature: after the depression of the 1930s the world has survived with unsecured paper money, having learned how to control the mass of such paper, reducing the shortcomings of paper currency but using its advantages. Competence is the only thing required in surmounting the inferiority complex at the thought of which we freeze when we compare our currency against the dollar, the gulden or the yen.

Within sensible limits the interrelationship between credit and the budget is equally natural. The budgetary deficit is covered by the internal debt. Some sources are unreliable or dangerous. The emission of treasury notes should be consistent with their nominal rate of exchange, for which reason it cannot be applied too extensively. Foreign loans are the lot of essentially underdeveloped economies. Within the country, the state can offer loans to any applicant who considers the market price of indebtedness to the state acceptable. The nominal value of bonds is not related to their selling price which is dictated by the market; the former indicates the amount which the treasury will pay when the loan comes due. The central bank is a major purchaser of state notes and, thus, a creditor to the government. This is not simply a manifestation of its patriotic feelings.

Trading in state notes ("open market operations") is a soft but efficient means of controlling the money in circulation. What does the central bank do if it deems necessary to hold back somewhat or even to reduce the mass of money in circulation? It sells state bonds. It is thus that cash is replaced by treasury notes. However, this has another, an indirect effect. The central bank is a major seller: the moment it dumps on the market a stack of notes, their price drops. If treasury notes on the payment of \$100 in 20 years may have cost \$60 yesterday but only \$50 today, what does this mean? It means an increased interest rate. "Money has become more expensive and harder to get," which was precisely what was needed.

The central bank is not like a private store but rather acts as the manager of a monetary system and, so to say, a "national economic security committee." It must correct its commercial considerations by taking the importance of the project into consideration. It is an enterprise which controls the mass of currency, without generating its own profit but triggering, above all, "external effects." Naturally, it could inflate the currency of bank balances and thus plunge into chaos the rest of the economy. The way this is done is familiar to us as well. In the developed countries, however, the central bank is a public monopoly controlled by the legislature and the purpose of its activities is to maintain favorable conditions within which the national economy can function.

It would be worth our while to understand the basic principles of the quantitative theory of money and to master simple and reliable instruments for controlling the mass of paper money. Since this is insufficient, other



means have been developed, such as commercial credit and 6-7 percent internal debts and foreign loans from private sources, as well as privileged savings accounts ("share holding capital" with guaranteed dividends", in which an interest of 5-7 percent or more is paid instead of 2-3 percent, against the doubtful advantage of "involving" money for which nothing can be purchased, as well as interest rates on deposits, and any and all other conceivable means of whipping up the pace of inflation

The recent bank reform failed to do what was necessary and primary: the functional separation of the central bank from the commercial system. Worse, sectorial banks were granted autonomy and stopped being customers of the Gosbank. Departmental credit systems appeared as institutions which totally exceeded the limits of common sense and clashed with the concept of money, and the idea behind it and its purpose.

We must undertake without delay the reorganization of the crediting system, to start with on the basis of available world-wide examples. Neither mandatory cash reserves nor crediting of commercial banks by the central bank would conflict with any kind of ideological principle. These are merely technical means for controlling the monetary system. The question of relations between the crediting system and the budget is somewhat more delicate. What follows from the general principle that "the enterprise is not responsible for the obligations of the state" is that the Gosbank as well (functioning as a central bank) is a publicly owned enterprise the purpose of which is to ensure the stability of the currency and not an auxiliary authority of the Ministry of Finance, which could correct the errors made in budgetary policy. Naturally, bank loans to the budget are not excluded but, like any loan, they would be an agreement between equal parties but in no case a quittance sanctified by custom.

I believe that even a free quotation of government obligations would not damage the prestige of our state. It would, however, make realistic the public monitoring of its activities. Is the Council of Ministers unable to control the Minvudkhov or the Minenergo? Let it finance their activities through internal loans. The sales price of bonds would indicate the eagerness of the people to support the ecological devastation of vast areas. On the other hand, the tragic events in December indicated that in a worthwhile project our people will not refuse even unredeemable state subsidies. It would be equally good to have a permanent Supreme Soviet which would provide a systematic assessment of governmental activities by rating the state's indebtedness.

Finally, we should select some 20 or 30 young people, who have still not become entirely contaminated by the propaganda of the gold ruble and other medieval relics, and ask Western countries sympathetic to us to give them practical training with the public treasury or the central and, perhaps, the biggest commercial banks.

Occasionally, discussions on the problem of strengthening the ruble begin with a consideration of the "physical" aspects of commodity shortages. What does a "physical shortage" mean? Physics does not know the meaning of deficits; it recognizes only "defects of the mass" (in nuclear conversions); in economics all deficits are relative. A labor scarcity means a surplus of jobs; a shortage of funds in the budget means a surplus of state outlays; a shortage of commodities means a surplus of money. Are we fed up with the scarcity of goods? Well, let us reduce the amount of money in circulation! Thousands of books have been written on that subject and a global history of 50 years of experience throughout the world has been acquired.

V

In an economy based on cost accounting any active monetary policy is not only a prerequisite for a productive and socially useful manifestation of economic motivations but also an efficient instrument for structural change. Collective egotism cannot be surmounted by highfalutin admonitions by those who have mastered their language on a suitable global level. Much more convincing is the external and insurmountable fact: there is no money. Does one wish to ship to a remote village a dyed piece of scrap metal? Feel free to do so, but without state subsidies or free "credit" for the purchasing of agricultural tools, whose cost is rapidly reaching the cost of artillery systems. The development of computers and telephone facilities in the country will find sympathetic lenders and, if necessary, will also have budget support.

The financial and credit systems, which currently connive with departmental egotism, should be put on the service of the national interests. The key feature here is the central bank, controlled by the supreme legislative authority. The policy of "tight" money, based on the will of the people and on the interests of the state, does not mean in any way any kind of wasteful stinginess in the areas of scientific, technical and cultural progress. Our Soviet "business," alas, is unaccustomed to looking beyond the next quarter or year; it poorly handles concepts which cannot be expressed in terms of rubles or tons. Cost accounting short-sightedness yielded abundant but inedible fruits. The country needs a true venture business, which would presume solid sources for financing ideas and developments, the commercial efficiency of which is not clear or guaranteed. Initially, budget-supported organizations (academies, universities, and cultural establishments) and their consortiums, supported by the central bank, could act as the initiators of nonprofit investments. Before we know it, the mass economic mentality will enhance its cultural standards: the financing of risky and "impractical" projects will become a no less prestigious occupation than bleaching blue jeans. Money of cost accounting origin as well would become involved in scientific and cultural progress.

Generally speaking an active monetary policy and, even more so, its strictly restricted trends are incompatible with ensuring to everyone work according to his whim and attraction. No structural reorganization of the national economy—with or without the use of monetary instruments—would be possible without unemployment frictions, for resources must be freed to start with and manpower must be retrained and redeployed before it can find a useful social application.

Since the 1930s the Western world has steadily navigated between inflation and unemployment having learned, one must point out, as a rule, how to follow a safe fairway. This requires reliable navigation and, which is equally important, order on board ship, and the faith of the crew and the passengers in the navigator and the skipper. The alternative of "inflation-unemployment" is based on deeper and simpler contrapositions: deficit pitted against a saturated market and exhausting competition while waiting in line, against a healthy and highly productive competitiveness for places where to apply one's labor. The central macroeconomic problem of any economy in which the exchange of activities is done through the intermediary of money, must be equally distant from overproduction (unemployment) and commodity scarcity (inflation).

In our circumstances, it would be stupid even to conceive of forced unemployment. After decades of unrestrained irresponsibility, the country has developed infinite areas where "public projects" can be applied. Fields, forests, river banks and river beds are cluttered with discarded rusting bits of iron. The cities are choked up in summer from food and residential waste, and become impassable in winter. A great power such as ours has no acceptable road and telephone communications. Urban engineering networks are in a state of permanent breakdown. And what about transportation, the mails, schools or consumer services? ....

No, we are not threatened by unemployment. However, the other side of a strong monetary policy should include the establishment of a national service responsible for the retraining and moving the manpower from areas where its application is either useless or socially harmful to sensible jobs. A healthy stress on the labor market would gradually restore work to the status of a desired occupation rather than the despondent marking of time. Individual or cooperative activities loyal to the consumers cannot exist without the pressure of potential competitors outside competition. We are not threatened by unemployment, but we must abandon the attitude that a job is a guaranteed state philanthropy.

Inflationary-crisis trends must be countered with a constructive alternative: improving the economy through a strong monetary policy. A firm and truly efficient economic policy also presumes a political will, an authoritative power and a capable economic center.

The 27th CPSU Congress announced a strong social policy. As I understand it, this implies not only the availability of meat and the implementation of a housing program but also a policy of consolidation of a society which had been slumbering during the period of stagnation and scattered in corporate, group and national nooks, and a consolidation based on national objectives. Unquestionably, the first among them should be the rebuilding of a healthy economy. No modern industrial economy can function without an economic policy. In addition to structural, technical and social aspects, such a policy mandatorily includes ensuring the stability of the national currency. The time to act has come.

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### Computers, Information and Management

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[Article by Oleg Konstantinovich Kushakov, engineer; Igor Vasilyevich Romanov, engineer-economist; and Arkadiy Fedorovich Samokhvalov, economist]

[Text] "In the past year and the first 5 months of this year, the deputy chairmen of republic council of ministers spent slightly less than 1 year, while ministers and leaders of republic departments spent, within the same period of time, a total of about 900 days in Moscow, not to mention the time which their deputies spent in Moscow. This amounts to entire 5-year periods. We believe that given the contemporary facilities of the information industry and communications there is no need for such frequent trips" (K.M. Makhkamov, conference delegate, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee).

Problems of developing information facilities have assumed an important place in the stream of publications on key problems of social development. They were raised in their most general aspect in KOMMUNIST as well. In our view, what predominated in this case was a shift in the thinking of the authors from the technical foundations of the information industry to the social superstructure. However, essentially such problems are applicable in various areas of human activities (science, education, management, etc.) in quite different manners. In each specific case information technology has its nontechnical features and specific characteristics which, if ignored, could greatly hinder any kind of progress or even stop it altogether.

It is obvious that one of the important prerequisites for the management of socioeconomic processes is the creation of information technologies and their mastery. This applies above all to the activities of party, soviet and economic authorities, both central and local. Unfortunately, domestic experience in any whatsoever extensive use of computers for management purposes has been limited only to the area of economic management which is nearing its 30th birthday. It is noteworthy that whereas

prospects for the use of computers in management decision-making in the 1960s and subsequently were described and promoted quite extensively, the results of the work accomplished has not even been mentioned.

Familiarity with numerous publications which substantiate the need for equipping as rapidly as possible the leading authorities on all levels with personal computers and networks of data processing systems leaves the impression that, as was the case 3 decades ago, once again we are on the threshold of revolutionary changes in managerial work and that the positive and negative aspects of already gained experience are of no significance whatsoever in this new "rush."

So far, discussions have not covered features of the old practice of use of computers in management, such as the extremely insufficient use of computers in the activities of party and soviet authorities, the strictly departmental nature of contemporary computer centers, the large number of ASU personnel and the overall very low efficiency with which the computers' potential is used. In our view, the reasons for such an adverse situation have little to do with existing technical facilities. They are related above all to the specific nature of management activities and the history of their development in the country.

All types of managerial activities (accounting, analysis, decision making and control) are based on information, which largely determines the level of substantiation and efficiency of decisions. However, an awareness of the high practical significance of the independent study and structuring of the information bases of management does not develop immediately at all. It appears only in the course of making use of the opportunities provided by computers in the interest of real management, as pertinent experience is accumulated and interpreted (such is, incidentally, the case abroad as well). However, this is insufficient. We must radically surmount the stereotypes of a "pre-computer" attitude toward managerial activities in general. For several decades we actually confused the concepts of "decisiveness" with "decision making." Uncertainty and the need for the study of alternate possibilities were considered features of weakness. The administrative apparatus was required to make quick judgments and a high rating was essentially given to its readiness to carry out decisions despite difficulties. In a number of cases this work style did not coincide with the realities of life and led to negative results. Decision-making involves, above all, the study of information and the choice of optimal ways and means of advancing toward the objective. Decisiveness means firmness and inflexibility in its implementation. It is important accurately to combine these components of management.

I

The initial steps in gathering and processing economic information in the interest of centralized national economic management may be traced to the beginning of the 1920s. At that time the policy of managing public

production was based on the concept that the building of socialism can be guided with the help of "indirect" economic methods in controlling economic processes. In order to define the prospects of the national economy it was necessary to evaluate the trends and pace of development of such processes, to single out their main components and to analyze their possible influence on the end results of development of economic relations. All of this presumed a relative but entirely clear independent functioning of information services. The intrinsic value and objective nature of information were considered self-evident. The personnel of the administrative apparatus were guided from the very start not by the aspiration to obtain an interrelated and entirely computed system of summing and "individual" indicators but the need to study a given aspect of economic activities, their projects or the national economy as a whole.

Let us also emphasize that in the 1920s the information services relied on the significant accomplishments of the statistical system of prerevolutionary Russia. Many of its representatives were involved in developing governmental statistics and state planning and management of economic processes. Statistics and planning operated as two aspects of a single entity, reciprocally enriching and developing each other. Furthermore, with its great experience, statistics greatly influenced the development of the theory and practice of planning and management and established their information support.

A number of decisions aimed at radically changing the existing economic management system were made at the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s. The level of centralization sharply increased in national economic management. The area of direct influence of the state in the development of the primary units of the economic system was broadened significantly. It was precisely in the 1930s that the excessive merger of the processes of decision-making and preparation of information and "subordinating" information to management was initiated. A line of exclusive development of information which, in the view of the leaders, was required to substantiate planned directives and control over their implementation was established. The respective indicators began to be developed by specialists both in terms of the economy as a whole as well as its individual components, in great detail. Every official in the administrative apparatus had "his own line in the plan:" an indicator or group of indicators which he computed with the help of his own simple computing systems. It was usually that same official who provided a study of the initial data and repeated accountability operations and individual coordinations and balancing with the related information. It was thus that the substantiation of managerial (planning) decisions began greatly to depend on the individual



abilities, skill, knowledge and intuition of specific individuals who drafted or made such decisions in a rather restricted area. It was understood that the sum of indicators, developed and submitted for strict implementation, totally covered the processes occurring in the national economy. The need for objective data and their more profound study, in addition to control over the implementation of a given directive, was virtually absent in the then used management system. It was precisely at that time that the "index approach" developed in the information support of this system: management focused its attention on individual indicators rather than on the wide range of interrelated data which comprehensively characterized the administered projects.

But this was not all. Every member of the apparatus had to develop, by necessity, for his own use, a corresponding information base. This led to a repeated duplication of documents and the avalanche-type increase in their circulation, as well as the absence of an established, acknowledged and essential information, needed to substantiate decision-making for common use and, sometimes, to the arbitrary imposition of secrecy and exclusive possession of some key data. The result was that the administrative apparatus developed fictitious authorities, who were valued not because of their ability to make an optimal choice or even simply to make a decision but for the reason that they had the figures or information needed for use by management.

As a whole, the development of information was increasingly losing the independent, summing and investigative nature which it had during the 1920s. The problem side of such activities became known to a very small range of specialists. Their decisions concerning the structure of information were backed by the authority of the respective organizations, becoming final and not subject to discussion. The one-sided impact of the management apparatus on generating information increased steadily. Under these circumstances, the possibility of the existence and development of data other than those required to meet the information needs of the administrative apparatus became almost unrealistic.

## II

The question of reforming the entire system of national economic management was raised by the turn of the 1960s. As to its information support, in this case some concepts, which remain relevant, were formulated quite clearly. Management improvements were not conceived without the extensive use of contemporary data-processing facilities and the creation of automated management systems. Two main trends in the use of computers became clearly defined:

For purposes of organizing the gathering, processing, storing and converting of economic information (accountability and planning);

For purposes of making economic and planning calculations.

However, it was the management apparatus itself that undertook this project and instead of a thorough review of information support, everything was reduced to refining and looking over the existing list of planning and accountability indicators. The idea of the double use of computers was not properly developed although it was unquestionably productive. New technical opportunities were somehow made to fit the old frame in which the formulation of data was customarily considered a subordinate, a secondary and auxiliary matter of no independent significance. The main efforts were focused on the use of computers for purposes of somewhat improving the speed of management activities within the framework of the previous approaches to the shaping of information flows. The same priority was given to processing rather than organizing information.

Such a trend in the use of the acquired technical facilities could be traced both on the level of theory (such as the "system of optimal functioning of the economy") and on the level of the development of planning decisions, particularly for the USSR Gosplan, the gosplans of Union republics, the USSR Gossnab, the sectorial ministries, and so on. Consequently, despite certain achievements in the 1960s and 1970s in solving essential problems, the use of contemporary information processing facilities in the management area and the functioning of its apparatus remained unchanged.

In fact, computers were not used in handling the basic flows of management information and in the process itself of its structuring. They were used, as a rule, in the "automation" of routine computations, which only isolated them from the entire array of management operations. For example, if one-time or systematic optimizing computations were carried out with the use of computers, each time the corresponding data and programs were especially introduced into the computer and on each individual occasion the official in the administrative apparatus assessed the options provided by the computer, selected one and included it in the existing information flows. The situation did not essentially change whether the official worked with a computer personally or with the help of his assistants, such as programmers and operators. What mattered was something else: the initial data and result of computations appeared and were fed back into the same functional nucleus of the management system. Subsequently everything developed as though there had been no options, possibilities of repeating them, and so on.

Therefore, the use of contemporary means and ways of data processing essentially failed to affect the activities of the management system despite the initial fears of the personnel, "psychological barriers," etc. Conversely, by leaving the administrative-command style of management which had developed as early as the 1930s virtually unchanged, it strengthened its positions. The computer

"capabilities" of the machines enabled it to expand its influence, for it became possible to increase the number of approved, computable and controllable indicators, to broaden the nomenclature of goods and resources, both the planned and the distributed on the upper management levels. The reverse of all this was the exceptionally low return on the potential of computer facilities accessible to management.

The mushrooming growth in the development of current data concerning the implementation of planned assignments (for the month, the 10-day period or the day) should be interpreted as a striking example of unjustified increase in the information flows in recent years. The reasons for this lie above all in the unwillingness of the management apparatus to abandon its bureaucratic style of activities, command, and petty supervision of subordinate enterprises and organizations, and the aspiration to solve from the center problems related to their current operations. However, nor should we ignore the lack of information professionalism on the part of the managers in the apparatus, who neither can nor have become accustomed to assess what a "minor" additional request for unexpectedly arising need for data could turn into in making it part of the machine technology and giving it a systematic nature. In practice, as a rule, such a request leads to the type of expansion of the volume of information which cannot be physically mastered and efficiently used even by the rather large management apparatus. At best, its "analytical work" is reduced to noting the fact that the plan was not fulfilled. Furthermore, the need to make, shall we say, monthly decisions on each one of several hundred separate production items and thousands of commissioned projects and installed capacities inevitably leads to the inflation of management personnel, thus consuming significant funds and computer center resources.

The activities of the computer centers network, which developed in the 1960s and 1970s and are still developing, deserve special considerations. Such subunits were scheduled to become centers for generating new ideas in terms of improving information technology in decision-making and implementation, together with the personnel of the management apparatus. In this case the apparatus was the customer and the computer centers (alone or with the help of other organizations) were the developers of corresponding planning decisions. Relationship between them turned out to be clearly regulated on the basis of the principle that "the customer is always right." Since the apparatus did not try in fact at that time to change the style and nature of its work, it formulated or took into consideration the problems involved in the development of management information which changed nothing and were of an auxiliary nature. This situation suited a number of specialists in the computer centers as well: they processed exclusively the information indicated by the apparatus and were not responsible for creating an information base which was truly necessary in the formulation of productive decisions. This led

to the establishment of strictly departmental information services which actually replaced the previously existing machine computing stations in computation operations. The only difference was that they were supplied with modern facilities for preparing, storing and processing information. Instead of restructuring the information base of the management system and ensuring the mass development of computer stocks of reliable information, needed for the fruitful utilization of contemporary data processing methods, their specialists engaged in paper shuffling, such as drafting endless planning documents, and the formal delivery for exploitation of ever new "automated" systems and subsystems, chasing after ever more advanced software and technical facilities, and so on. Furthermore, in the course of the organizational breakdowns of the apparatus, the already established data bases were frequently wasted or lost by the customer.

### III

Therefore, a close interconnection exists between the common approaches to structuring the management of the national economy and its information support. Therefore, perestroika in management must be paralleled by changes in its information base, which must be made consistent with specific economic management principles. The experience gained in the application of computers has convincingly proved that handling management information has become a special type of activity. Taking into consideration the views of specialists in this area in management perestroika could prevent many grave errors. It is important to emphasize that success in the creation of management information technologies is not predetermined today by any given technical facility. In discussing the advantages and shortcomings of equipment (speed, memory capacity, and so on), we ignore the truly pressing problems of applying contemporary ways and means in managing the country's socioeconomic processes. The need to apply electronic facilities in management is dictated not by a fashionable technical progress but by the pressing problems of providing information support and the potential opportunities of data processing with the help of computers in terms of upgrading the level of substantiation, the promptness, and efficiency in decision-making. Unless the further appropriation of funds for technical equipment of management systems, including the availability of personal computers, is not anticipated by radical measures in the organization, structure and content in its information support, no electronic facilities will provide the necessary returns or become a factor which would contribute to making the necessary changes in the social and economic organisms.

The perestroika under way in the country, which is aimed at a conversion from the administrative-command system to methods of political management and economic control and further democratization of the management process, and involving within it the broad toiling masses, cannot be satisfied with the current

practices in data processing both in terms of structure and organization. Today the contradiction between the social nature of management of socioeconomic processes, inherent in socialism, and the objective nature of data on the development of such processes and the departmental, functional or even individual methods for the use of the necessary information is manifested with increasing clarity and requires an efficient resolution.

Contemporary information support for the management system consists of two insufficiently interrelated sums of data (knowledge) concerning the targets of management. The visible one involves plan indicators, decisions, resolutions, approved statistical data, and so on. They pertain to the individual sectors and areas of the country, and are distinguished in terms of the time needed for their preparation and use. Such a sum of information is subjected, to a certain extent, to local machine processing in respective computer centers but, as a rule, does not provide a comprehensive information base for management, suitable for combined processing. The other sum of data is the unofficial information which finds itself on the desks and in the minds of a small group of personnel in the management apparatus. This includes information on potential production and cadre possibilities of enterprises and organizations, the quality parameters of managed projects and all kinds of "rough drafts."

With rare exceptions, such information is not subject to processing, storing and collective use under the conditions of contemporary data processing facilities. For familiar reasons, aware of the significance of possessing their own information, its owners do not aspire to transfer their "capital" for storage and use in computers. Even in the existence of extensive data arrays stored in the computers' memory, the personnel of the management apparatus retain, as before, for themselves perhaps an insignificant part of computations, corrections and latest refinements, which makes it impossible efficiently to use the available arrays without their permission. It is thus that a substantial percentage of the information remains in the possession of "private owners."

Meanwhile, the number of computer centers managed by different departments, organizations and enterprises is increasing rapidly. We already have several thousand ASU which employ hundreds of thousands of specialists and production assets estimated in billions of rubles. The overall unsatisfactory condition of information support creates favorable ground for bureaucratism and is becoming one of the main factors which holds back the solution of pressing problems of intersectorial and interterritorial management.

The restructuring of information support must be aimed at the computer-based creation and systematic improvement of integrated data bases, needed and suitable for substantiated and quick decision-making under the new conditions of economic management, and the establishment of a democratic procedure concerning access to stored information, without unnecessary restrictions and

far-fetched secrecy. In our view, this cannot be accomplished without truly strengthening the role of information and information services and management and without changing the interaction among such services on the basis of reciprocal material and information interest.

In our view, one of the primary steps aimed at changing the existing subordinate status of information services should be putting the entire responsibility for the accuracy, completeness and reliability of information needed for management purposes in the hands of the computer centers of the respective state committees, ministries, departments, enterprises and organizations. Naturally, this major step should be backed by weighed legal facts, for changing the technology of management activities would affect the basic interests of the personnel of the management apparatus and the computer centers. It would lead to their equal cooperation and clear demarcation of responsibilities: on the one hand, for decision-making and, on the other, for preparing the necessary data. In giving priority to problems of responsibility, we would like to emphasize the importance of this step, for it will affect above all production relations and the human factor and not the technical standards of data processing management facilities. In our view, the main task of the computer centers which provide information services to respective institutions should be production of primary information: the organization of information flows; study of the needs for data and their classification and systematizing; establishing the periodicity of the submission, volume and timeliness of data and the need for additional processing; shaping and "introducing" integrated data bases; and regulating the availability of information by the users.

The processing and "introducing" of integrated data bases is not the same as the mechanical storing in computers of existing management information but its critical analysis and structural changes consistent with the present tasks of the economic reform. Today we must not simply answer the requests of the personnel of the apparatus concerning the dynamics of a limited circle of individual indicators and the consistency between their values and the plans. Under the new conditions, information developers must be oriented toward independently achieving more common objectives: they must be ready to provide reliable data for the comprehensive study of the development of the national economy or of individual territories, sectors and economic projects. They must provide a broad picture of socioeconomic processes occurring in the country, anticipating and initiating interest on the part of management concerning new problems of economic development. On the basis of the new requirements and the very logic of contemporary management it would be expedient, in our view, to refine the concept of minimal specific information. Whereas so far both in management and information support the main unit of information was the indicator, now the inclusion of the information unit (the information model) must become a management target. Depending on the level of management, such targets could



include enterprises, organizations, farms, associations, sectors or regions. The essence of the approach is to describe each of the management projects through the sum total of mutually supplementary data; such a description should be essentially multidimensional and accessible on all management levels.

The main information flows used today in management assume their shape in the course of the formulation of economic and social development and the state budget plans, in statistical and bookkeeping accountability, in documents related to the system of material and technical procurements, and so on. The main sources of respective data are the primary units of the economic system. Their information is summed up on the level of the central economic departments and ministries. In order to obtain an overall picture of the national economy and its interrelated components, computer centers of departments must draw up lists of the necessary data and deadlines for their submission, and present them as a mutually profitable request for information, submitted by computer centers on the lower level. The next step should be to organize, on the basis of the submitted information, corresponding data bases for use in the interest of subordinate enterprises and organizations and the management apparatus and, on the basis of agreements, be based on the requests submitted by party, soviet and economic authorities. Any additional information which is not included in the list but which is collected, processed or requested from one or another holder of such data could be submitted for specified payments.

The restructuring of information support will inevitably require the study and solution of a number of problems of organizational-legal nature. Currently most computer centers which service management authorities are actually separated from them. At best they are "under" such authorities and it is difficult to conceive that, as they find themselves in such an unequal situation, their collectives would be able actively to restructure information support and, therefore, the work of the organizations to which they are administratively subordinated. To this effect, they should at least become part of the apparatus of soviet, party and economic authorities. Naturally, such a step would lead to increased cost of maintaining the management apparatus. However, this does not mean that the overall expenditures of the state would increase, for even today the forces of the respective computer centers are used in the interest of management, although outlays for their upkeep are not included in the managements' expense accounts.

Another problem is that of the present status of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, as the accountability-statistical center of the country, which controls the development of accounts and accountability in all economic sectors. In accordance with its tasks, the committee has struggled for years against the so-called unnecessary and illegal accountability. Time has proved that the results of this struggle have been inauspicious. The

efforts which are being made to impose a reduction in the unnecessary volume of accountability to enterprises and organizations of ministries, departments and party and soviet authorities (frequently with the help of the USSR State Committee for Statistics itself) can be achieved only by truly changing their functions and their tasks, and by introducing payments for information. However, should this take place, the rights of the USSR State Committee for Statistics in determining the range of data which, in its view, are needed by the management authorities in their work, would become anachronistic and conflicting with the course charted toward broadening initiative and autonomy on all management levels. In particular, ministries and departments should have the opportunity to work with the range of data which they deem necessary to meet their own needs. Therefore, the rights of the USSR State Committee for Statistics should have to be reduced to collecting the type of data needed for obtaining an expanded and objective picture concerning the most important socioeconomic processes in the country. This is also, above all, the objective and the task of the information services of the respective organizations and their computer centers.

The need for prompt restructuring of information support for management is dictated by the entire course of the changes taking place in the country. The creation of information technologies in management is the material foundation, a necessary prerequisite for changes in the former strictly administrative management style and methods and for eliminating management "decisiveness" but converting to the practice of "decision-making."

Naturally, the implementation of this task is an organizationally difficult matter. It will require the coordinated efforts of information services of party, soviet and economic authorities. Let us not forget that the resolutions on establishing a national automated system for gathering and processing information for management purposes were, as it were, not implemented. The USSR State Committee for Computer Equipment and Information Industry, which was set up several years ago, also focused its main attention on the coordination of strictly production and technical matters. For that reason, we need new approaches which would take into consideration acquired experience. Success in the true reorganization of management on a new technical basis depends to a tremendous extent on our success in ensuring the immediate participation in this matter (and not only in decision-making) of specialists with proper ideas and practical experience in the work.

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#### **A Painful Subject**

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[Article by Boris Andreyevich Protchenko, honored jurist of the RSFSR, senior scientific associate, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation, candidate of historical sciences; and Aleksandr Iosifovich Rudyakov, head of the legal consultations branch of the chief psychiatrist, Moscow Oblast]



[Text] In the area of human rights there is no more complex, pressing and inordinately sensitive topic such as the influence of psychiatry on the fate of people. One of its main aspects is the safeguard of the legitimate rights and interests of individuals suffering from disturbed mental activities and who, by the nature of their illness, frequently lack the capacity to protect themselves from illegal actions. However, this is only one aspect of the matter. The other is the defenselessness of perfectly healthy people in the face of arbitrariness; we are already familiar with this phenomenon. The third is the following: one can hardly find another "area" which is still so thoroughly hidden from the public and the law as is the practice of psychiatry. All of this, put together, developed in the course of time into a most serious social, political and moral problem.

Until recently some mass information media had criticized quite sharply the activities of psychiatric medical institutions, indignantly objecting to violations of legality, abuse and unconscientious attitude displayed by some psychiatrists toward their duties. All of a sudden, however, as though on order, such critical publications came to an end in our country, as though the problem no longer existed. Is this the case?

In our view, it is not. Above all, by no means have violations in the in-hospital treatment of the mentally ill been eliminated. Naturally, it would be unfair to deny the significant contribution which psychiatrists have made to organizing and applying treatment for mental illnesses. All of us are confident that the overwhelming majority of such specialists are conscientiously fulfilling their professional duties. However, we must not forget that possess very broad rights which give them power over the sick, including the possibility of controlling their personal freedom. Cases of using psychiatry to suppress dissidence quite eloquently confirm the power of this weapon, should it fall into the hands of dishonest politicians. We find out about human tragedies which take place behind the barred windows of specialized hospitals and the conditions under which such patients are kept only occasionally and, most frequently, unofficially.

The political and legal aspect of the problem is exceptionally relevant. In pursuing the objective of the comprehensive democratization and humanizing of society and the structuring of a state based on law, we must analyze the condition of the legal backing of psychiatric practices. This applies above all to cases in which medical measures of a coercive nature are applied, related to committing a person to a mental hospital and thus restricting his personal freedom. In our country, however, so far this area of medical practices has not been suitably regulated.

New hope that this situation can be corrected appeared in connection with the promulgation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On Ratifying the

Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Providing Psychiatric Assistance," dated 5 January 1988, and the Order No 225 of the USSR Minister of Public Health, dated 21 March 1988 "On Steps for Further Improvements in Psychiatric Assistance." Obviously, public opinion was calmed down also by commentaries to these regulations by top personnel of the USSR and RSFSR ministries of public health. However, an attentive study of these legal acts would reveal that they suffer from very serious shortcomings, which makes it necessary to question the efficiency of their practical application.

Unquestionably, the Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Providing Psychiatric Assistance contains important and progressive new features, such as granting individuals suffering from disturbed mental activities the right to an attorney, to appeal the actions of the chief psychiatrist, including a direct appeal to the courts; transferring under the administration of the USSR Ministry of Public Health the mental hospitals which were previously part of the USSR MVD system and in which, as stipulated by the courts, the mentally ill, who have committed socially dangerous acts according to criminal law, can be subject to mandatory treatment. All of this would have been fine had the rules regulating the rights of the mentally ill not been excessively broad and in the nature of declarations and promises which, in some cases, turned out to be totally unclear. For example, what is the worth in this case of the stipulation of Article 9 of the regulation which, as one of the foundations for mandatory mental certification of individuals, includes violating the "rules of socialist community living?" Have perestroika and glasnost not proved the entire far-fetched and ephemeral nature of this concept, the meaning of which, incidentally, can be interpreted in each specific case by none other than a psychiatrist!

Unfortunately, said regulation does not include specific rules which would guarantee the patient the real possibility of exercising his rights in full. Nor is there even any direct stipulation which makes it incumbent upon psychiatrists and officials in mental hospitals to create favorable conditions for the patient to complain. The procedure and deadlines for the consideration of such rights and the obligation of the administration of a psychiatric hospital to notify without any obstruction a legal institution that the patient demands a lawyer and to allow the patient to meet with him (unless, in the estimate of a medical commission, this is not prevented by the mental condition of the patient), and to provide the necessary conditions for confidential talk, and so on, have not been determined. It would be expedient also to make it incumbent upon the psychiatrists to explain to anyone who has been coercively placed in a hospital or to his representative his rights to appeal the actions of psychiatrists and to obtain legal aid.

A particularly sensitive problem which affects the inviolability of the individual, guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, is that of urgent hospitalization. Based on

the RSFSR Law on Health Care, it could be applied toward the mentally ill who are a clear danger to those around them or to themselves (such as attempt at suicide). Urgent hospitalization exists in a number of countries and its expediency is unquestionable. In terms of its juridical nature, this is a coercive measure of a medical nature implemented on an administrative basis. Its positive aspect is that it is applied quickly, providing urgent psychiatric help to the patient and promptly preventing the commission of dangerous actions on his part.

The regulation on the conditions and procedure for providing psychiatric aid may appear to include certain medical and legal guarantees against unjustified hospitalization: within 1 day the psychiatric institution must have a committee of psychiatrists investigate the reasons for the hospitalization of an individual; the chief psychiatrist must supervise the proceedings; the administration of the psychiatric hospital or the physician on duty must immediately inform in writing or by telephone the relatives of the patient and the superior health care authority about such hospitalization; the obligation exists (no less than once monthly) to recertify the patient by a medical commission which determines the need for his further stay in the hospital. The patient or his legal representative have the right to appeal the decision of the commission to the chief psychiatrist, and his actions to the superior chief psychiatrist or to the courts.

Nonetheless, cases of improper urgent hospitalization have taken place. Such cases are intolerable and their elimination requires additional legal steps which would ensure control on the part of the respective state authorities for the substantiation of urgent hospitalization and obligatory holding of individuals in a psychiatric hospital. In such cases we must take into consideration the speed with which the medical certification and the investigation by the medical commission, substantiating the decision of the physician (within a single day) is applied which, in our view, does not guarantee the prompt determination of errors. A mandatory prerequisite for urgent hospitalization is the real threat presented by such individuals to others or to themselves. In a number of cases, this cannot be determined exclusively by establishing the actual circumstances proving the social menace represented by individuals or the interrogation of citizens who do not always provide objective and accurate information. Occasionally, the interrogated individuals are interested in removing a person they find bothersome, for the sake of taking over his housing or property, settling personal accounts, and so on. It is difficult for the psychiatrist to determine the accuracy and objectivity of such information. Frequently, this is even impossible. This fully applies to the medical commission as well. For that reason, cases of long hospitalization, under the present regulation, are inevitable.

In our view, the law should stipulate that after the decision of the medical commission concerning the mandatory committing of an individual to a mental

hospital has been made, the hospital administrative must immediately submit data substantiating the need for such hospitalization to the prosecutor who, if necessary, could investigate the information relative to the social threat presented by individuals and either sanction mandatory treatment or reject it, which would entail the immediate discharge of the individual from the hospital. The practice of such supervision by the prosecutor is consistent with the Law on the USSR Prosecutor's Office and with the strict observance of legality and the rights of the individual. If in the course of a certain period of time, let us say 3 months, it turns out that the obligatory treatment of the patient in a mental hospital is necessary, a mandatory court procedure must be enacted. The people's court must thoroughly assess the substantiation of the reasons for extending the hospitalization of such individuals, and the consideration of this matter must take place with the mandatory participation of a defense attorney for the patient, the prosecutor, and the patient himself (assuming that his state of health allows it) as well as of his legal representatives and the psychiatrists on record. The court's decision may be appealed to the superior court by any one of the interested individuals. Let us point out that the judicial procedure for solving the question of mandatory hospitalization is stipulated in a number of countries, including the GDR and Bulgaria.

The order of the USSR Minister of Public Health we mentioned ratifies 11 different regulations and three instructions. All of this is taking place at a time when, in the course of the restructuring of administrative activities and the struggle against bureaucratism, the number of departmental documents should be comprehensively reduced and the documents themselves be made absolutely consistent with the legislation. The multiplicity of departmental regulations hinders their proper clarification by both executors and individual citizens, not to mention those who are mentally disturbed and thus prevents them from regaining their violated rights.

The basic stipulations of the law must be developed and detailed in accordance with the specific area of their activities, psychiatry in our case, in the departmental regulations. The actions of psychiatrists must be clearly regulated in order to ensure the fullest possible observance of the right and legitimate interest of individuals, particularly those who are mandatorily committed to a mental hospital. The Ministry of Health documents, however, include nothing of the sort. In our view, they show a tendency toward solving all problems in an administrative-arbitrary spirit and a departmental aspiration to confirm the special status of psychiatrists in society and their independence of the requirements of the law.

The instruction on urgent hospitalization required a particularly thorough work, for in this case the forced hospitalization and further retention (in frequent cases quite lengthy) of a person in a mental hospital are based on the exclusive decision of the psychiatrists, with no

sanctioning whatsoever by the court or the prosecutor. This instruction should have clearly stipulated the legal guarantees protecting a citizen from unjustified and illegal restrictions on his freedom. Nonetheless, it stipulates essentially the actually unlimited rights of psychiatrists to commit individuals to mandatory in-patient treatment, on the basis of internal departmental control. Furthermore, in circumvention of Article 16 of the Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Rendering Psychiatric Assistance, the instruction on urgent hospitalization gives the right to order such hospitalization also to physicians who are not specialists in psychiatry (!) in places where such specialists are unavailable. It is obvious that in such cases there are no guarantees whatsoever protecting the person from mandatory hospitalization (usually under militia guard) in a mental hospital.

It may seem clear to anyone that it is precisely under the conditions of forced hospitalization in a mental hospital that a guarantee that the socialist law which gives the right to individuals or their representatives to resort to the help of a highly skilled jurist—a lawyer—is of exceptional importance. However, nothing relative to this topic is stipulated in the instruction on urgent hospitalization or in the Regulation on the Psychiatric Hospital, drafted by the USSR Ministry of Health. Therefore, actually, anyone who is mandatorily committed to a hospital by psychiatrists has no right to a defense attorney. The matter of guaranteeing the right of the mentally ill to appeal improper actions of physicians in the case of urgent hospitalization is only slightly better: the instruction merely mentions the fact but says not a word about the specific guarantees which would ensure such a right. Yes, to put it bluntly, the psychiatrists have tried reliably to protect themselves from undesirable outside control and bother and responsibility related to the fact that a mentally ill person (or, perhaps, a same one), mandatorily committed to a mental hospital would have the necessary rights to ensure his legal protection.

Another noteworthy feature is that the regulation and departmental rules do not stipulate any procedure for paying a lawyer's fees. This too reduces to naught the exercise of this right by the patient. Obviously, such payments must be made by the state, if only when the patient is unable to meet such expenses. Nor is there any mention of this in the special instruction of the USSR Ministry of Justice.

Let us now consider another kind of mandatory psychiatric treatment. This is imposed not by psychiatrists but by the court as a coercive measure of a medical nature. It consists of committing a person in a mental hospital under ordinary, intensified or strict observation. The criminal procedure legislation and rules of legal proceedings in trying such cases stipulate the grounds for applying, amending or lifting said measure. Mandatory medical steps are taken by the court on the basis of the consideration of criminal cases, and applied to individuals who need treatment in a mental institution, who

suffer from disturbed mental activities and are charged with committing a socially dangerous action as stipulated in criminal law (i.e., a crime). Such cases are considered by the examining magistrate with the mandatory participation of the defense attorney. The presence in court of the defense attorney, the legal representative of the patient and the prosecutor is also mandatory. The laws stipulates a procedure for appealing the actions of the examining magistrate and the court and provides other legal guarantees, the purpose of which is to stipulate the reasons for mandatorily committing to and keeping the patient in a mental hospital.

Let us point out that some of the regulations stipulated in the law have been given an expanded interpretation in the instructions of the Ministry of Health. Thus, it is "recommended" to the medical psychiatric commissions, in issuing conclusions concerning the possible changes in the type or canceling of mandatory treatment in a psychiatric hospital, to proceed on the basis of the so-called principle of gradual approach. This means that regardless of the actual state of health of the individual, changes in the regimen or revoking hospitalization must take place gradually, although the law (Article 60, RSFSR Criminal Code; Article 412 RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code and the respective articles in the codes of the other Union republics) does not include such stipulations. The court has the right independently to decide whether or not a mandatory treatment could be revoked or to change replace one type of psychiatric hospital with another, without observing the "principle of the gradual approach," but on the basis of the mental health of the individual. The stipulation found in the instruction that medical commissions must impose upon the court a "gradual" treatment, which is not based on the law, worsens the situation of individuals kept in mental hospitals, for it entails an unjustified extension of hospitalization, which is a restriction of personal freedom and, in many cases, leads to the worsening of their state of health, hinders the return of the patients to normal life and to their families and creates a feeling of hopelessness and rightlessness.

The same instruction categorically stipulates that the court will promulgate, amend or revoke said coercive measures "taking into consideration the recommendations of the forensic-psychiatric expert commissions" (Item 5). Therefore, it is as though the court does not have the right to disagree with the recommendations of expert psychiatrists, whereas according to the law (Article 80, RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code) even the conclusion of the experts is not mandatory to the courts.

Equally against the law (Article 60, RSFSR Criminal Code), the instruction stipulates that the revocation of mandatory treatment by the court does not mean that the patient in a psychiatric hospital, kept under close supervision is subject to mandatory and immediate discharge: if "medical indications" exist, allegedly the patient could be kept in the same hospital for further treatment. This is against the direct stipulation of the law



according to which commitment in a psychiatric hospital under close observation is a coercive measure of a medical nature, the right of application of which is exclusively the court's! Under such circumstances, to leave a patient in a mental hospital under close observation, after the court has revoked mandatory treatment is, in general, against the law and, in an ordinary mental hospital, is admissible only with the agreement of the patient or his representative, i.e., as a general rule.

It would be pertinent to point out the fact that the attempts by psychiatrists to take the place of the courts and to define judicial practices in criminal cases of people who are not responsible for their behavior were particularly manifested in yet another departmental regulation of the USSR Ministry of Health: The Instruction on the Conduct of Forensic-Psychiatric Expert Evaluation in the USSR of 1970, which is still valid. The law (Article 11, RSFSR Criminal Code, and Article 409, RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code) directly stipulates that it is only the court, after consideration of a criminal case, that has the right to consider a person non-compos mentis and relieve him from criminal responsibility for committing a socially dangerous act as stipulated by criminal law, while the role of the psychiatric expert is limited to issuing a conclusion on the mental condition of the individual and his ability at a given time to control his actions or to be aware of them (Articles 79 and 408, RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code). Nonetheless, the instructions stipulate that the experts have the right to issue conclusions on whether a person is or is not responsible for his actions. Yet the concept of non-compos mentis is purely juridical (Criminal Law) and means that the person who has committed a socially dangerous act has been considered by the court as having proven, by virtue of his mental condition, that he was unable to act deliberately or negligently, for which reason the person is innocent and is not subject to criminal liability. The function of the psychiatric expert is limited, in this case, to issuing a conclusion consistent with his professional knowledge on the mental condition of the individual at the time of the commission of the crime, whereas the court alone must decide matters relative to guilt and responsibility.

Guided by the instruction, however, to this day the experts continue to issue conclusions concerning the responsibility or irresponsibility of the person, i.e., about matters which are not within their competence. This has very adverse consequences directly affecting the rights and freedoms of citizens and the meting of justice. The point is that both courts and examining magistrates have learned to tolerate this practice. Many of them simply find it to their liking, for this relieves them of responsibility for the quality of the preliminary investigation and for the administration of justice by shifting the responsibility to the psychiatrists. As a result, in the course of the investigation and trial of criminal cases in this category, an obvious simplification has been instilled: if specialist psychiatrists have determined that a person is non-compos mentis there is no reason for jurists to make

a thorough investigation of the proof that a socially dangerous action has been committed and establish grounds for the use of coercive measures. All this is taking place under conditions in which psychiatry is the least developed area of medicine and when the criteria used to define the mental condition of a person are frequently extremely vague and subjective! Suffice it to say that to this day there is no unanimous opinion among scientists about defining the mental state of individuals suspected of schizophrenia (one of the most widespread mental illnesses) or in determining the nature of the disease itself. The practical confirmation of this fact is found in the numerous cases in which the evaluation by different experts of the same individual may be totally opposite: some experts may claim that the person is sick while others that he is well.

The consequences of such vagueness could be most severe. We are familiar from practical experience with cases of sentencing, including to the death penalty, of mentally ill people who were mistakenly considered by experts and, after them, by the courts as being responsible for their actions. Conversely, mentally healthy dangerous criminals have been groundlessly considered irresponsible for their actions and have escaped punishment. Let us add to this that frequently the expert psychiatrists base their conclusions on the situation as presented by the examining magistrate.

Departmental considerations, the "honor of the uniform" and the desire to maintain one's priority status in regards to the courts lead to the fact that the Ministry of Health is not amending its instruction which is inconsistent with this part of the law. Efforts are being made to reduce a serious problem to the level of a semantic argument. We believe that the only proper action here would be immediately to redraft the instructions and regulations, making them entirely consistent with the law. This should be carried out on the basis of high scientific standards.

Some new developments in criminal legislation deserve sharp criticism as well. The Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Providing Psychiatric Help, as approved with the 5 January 1988 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, calls for observing the principles of democracy and socialist legality and humanism. The regulation calls for displaying a respectful and humane attitude toward the sick, which would exclude any degradation of their human dignity. This is excellent. However, the new legislative and other legal guidelines, which worsen the situation of individuals suffering from mental disturbances, do not agree in the least with such lofty principles.

Thus, in accordance with the regulation, the 5 January 1988 RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase amended Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code on the use of coercive measures of a medical nature toward individuals who have committed socially dangerous acts, as stipulated by criminal law. A new type of coercive

measure is being introduced: confinement in a psychiatrist hospital under close observation. The new draft of Article 59 of the RSFSR Criminal Code stipulates that this measure may be used in the case of mentally ill who have committed a socially dangerous act unrelated to threatening the life of citizens and whose mental condition is no threat to others.

It is no accident that many people ask why put in a hospital under close observation an individual who is not threatening to others? Why not keep such an individual in a hospital under normal observation? In an effort to explain the need for such coercive treatment, in its instruction the Ministry of Health stipulates that patients subject to close observation include those who tend to violate hospital rules, which makes keeping them in a hospital under ordinary observation impossible. This, however, violates item 45 of the General Regulation on the Psychiatrist hospital, which calls for differentiated conditions (regimens) of observation of patients in ordinary hospitals, based on their condition. The question of setting differentiated conditions for hospitalization with ordinary observation of any patient, including one committed to mandatory treatment and who tends to violate hospital rules and, consequently, who requires close observation, was resolved a long time ago. Many years of adequate practical experience has indicated that such patients, treated in ordinary hospitals remain, until their mental condition has improved, in so-called supervised wards or hospital departments, after which they are moved to respective treatment wards. The efficient solution of such problems, depending on changes in the condition of the patient, are within the exclusive competence of the hospital's medical authorities, not requiring the use of a complex and unnecessary judicial procedure.

We do not share the enthusiastic assessment expressed in the press by the chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Health on the subject of psychiatric hospitals with close observation, in which, allegedly, most patients who have committed socially dangerous actions will be given mandatory treatment. It was on the initiative of the USSR Ministry of Health and with the knowledge of the management of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of General and Forensic Psychiatry imeni V.P. Serbskiy that it was stipulated that hospitals with close observation must have safety systems and be guarded by militia subunits. Is it not clear that placing a patient under similar conditions cannot be conceived, and this does not apply to patients alone, as other than being kept under guard, for an unlimited period of time?! Furthermore, plans have been approved as to the number of beds (places) in such hospitals. This is difficult to consider as anything other than an absolutely illegal and inadmissible planning of the number of socially dangerous acts which will allegedly be committed by the patients. Let us note in passing that instead of hospitals with close observation, as stipulated by the law, for some reason the Ministry of Health is opening wards with close observation in ordinary mental hospitals. We find

an explanation for this in the fact that despite the scientifically unsubstantiated forecasts and plans of the USSR Ministry of Health and said institute, actually there has been a certain decline in the number of cases of socially dangerous acts committed by non-compos mentis patients.

According to the data available to the authors of this article, the number of patients who, in accordance with court decisions, must be assigned to mandatory treatment in mental hospitals with close observation is so insignificant as to exclude the possibility of opening not only hospitals but even wards. However, ignoring common sense, even that circumstance could bring about practices adversely affecting the patients. The point is that according to the general stipulation, both financing and the number of hospital personnel directly depend on the number of occupied beds. This is fraught with the aspiration unjustifiably to increase the mandatory placing of patients under conditions of close observation for the sole purpose of filling hospital beds.

The introduction of types of mandatory treatment, such as assigning to medical institutions under militia guard, of patients who are no threat to others is totally unjustified, illegal and immoral. It can only lead to recriminations by the patients and even to excesses on their part. It is conflicting with the principles of dealing with people suffering from mental disorders as formulated in the regulation.

Regulations such as actually guarding patients who are no threat to others by militiamen also conflict with the progressive opinion of psychiatrists—scientists and practical workers—about the beneficial medical influence of the "open door" system to most patients. It would be much more useful and humane for the substantial funds of the health care budget used to pay the guards to be used to increase the size of the medical personnel in supervisory departments and wards.

Committing to a psychiatric hospital under close observation should be deleted from the regulation and not included in the new Foundations for Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics, the draft of which has been made public.

Furthermore, it is extremely necessary to implement the principles of humanism and compassion and to introduce in criminal legislation a separate conditional-mandatory measure of a medical nature unrelated to committing a patient to a psychiatric hospital, proceeding from the concept that preserving ordinary living conditions and personal freedom could greatly contribute to the successful treatment of a severe illness. A court-appointed relative or any other individual as guardian of a mentally ill person, who would provide proper care and with mandatory outpatient observation by psychiatrists could be such a step.

The introduction of such a measure would allow the court to approach, in each separate case and on a differentiated basis, the making of decisions on the use of mandatory treatment; it would individualize its types and regimens, depending exclusively on the mental condition of the individual and would not allow, for reinsurance purposes, committing people to mental hospitals without proper substantiation; it would also call for the prompt release from the hospital of those who have no need for in-hospital treatment.

The regulation on the conditions and procedure for providing psychiatric aid stipulates that individuals who have been ordered by the court to undergo compulsory treatment must be mandatorily recertified by a commission no less than once every 6 months. The conclusion of the medical commission on changes in the state of health of individuals provides grounds for raising with the court the question of amending or lifting the compulsory medical measure. However, this important stipulation has been circumvented in the Ministry of Health instruction, to the detriment of the interests of the patients: Item 31 of the instruction stipulates that recertification by a medical commission must take place once every 6 months. The stipulation is that even if such recertification takes place before the end of the 6 months the essence of the matter is not changed, since this is allowed not for the sake of establishing possible changes in the state of health of the individuals but only if the condition of the patient has already changed and all that is required is the commission's confirmation.

This departmental viewpoint, which violates the stipulations of the all-Union law, clearly worsens the status of the patients, for it leads to the unjustified prolongation of the stay in a mental hospital or else delays the mitigation of the regimen, which is an important factor. The instruction must be made entirely consistent with the regulation approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Furthermore, the instruction should stipulate that commission recertification must take place immediately if the court, in considering a petition submitted by relatives of the patient on lifting or amending the compulsory measure of a medical nature, requests of the health authority a report on the state of health of the patient. Otherwise, the right of close relatives, as stipulated in Section 3, Article 412, RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code, to submit such petitions assumes a purely declarative nature.

There is hardly any reason for the amendment to the text of Section 1 Article 412 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code, according to which the administration of a psychiatric hospital is now deprived of the right to make a presentation to the court requesting the elimination or change in the previously adopted compulsory medical measure. Furthermore, there are no grounds or procedure for submitting to the court such a presentation by the chief psychiatrist himself. Also, a considerable number of psychiatric hospitals are sometimes located at a great distance from his place of work.

Should we point out that the main psychiatrist does not have the possibility of checking the accuracy of the conclusion of the medical commission by taking a trip and personally examining every individual patient? Unquestionably, the exclusive right of the chief psychiatrist to petition the court on lifting or amending the type of compulsory measure, as stipulated in Article 412, RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code, in the draft of the 5 January 1988 RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, is of a formal nature; it would result in unnecessary correspondence, official traveling, taking psychiatrists away from their work, and a precipitated lifting or changing the compulsory medical measure by the court, all of which, in the final account, will affect the condition of the patient.

The adoption and enactment of legal acts in which such major shortcomings and errors have been allowed is explained by the fact that the Ministry of Health is continuing to keep psychiatric problems secret from society. Legal acts were drafted without discussion or extensive participation of the psychiatric public, scientists and practical workers and lawyers.

The actions of practicing psychiatrists, medical commissions, officials, and psychiatric institutions which make decisions on compulsory in-patient treatment, must be efficiently and clearly regulated in legislative and legal acts; this applies to instituting strict control over the legality and substantiation of the actions taken by psychiatrists. Said requirements are obvious; they are also reflected in the resolutions of the United Nations on human rights. It would be difficult, on this level, also to overestimate the significance of the final document of the Vienna meeting, according to which the governments, including the USSR, pledged to "protect individuals from any psychiatric or other medical practices which violate human rights and basic freedoms, to take efficient measures to prevent such practices, and to punish them." We are convinced that by virtue of the major juridical, political and international significance of said humanitarian problem, we need a USSR Law on Psychiatric Health, which should stipulate not only the general principles and conditions which guarantee the rights of citizens receiving psychiatric help but also specific standards and regulations which would be mandatory to the executive personnel. This would exclude the publication of numerous departmental regulations which arbitrarily, and frequently in the interest of departments, interpret the stipulations of the laws, which is particularly dangerous in this area.

Naturally, for the time being not all the actions taken by psychiatrists can be monitored from the positions of legality. This applies, above all, to the treatment methods, including the administration of drugs which affect the central nervous system and cause changes in the mind of the individual and in relations between the medical personnel and the patients. However, here as well major abuses are possible. It is obvious that the



efforts to bring the necessary order in psychiatric practices, to secure the rights of the individual and to improve legislation and departmental rules regulating the use of psychiatric treatment should be continued on a high medical and legal level and openly. Without it there can be no confidence that the rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR for all of us—sick or well—will be strictly observed in all cases.

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### Public Opinion: Readers' Letters

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[Text]

### History In a Creative VUZ

*T. Sergeeva, candidate of historical sciences, docent, State Institute of Theater Art imeni A.V. Lunacharskiy*

Naturally, the question of teaching social sciences taking into consideration the specialty of the VUZ, is not new. So far, however, the discussion of this matter rarely affected the structure of sociopolitical subjects. Arguments dealt with how to make more accessible, clear and attractive to the students—future actors, physicians, directors or engineer—courses in the history of the CPSU, political economy, historical materialism, dialectical materialism, and so on, and how to enhance the level of teaching, perfect its ways and means, redraft curricula and improve the quality of lectures. It is true that discussions are also taking place as to what it would be better to study and in which course. However, the sequence changes within the same circle of subjects. The most critical situation is the one which has developed in the course in CPSU history: efforts are being made to redraft the curriculum and various choices for its name are being suggested, such as "Historical Experience of the CPSU and Our Time," or "History of the CPSU and the International Communist Movement."

At one point Marx pointed out, perhaps not only in the heat of an argument, that they are familiar with only one science, the science of history. The current structure applied in teaching social disciplines is oriented above all toward theory and, frequently, the theory of a wrongly understood and dogmatically interpreted Marxism. "Civil" history remains actually excluded from this circle. This has led to the sad situation in which our social science has become literally depopulated from history. Its curricula proceed from the fact that the laws of development of nature and society were discovered a long time ago and that all the teacher must do is to present these unquestionable truths to the student. In that case, naturally, there is no particular need to study the specific facts, events and phenomena of the past or

the activities of historical personalities, for all of this can be explained on the level of trends and patterns, and nothing else. Furthermore, the firm opinion has developed among social scientists that one can teach without being a researcher (this is also supported by the fact that editorial and publishing departments in most VUZs have no right to publish works on the social sciences).

It seems that in the creative VUZs in Moscow I am one of the few teachers who teach courses in civic history. Therefore, I shall rely essentially on the practical experience of the GITIS and other theater VUZs, although I would assume that problems in this area are common to all. Actually, in all likelihood such a topic could hardly be discussed at the VGIK or the Literary Institute, for the simple reason that a 1934 decree, which returned civic history to the higher schools, did not affect these institutions. These relatively young VUZs did not have a deep-seated tradition in teaching history. In other VUZs, where such a tradition was alive, the muse Klio had abandoned the premises approximately since the mid-1960s and no longer reappeared, perhaps with rare exceptions when special courses were offered.

It was during that period that the present structure of sociopolitical disciplines developed. Characteristically, the respective VUZ departments were given that name or are still known as "Marxism-Leninism departments." Naturally, anything which exceeded the limits of the then necessary, sufficient and fundamental parts of Marxism was not included in the curricula. It was precisely then that the courses in general history and history of the USSR vanished from the acting and directing departments of the GITIS. No course in USSR history was taught (and is not, to this day) even to students of the ethnic studios, of whose graduates our institute is so proud. Courses in general and domestic history were kept only in the theater-studio department and although the number of hours assigned to them gradually was reduced by one-third, the tradition of teaching the subject did not disappear.

In this situation I believe that the theater VUZs lose more than other, even compared to other creative VUZs, for on the stage specific personalities live and act and history, which is the greatest human drama, has been the nursing ground for many great playwrights, actors and directors. It is no accident that the outstanding members of the Russian stage maintain such close friendships with historians: M.S. Shchepkin with T.N. Granovskiy or F.I. Shalyapin with V.O. Klyuchevskiy. Shalyapin's memoirs *"A Mask and a Soul"* depict clearly and lively the atmosphere of their spiritual contacts. In our time of revival and even increased attention to history by literary workers, artists, playwrights and directors, I find a quotation from this book exceptionally relevant: "...I must play not history but a person depicted in a given work of art, however different this person may be from historical truth.... If a writer is fully consistent with history, history will help me to understand his intentions more profoundly and comprehensively; if the artist has

deviated from history or has deliberately strayed from it, knowledge of historical facts becomes even more important to me. It is precisely on the basis of the deviation of the writer from historical truth that one could capture the most intimate essence of his idea." This conclusion, I believe, is self-evident: the science of history must be an organic, a necessary link in the chain of disciplines which constitute the foundations for higher theater training and humanitarian culture in general.

Here is another example: that same V.O. Klyuchevskiy lectured at the Painting, Sculpting and Architecture School (from which the present Surikovka and the Moscow Architectural Institute originated). His students included V.A. Serov, A.M. Vasnetsov and others, an entire generation of Russian artistic intelligentsia.

Soon after the abolition of serfdom in Russia a plan for a drama class was drafted at the St. Petersburg Theater School, in which the humanities were assigned a significant role: in addition to aesthetics and the history of plays and the art of the stage, there was also history "in its biographic, archaeological and ethnographic aspects." During the reign of Nicholas I, for example, the training of the future actors was reduced only to declaiming and accurately reading poetry and prose and stage practice in graduation performances. The critical phenomena in the history of theatrical education were due to limiting its tasks to the teaching of strictly specialized subjects. Naturally, this applied not only to the training of actors and directors or the "internal departmental" problems of higher education.

Of late it has been remembered that history essentially combines science with art. The far-reaching specialization in historiography is of little help to the historians in implementing one of the most important social and cultural tasks: to be the educators of the entire people. Equally unquestionable is the fact that the relationship between the historian and society goes both ways. Usually only one of the ways is emphasized: the demands which society has of history. This makes simple to accuse a given historian of being unconscientious or deliberately falsifying the past, whereas it should be a question above all of the style of thinking, the affiliation with a scientific school or a trend and the study of a specific age. In order for the science of history to be able efficiently to perform its social function we need not only a responsible historian and mature historical science but also a maturity on the part of society itself, which must have a sense of history and is able to learn from its lessons.

As a rule, the real influence of the science of history on social awareness is achieved through literature, the motion pictures and the theater. It is important, for that reason, to reopen in the creative VUZs courses in general and domestic history. I believe that the way to a new quality of teaching of the social sciences and their social benefit goes through perestroyka in their structure and

the humanizing and democratization of the social sciences themselves which, by virtue of their nature, depend on the nature of politics and the level of development of mass awareness.

For the time being, students mock, make jokes and rebel and, finally, skip lectures and seminars. As a rule, their "positive program" is reduced to a single requirement: eliminate the teaching of social sciences. Therefore, extensive work remains to be done to restore the prestige of the social sciences and, not least, of history. Dogmatism, on the one hand, and an immature social and professional stance, on the other, demand from all of us extensive, creative and immediate efforts.

#### About an Unpublished Manuscript

*A. Kalnynsh, academician, Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, and A. Pelse, candidate of economic sciences, Riga.*

The age of glasnost created the phenomenon of turning to previously unpublished books by noted writers in our country. In past decades, however, scientists as well kept working. Obviously, familiarity with their works would be both useful and interesting. One of the characteristic examples of this is the manuscript which was completed as early as 1976 by Ya.B. Turchins, corresponding member of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, entitled "Political Economic Categories and Laws of Socialism."

Ya.B. Turchins dedicated many years to the study of the economic problems of socialism. The result of his efforts was an attempt to structure an integral system of political economic categories and laws of socialism in their interconnection and interaction. However, the scientific public was unaware of it. For almost a decade (1976-1985) the publication of this manuscript was blocked by the "prohibiting" view held by many members of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, who enjoyed the support of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Science Department. Positive reviews on the work were not taken into consideration. Despite numerous appeals to various authorities, Turchins was unable to achieve a positive solution of the problem. He died before democratization entered the science of economics.

We would like to acquaint the readers with a few of the concepts expressed in his work. The author criticized the traditional interpretation of economic laws of socialism (the basic economic law, the law of the planned and proportional development of the national economy, the law of the steady growth of labor productivity, etc.), in an effort clearly to define the functions of these laws and provide them a quantitative expression expressed in mathematical formulas, thus making them operational and applicable.

The most important question is, what is the true result of the production process? It is this that determines the assessment of its efficiency, the solution of the wage problem and the possibility of choosing the optimal variant in economic management. According to the author, this result is the net output which consists of finished consumer goods and increased means of production; in terms of value, it is expressed as the difference between goods marketed and material outlays.

In discussing the question of such outlays, Turchins claims that under socialism there are two constructive production factors: labor and production capital. Their relative interchangeability in the creation of net output is reflected in the coefficients of their absolute efficiency. Under the conditions of limited resources, each unit in either factor must be applied in the production process wherever the greatest savings in the other factor can be achieved. For example, the coefficient of labor efficiency expresses the amount of net output obtained as a result of the use of an additional labor unit.

Turchins also paid great attention to problems of price setting, national economic planning, the theory of the differentiated income, cost accounting, and the economic efficiency of scientific and technical progress. Unfortunately, these ideas cannot be considered in detail because of the limitations of a letter.

One does not have to agree with all of his ideas and a great deal now can no longer be considered a novelty. Nonetheless, in our view it would be expedient to introduce these ideas in scientific circulation. A comparison among various options concerning different theoretical concepts in socialist political economy is extremely important today. For that reason we suggest that Turchins' book be published without delay.

#### **Advantageous But Not for Us....**

*V. Garbuzuk, senior scientific associate, Kaluga Branch, MVTU imeni N.E. Bauman, candidate of technical sciences*

Practical workers in agriculture speak a great deal, with concern, about the low quality of the equipment received by the agrarian sector and the fact that despite the steps which were taken, there is no confidence that progress is being made. As a scientific worker I too have no such confidence. What is the basis of my conclusion?

A very difficult situation concerning spare parts for caterpillar tractors developed by the end of the 1950s in Kaluga Oblast. Some 4,000 DT-54 were "unshod." The party obkom ordered a few local plants to organize the production of spare parts which were in very short supply, including truck wheels. The assignment was fulfilled, but the durability of the wheels was substantially inferior to those produced on a serial basis. What else could be expected of hastily organized production facilities?

In 1981, acting on its own initiative, a small group of associates of the Kaluga Branch of the MVTU imeni N.E. Bauman decided to develop a technology which would prolong the service life of such wheels. The very next spring experimental prototypes were tested. Two tractors equipped with them worked for nearly two seasons instead of one, without the need to replace this part.

Actually, the suggested changes in the production of such wheels are extremely simple (obviously, at this point we should not engage in a technological description); the method does not require any noticeable capital investments or substantial changes in the technological process. One would think that the ministry and the producers of agricultural equipment would be interested.

We started knocking at all doors. We were supported by the Kaluga Oblast Selkhoztekhnika and, subsequently, by Rosselkhoztekhnika. However, we were unable to shake up the indifference of the then Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building. Efforts were made to interest the tractor manufacturers themselves. The answer we received everywhere was "bothersome." Above all, no one was forcing them to either think or act. Since this was benefiting those who use the equipment, let them make the effort. It is thus that the question did not hang in the air but plunged into a deep precipice....

Years went by and the fresh wind of perestroika started blowing. The authors cheered up and there was hope. They decided to remind others of the work they had done. In the summer of 1985 they "reached" I.P. Ksemevich, chief of the Main Technical Administration of the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building. He heard them out attentively and said that this project was interesting and necessary and deserved attention and support. He efficiently organized the drafting of a letter to be signed by A.M. Skrebtsov, deputy minister, on the strength of which the Pavlodar Tractors Plant manufactured a batch of wheels based on the method we had suggested. In October of that same year the wheels were sent to the NPO NATI for testing.... So far, there have been no results and we do not know when the results will be received. Meanwhile, this is already 1989.

Let us try to give an approximate estimate of what such "efficiency" is costing to our country. Every year, more than 200,000 caterpillar tractors are manufactured. In round figures, their service life is about 5 years. Therefore, the national economy uses more than 1 million caterpillar tractors. Each one of them has 16 truck wheels. Their average life is 1 year (in a normally operating tractor). This means 60 million truck wheels annually. According to the current price lists they cost 7.9 rubles each. Therefore, doubling the durability of the truck wheels would save us more than 60 million rubles annually. In addition, a caterpillar tractor has many other parts which are subject to intensive abrasive wear, such as caterpillar links, and driving and driven wheels.



Our technology is applicable for all of these parts, as has been confirmed by studies which were conducted at the Voronezh Excavator Manufacturing PO imeni Komin-tern.

The Technology of Materials and Welding Department of the Kaluga branch of the MVTU and the Kommunnarsk Metallurgical Plant in Voroshilovgrad Oblast made studies on upgrading the durability of cast iron ingot molds for the production of steel ingots. In 1980, using the same strengthening method, 22,000 tons of molds were produced (one-quarter of the shop's annual output). Comparative tests indicated that their strength and, therefore, their durability had increased by 15 to 20 percent. Savings totaled 125,000 rubles. The work was highly appreciated. Three authorship certificates were earned and a diploma of laureate of the All-Union Competition of Casting Workers was awarded...

No further progress was made. The entire problem was that of procuring boron carbide, one of the components of the new technology, a small amount of which is needed. Furthermore, it would be possible to use other materials (such as cyclone dust or sedimentation slag).

It has been estimated that reducing the use of ingots in the application of the new method would amount, for the entire sector, to 400,000-500,000 tons per year. The economic benefits would be between 20 and 25 million rubles annually. In our view, saving 25 rubles per ruble of outlays is not bad at all. Unfortunately, these are only estimates while in practice nothing is happening.

In May 1986 we sent a letter to the State Committee for Science and Technology and the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy. The state committee answered us quickly (within a month), informing us that our letter had been directed to the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy. That ministry as well reacted efficiently by referring to that same lack of boron carbide.

As to the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, it has remained silent.

In the autumn of 1987 the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology answered another one of our appeals. In particular, it said the following: "With a view to refining and substantiating your request... you are asked to answer the following questions." One of the questions, for example, was the following: "Is hydrolyzed ethylsilicate the material in short supply?"

I answered that it was not. I was told "prove it." The GKNT and the Gosstab are neighbors, while the distance from Moscow to Kaluga is 190 kilometers. This type of questions and answers, I believe, is the equivalent to passing the buck. Its author believes that this is quite tricky. Eventually, V.T. Garbuzuk would understand the problem and answer and will be asked: "Where did

you get it? Submit proof." Meanwhile, time is wasting. Eventually, some people will be pensioned off and others will be labeled scandalmongers, and everything will turn out well.

### Humiliation by Mistrust

A. Zubin, party committee secretary, Atlantic Department, Institute of Oceanography imeni P.P. Shirshov, member of the auditing commission, Kaliningrad CPSU Gorkom.

For more than 30 years I have worked in a "floating" organization in which the majority of employees (scientific associates, engineering technical personnel, and seamen aboard scientific research ships) travel to foreign countries and therefore become entangled in the procedure for leaving the USSR for official purposes. How is this procedure being applied after its recent simplification and reduced waiting time?

To begin with, it involves several steps: the case of the "visa applicant" is considered on at least three levels. Second, a decision on the "letting" a person to travel abroad is made; finally, the request is considered by the party authorities (which, generally speaking, is illogical in a state based on law). Third, the "applicant" has no legal recourse at all, and the question of his trip entirely depends on the subjective opinions of those who make the decision, which opens extensive opportunities for arbitrariness and even corruption and bribery, particularly on the "lower levels" of processing.

I have absolutely no intention of indiscriminately accusing all "decision makers" of such things: by virtue of my duties as party committee secretary, to a certain extent I am involved in this process. I know from personal experience, however, that if it is possible to refuse someone, this opportunity will be applied 100 percent. This is based on a number of factors: reinsurance in issuing a visa, something which has reached a point of absurdity; fear of causing the displeasure of superior "decision makers," by making a "blunder;" finally, the desire to be the "boss," to have the right to "punish or pardon," without bearing any responsibility whatsoever in the case of an unjustified "civil punishment," etc. As a result, thousands of our compatriots who must travel abroad on business are subjected to degrading mistrust.

It seems to me that the processing of exit visas for traveling on business or public affairs (i.e., at the expense and the interest of the state) should be clearly regulated legally and based on specific and open laws such as, for example, that "any citizen of the USSR has the right to leave the country for official or social purposes if the trip is deemed necessary, his state of health is satisfactory and his work in the USSR does not involve secrecy." In other words, the decision of the possibility of a Soviet citizen to travel abroad on an official assignment must be based on the clear stipulations of the law and not on

the subjective attitude toward him by the "decision makers," and be confirmed by corresponding juridical responsibility on both sides.

It is self-evident that no character references or "class sense" can be a panacea to the violation of the laws and morality (examples of this are quite familiar). Yet subjecting to mistrust thousands of people because of one or two "nonreturnees" is, to say the least, not for us. Finally, in such a case one could stipulate material responsibility within the framework of international law.

This question should be considered in discussing the ways for the development of a state of law.

#### Excerpts From Letters

*A. Ovchinnikov, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, Kuybyshev University*

As University Party Committee Secretary, I was amazed at the inevitable numerous and varied resolutions stamped "secret" by our raykom buro. This restriction was even stamped on orders dealing with the allocation of manpower and equipment to sponsored kolkhozes and sovkhozes. It is easy to understand who benefits from such "secrecy." I would like to see in KOMMUNIST an entire cycle of articles on the various aspects of the development of information standards both in the USSR and abroad. Unfortunately, our social scientists have a poor understanding of the situation in this area.

*O. Gordiyenko, candidate of philosophical sciences, Dneprodzerzhinsk*

It seems to me that in solving ecological problems we are overemphasizing the "spirit" and awareness, while excessively sparing the "body," the material interests of the violators of the ecological balance. I consider that we have reached a point at which it is necessary to act not only through exposures, admonitions and persuasions but through specific and really tangible economic steps. The development of production for its own sake or for the good of the abstract person can cause but harm to the real person, as today all of us have already realized.

*A. Lorensova, member, Ural Section of the Historical-Literary Association of Old Bolsheviks of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism*

One of the reasons for the low results of the school reform, in my view, is the lack of efficient training of those who are sailing this ship: the heads of schools and pedagogical colleges and the public education authorities. It would be difficult to consider attending a 2- or 3-month course a training in this matter. There are many academies and institutes in the country and, of late, also courses for managers, which train management personnel on a modern scientific level. In my view, the heads of public education, in charge of meeting the temporary requirements, also need modern training.

Attention should be given to the experience of the Academy of Communist Education imeni N.K. Krupskaya, in which, in the 1920s and 1930s, a generation of managers and practical organizers in public education was trained. Unfortunately, the experience of this academy was unjustifiably forgotten. In my view, the revival of such an academy would be a decisive step toward taking public education back on the path earmarked by Lenin, a path which was essentially abandoned by our educators and schools during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation.

#### Is the Mailman to Be Blamed?

*Discussion conducted by S. Melentyeva:*

The telephone in the editorial premises rang: "Hello. I am an old subscriber of yours. My social assignment is to make surveys for my associates, based on materials of the central press and journals. I live in Moscow and have already become used to the fact that the first issue of KOMMUNIST comes out at the very beginning of the month of January. However, almost half of this month is over and I have still not received the journal..."

Occasionally, we receive such reports but, as a rule, they come from other cities and settlements. The call from our Moscow subscriber puzzled us. "I went to the post office," he went on to say, "to the 'deliveries' department, where there were piles of papers, newspapers and journals. Having seen among them the issue I needed, I gave the employee a receipt. However, my document left her indifferent: 'I cannot issue you this journal, the delivery documents are still not ready.' Without entering into a description of my discussion with her, let me merely point out that, as it were, I was not given the journal but gained a great deal of other information, such as the fact that the post office not only does not have the documents required for the distribution of periodicals but not even a place where periodicals can be stacked and stored, and that there is no employee in charge of this job. Apparently, the reason for all of this is the fact that freedom of subscription was granted. I also heard the well-familiar 'complain to whom you like'."

That reader was not blaming the editors but was asking for a clarification of the situation which had developed. Our correspondent turned for an explanation to B.P. Butenko, member of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Communications.

[S. Melentyeva] Boris Petrovich, the introduction and subsequent lifting of limits on subscriptions this year drastically distorted, according to sociologists, the overall picture of demand for newspapers and journals. How was this reflected on the work of the postal service?

[B.P. Butenko] Last year we expected a 10 percent increase in the number of subscriptions. We were almost right. After the ceiling for the country at large was lifted, subscription to central newspapers and journals

increased by 9 percent. In Moscow, however, it increased by 25 percent. That is the reason for which, to our great regret, from the very first days of this year, the Muscovites have experienced breakdowns in deliveries of periodicals. This is not even a question of the increased volume for which, I repeat, we were not prepared. Usually our work reaches its peak in December, when on the basis of procurement cards the communications departments recruit "walking" mailmen, as we call them. But then the subscription period was extended to 15 November and additional mountains of such cards appeared. Furthermore, there were hundreds of cancellations of subscriptions in Moscow, and address changes (clearly, the people were taking subscriptions in the name of acquaintances, to make sure they would have them). Many communications departments proved to be unable to cope on time with such an additional load. The entire system of the Moscow Postal Service and Soyuzpechat worked hard to process the additional cards. Currently these difficulties have been essentially eliminated, the situation has been stabilized and the dispatching service of the Moscow Postal Service can efficiently deal with complaints (which, obviously, there will be more) and take emergency measures.

[S. Melentyeva] Last year's situation with subscriptions led the people to suspect that any breakdown in the work of the postal service due to poorly organized information may have had a political aspect, thereby leading them to formulate various conclusions. Thus, our reader G.A. Vilner from Karaganda reports that for quite some time the local Soyuzpechat stands have had no mailing envelopes and that the communications departments occasionally justify this by citing that same unrestricted subscription: they claim that there is absolutely no paper in the country. According to this reader, suggestions have even been submitted of using home-made envelopes. Is this the latest shortage?

[B.P. Butenko] I believe that this is a bad joke on the part of one of our 740,000 employees. Obviously, it was simply a case that the latest shipment of envelopes was not ordered on time. They are produced by the Goznak enterprises and not by the printing presses of the journals. Therefore, to explain the disappearance of envelopes as a result of the increased number of subscriptions to periodicals is, to say the least, strange, although a problem does exist here: because of the reorganization of the process, the esthetic side may have to suffer somewhat and mail envelopes will be less colorful. However, demand will be met.

The Soyuzpechat stands indeed felt the impact of the lifting of ceilings but in another area: retail sales. We could sell approximately double the number of newspapers and journals than we are being given today by the publishing houses for newsstand sales. In order to avoid complaints, we must specifically know the reasons for receiving a given number of copies. Here as well we need glasnost.

[S. Melentyeva] Going back to the problem of the delivery of publications: naturally, we must not ignore the work of the mailman. Understandably, his bag is now much heavier. We know that he is not paid a high salary, which was something we too wrote about (KOMMUNIST No 13, 1988). To what extent is the mailman himself interested in delivering faster the increased number of journals and newspapers?

[B.P. Butenko] I must point out that by order of the ministry additional incentives have been contemplated to encourage the mailmen. Each communications department will decide for itself whether to hire full-time personnel (based on the wage fund) or substitutes. It has now become possible to add another 1,000 to the more than 4,000 Moscow mailmen. It is true that we are short of people.

Our reserve is people who can and are willing to work mornings. At this point, however, another problem arises: delays in the delivery of the newspapers by the printing presses. Here is an example: in the first 10 days of 1989 60 percent of the Moscow communications departments received the newspapers with delays ranging between 1 and 5 hours. The substitutes come early to pick up the publications for distribution. Unable to wait for the newspapers, they leave for their regular jobs. They must be paid for their time, for this is not the fault of the substitutes, and otherwise we would lose them. However, the work has not been done, the subscriber has not received his newspaper and the regular workers must assume an additional load (literally).

Every morning 600 cabs deliver the newspapers in Moscow. Their time as well is strictly regulated. For the time being, we have not found a solution which would satisfy both parties.

[S. Melentyeva] Does this mean that the frequent accusations one hears at the post office boxes in the morning are misdirected?

[B.P. Butenko] Last year, some 15 percent of all newspapers (approximately 7 billion copies) arrived with delays. Basically, this means 7 billion potential conflicts. And everything is directed at the mailman, who is the last person to face the subscriber. His hard physical labor also becomes nerve-racking. As it were, people are unwilling to work for us.

[S. Melentyeva] Does this mean, Boris Petrovich, that the problem can be resolved by economically and legally streamlining relations between the post office and the publishing houses?

[B.P. Butenko] Last year press procurement and distribution work cost our sector more than 500 million rubles in losses, for the cost of handling one periodical exceeds the publishing house's discount by a factor of six. Nearly 56 billion of the 65 billion pieces of mail handled are newspapers and journals. The delivery of periodicals is



supported by the other services: parcels, letters, books, and postal money orders. And all this is taking place under conditions in which the enterprises in the sector have converted to self-financing. Various options are being discussed. Raising the prices of periodicals is not the best of them. I do not know the type of income which the publishers themselves earn from subscriptions. Possibly a minor percentage of such funds would suffice for deliveries to stop showing a loss. Clearly, we should give some thought about how to do this. For the time being, the entire loss is being absorbed by the postal service.

[S. Melentyeva] But could the publishers be fined for delayed deliveries?

[B.P. Butenko] The arbitration authorities do not consider our complaints if a newspaper has not come out on time because of waiting for important news reports. The postal service, however, has nothing to do with this. If we seriously convert to self-financing, we should estimate the cost of such special publications for all newspapers at the same time and not for one or two.

I believe that the solution does not lie in fines but in establishing practical relations between the postal service and the publishers, so that the latter are aware of what eventually happens when they are 1 or 2 hours late. This is not only a question of money. If the newspaper has been delayed, we must look for another airplane and remove other shipments from it. It may also happen that there is only one flight daily. As a result, the press may be late 1 hour but the subscriber in another city will be lucky if he gets his newspaper on the following day.

[S. Melentyeva] Judging by the letters, both journals and weeklies are delayed.

[B.P. Butenko] Essentially, journals are shipped by train. Furthermore, they are not printed on the same day. Here we have a week to work with. We try not to be slow in deliveries. Every day more than 1.2 million copies are shipped out of the Chekhov Printing Combine, Moscow Oblast. There is no place to keep the materials there, there are not even spare tracks for the mail cars. Conversely, what is most unpleasant for us is should a traffic jam develop in Chekhov. Before the new year, for example, we had to borrow trucks from the virtually entire European part of the country to prevent the production process from bogging down.

The readers have obviously been able to notice by now that the deliveries of OGONEK, for example, changed from Saturday to Monday and that of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, from Wednesday to Friday. Let me immediately explain that the reason in this case is precisely the increased number of subscribers. The printing process takes longer than in the past. The handling capacity of the railroads has reached its limit.

Saying this, I do not wish to deny my responsibility and that of the workers in our enterprises and protect them from all kinds of claims. The moment the journal has reached the oblast center it is we who are responsible. As of then it becomes a question of our work and discipline. The postal service is ready to assume responsibility for this.

As to your journal, currently it is printed not only in Moscow but also in Kiev and Novosibirsk. We hope that this will substantially shorten the time for the delivery of KOMMUNIST and settle many of the subscribers' claims.

#### After Publication in the Journal

The USSR Ministry of Health considered the article by V. Karpenko "The Unplowed Field of Rural Medicine" (KOMMUNIST No 15, 1988). Following, somewhat abridged, is the letter signed by A.M. Moskvichev, deputy minister.

The author of that article raises at the right time and objectively pressing problems of health care in the countryside, as he considers existing procedures of planning and financing the activities of hospitals and encouraging the work of the medical personnel, which hinder efficient work.

Currently an experiment is under way in Kemerovo, Kuybyshev and Leningrad, the purpose of which is better to meet the needs of the people for medical help and to enhance the responsibility and interest of medical personnel in the end results of their activities. The USSR Ministry of Health has drafted the order "On Measures for the Reorganization of In-Hospital Medical Help in the Country," which calls for the decentralization of health care management, and securing conditions for the practical exercise of the rights of heads of medical institutions in the area of planning-financing and organizational-methodical autonomy.

On the suggestion of the ministry, the USSR Gosplan decided, starting with 1989, to plan the wage fund of health care institutions not according to the number of people but according to the table of organization. This will broaden the opportunities of managers to provide material incentives to personnel who have particularly distinguished themselves.

Despite the fact that medical assistance to the rural population is provided by a widespread network of health care institutions (more than 3,500 central rayon hospitals, 17,700 outpatient clinics and section hospitals and about 90,000 feldsher and feldsher-obstetrical centers), significant differences remain in terms of the accessibility, standards and quality of medical aid provided to the rural population, which are substantially behind contemporary requirements and facilities available in the cities. In 1987 the medical-prevention establishments had their vacancies for physicians filled 93.7

percent. On 1 January of last year there were no physicians in 210 section hospitals and 504 outpatient clinics. The rural population is short of specialized physicians. Because of significant turnover, the true rate of increase in the number of physicians in rural health care institutions is inconsistent with the number of physicians assigned to those areas.

The main reasons for the fact that medical personnel are unwilling to remain in rural areas are the unsatisfactory material and technical facilities in rural medical and prophylactic establishments, the limited opportunities for professional growth, due to the isolation from major health care centers, unregulated working hours, lack of residential facilities for medical personnel and, in frequent cases, lack of conditions for cultural relaxation. This problem can be solved only through the joint efforts of the health care authorities and the local soviet and party authorities.

The USSR Ministry of Health is planning, starting with 1989, to increase by 18,500 the number of young specialists assigned to rural medical institutions. Furthermore, together with the Central Committee of the Medical Workers Trade Union, a letter was submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers with the proposal to extend its resolution "On Guaranteeing Housing Rights to Citizens Who Are Temporarily Absent From their Permanent Residence by Virtue of the Nature and Conditions of their Work" to medical personnel assigned to rural areas or who have expressed the desire to work in such areas.

Taking into consideration the unsatisfactory condition of the health of the rural population and the inadequate volume and quality of medical aid, we are planning to open by 1993 in all central farmsteads of kolkhozes and sovkhoses section hospitals, outpatient clinics or feldsher-obstetrical centers and by 1995 to complete, in its essential features, the reconstruction of section hospitals which will have central heating and hot water, make the material and technical facilities of medical institutions consistent with the requirements of sanitation and hygiene, and meet all their requirements for means of communication and equipment.

The USSR Ministry of Health, A.M. Moskvichev concludes, has set itself the task of making the availability of cadres for medical institutions in the countryside meet existing standards and to ensure their further enhancement to the urban level.

N. Tyurin's correspondence "At the Boundary" (KOMMUNIST No 15, 1988) discussed the practices and problems of the party organization in Luzhskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast, and the work style and method of the apparat of the Luga CPSU Gorkom. In his answer to the editors, V. Antonov, first secretary of the Luga Party Gorkom, reports the following:

The questions raised in the journal were analyzed in November-December 1988 at a meeting of the party-economic aktiv, the accountability and election party meeting of the apparat of the CPSU gorkom and of several primary party organizations. Meetings were held between the personnel of the apparat and party veterans and the party members named in the publication.

The discussions revealed that a number of problems which require most serious attention were objectively reflected in the article. The need for further democratization and glasnost in the work of the party apparatus and its mastery of political management methods and ability to work under the conditions of pluralism of opinions was confirmed.

Among others, these questions were critically considered at the accountability and election conference of the city CPSU organization. The importance of abandoning the command-ordering work methods of the party apparat and relieving the gorkom from extraneous economic functions was noted. The conference formulated as urgent the tasks of significantly upgrading the work standards with cadres on an open and democratic basis and the solution of socioeconomic problems in accordance with public opinion.

On the basis of a personal request, Comrade V.M. Grebnev was relieved from his position as party gorkom first secretary. He was retired with a pension for reasons of health.

In the course of the accountability and election campaign the elected party aktiv was renewed by two-thirds; new secretaries of the CPSU gorkom were elected. Three commissions in charge of handling the main areas of work were created. The structure of the party apparat was changed. We believe that all of this will contribute to the adoption by the party gorkom of political management methods and will strengthen its ties with the primary party organizations.

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#### **East-West; Deideologizing of Intergovernmental Relations**

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[Article by Georgiy Khosroyevich Shakhnazarov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member]

[Text] The new political thinking, the essence of which is the acceptance of the integral nature of a contradictory yet interdependent world, makes it necessary to reconsider an entire series of concepts related to theoretical and practical activities in the international area. It is particularly important to coordinate with the objective realities of our time and the ideas of an integral world our own views of relations between countries belonging

to the two main social systems in our time—socialist and capitalist. The solution of the East-West problem determines to a tremendous extent not only the fate of both sides but the very survival of mankind. Yet, in the final account, the solution of this problem is impossible without eliminating the profound ideological confrontation which is at the base of the present division of the world. This confrontation is precisely ideological and not economic, spiritual or even political. In this case it is not in the least a question of eliminating ideological differences related to the conditions governing the existence, the interests and views of the main classes and social groups in contemporary society. No one has the power to abolish the eternal dispute between the various ideologies based on social, national or religious grounds. The question is only whether this dispute should lead to an irreconcilable confrontation and end with a universal Night of Bartholomy.

It may be objected that ideological confrontation in itself does not prevent peaceful coexistence and cooperation and the joining of efforts in solving the global problems of our time, the prevention of a nuclear slaughter above all. The experiment in the detente of the 1970s and, particularly, the favorable changes in the international climate, related to the course charted at the 27th CPSU Congress and the use of new thinking in world affairs prove this.

These are substantive arguments. However, they fail to consider one circumstance: in both cases we are dealing with unfinished processes. Detente was interrupted precisely because it encompassed only the tip of the "iceberg," exclusively the foreign policy area of relations between countries belonging to the two systems. As to the current drastic warm-up, it became possible to a decisive extent thanks to our perestroika and further progress along this way will once again be correlated to the social processes occurring in East and West and their ideological reflection and interpretation.

# I

Let us determine, above all, whether it is indeed true that the confrontation is included in the very conditions of social development and whether it is one of its objective laws. In that case it may have been possible somehow to ease its effect, to adapt to it. However, has man any power over the immutable advance of history and fate? That is essentially a fixation which has developed into a kind of constant of contemporary social existence, a matter of fate. It was believed that it was unnecessary to prove such a self-evident truth or to question it.

In our view, it would be useful to consider, once again, the basis of the confrontation concept. It is based on the idea that our time is the revolutionary age of transition from capitalism to socialism and that this transition will take place in the course of a fierce clash between the world proletariat and the world bourgeoisie. After October 1917 this concept assumed a specific shape, with the

difference that instead of clashes between the world proletariat and the world bourgeoisie, there was a clash between revolutionary Russia and the counterrevolutionary imperialist countries. It is thus that, from the very start, this conflict which was conceived, theoretically, as a conflict between classes, developed into a conflict between governments. Since that time and almost until very recently, the contradiction between socialism and capitalism as social systems was embodied, one could even say materialized, in the confrontation between the Soviet state and, subsequently, all socialist countries, on the one hand, and the countries in the capitalist world, on the other.

Such a "substitution," although it seemed to agree with the logic of historical events in the first postrevolutionary period, extremely simplified the picture of social development. Since inside the country sectarians could see only two fighting classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, in the international arena they could see only two opposite systems. Hence everything that was "ours" was automatically proclaimed socialist, and everything that was "not ours" was bourgeois. This category included all sorts of phenomena, ranging from the natural sciences (cybernetics or genetics) to fashion.

A speculative separation took place between what was bourgeois and what was socialist in virtually all areas of activity—architecture, medicine, music, theater, etc. The bourgeois label was stuck on anything originating in the West. In this case, the fact was essentially ignored that the "West" was heterogeneous, that it had a bourgeoisie but also a working class, peasantry, intelligentsia and other strata on which the possibility of socialist change depended. Furthermore, the socialist countries themselves, particularly during the transitional period, retained strata which are not closely related to socialism in terms of their existence, not to mention views and aspirations.

An even more essential circumstance was the fact that the main essence of international relations is the interaction among countries and not various social groups or political trends. Naturally, power in these countries is in the hands of specific classes and parties, which define their political course. Nonetheless, it is the sovereign national states which are subjects of international relations. Therefore, it is essentially erroneous to identify relations between countries or groups of countries with relations between systems. That which could be described as "intersystem" relations fully applies to the area of ideology and to theoretical and political principles. Relations among states are material. Countries engage in talks and conclude agreements. This cannot be accomplished by systems which cannot exchange memoranda or seek compromises. Essentially, the concept of "social system" is a highly abstract one and to transfer it to the grounds of political struggle means to violate reality.



There are those who may object that ideological principles exert a tremendous influence on the material world and that quite frequently doctrinal contradictions become sources of bloody clashes. This is a fact although, for example, an entirely earthly consideration of grabbing someone else's possessions may be found behind virtually all religious wars. The same type of pattern can be traced in history: contradictions of the "intersystem" variety, despite its entire significance and gravity, have not assumed priority, as a rule, and in any case have not been an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation among countries. For example, the bourgeois revolution and the execution of Charles I did not prevent Cromwell from establishing good relations with the majority of the European monarchs of his time. The absolutist regimes of Russia and France helped the American colonies in their fight for independence.

One may say that all of this took place within the framework of relations among exploiting classes. But then what about World War II? Naturally, in becoming the allies of the USSR in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany, the ruling circles in the United States, Britain and France did not abandon their anticommunist convictions. The point is, precisely, that during that critical situation they had to make a choice and saw that the main danger was that of fascism. The contradiction between democracy and the totalitarian reaction proved to be much greater than that between socialism and capitalism.

In my view, however, the right conclusions were not drawn on the basis of this fact. Since the idea of confrontation was a key idea in Stalin's interpretation of international relations, anything which conflicted with it was considered accidental, a temporary anomaly. Naturally, the official theoretical concepts were not entirely indifferent to changes in the world arena. The rigid formulations of the time when the Soviet Union was an isolated socialist island in an ocean of capitalist surroundings yielded to more restrained views at times of relatively favorable development of our relations with Western countries. The concept of "struggle," "confrontation" and "contraposition," were replaced by "rivalry" and "competition." The outcome of the struggle between the two systems was projected differently: whereas initially it was believed that capitalism would collapse in 10 or 20 years, subsequently a more realistic approach prevailed.

However, efforts to pin on the calendar of history the date of advent of the universal socialist era were surmounted only in recent documents. Freeing us from the chains of our sociopolitical thinking, perestroika provided an impetus to the reinterpretation of relations between countries belonging to the two different systems under contemporary conditions. On this level, the basic ideas of the priority of universal human values and the unity of civilization are of particular significance. Their systematic development, which was started by the 27th CPSU Congress, naturally led to the conclusion that

peaceful coexistence between countries belonging to different social systems should not be considered a "special form of the class struggle," and that the struggle between these two systems is no longer the determining trend of our age.

In the final account, both conclusions are based on the recognition that life on earth, which seemed eternal like nature itself, could end at any moment as a result of a nuclear or ecological catastrophe. In our country, as well as throughout the rest of the world, theoretical awareness is developing a scale of priorities in which the struggle for survival stands above the struggle for class, national or any other interests. Nonetheless, it is still not being fully realized that such value stipulations cannot follow one after another in a "sequential" order (let us first survive and then settle our class accounts and secure our national interests). Nor could there be objects of simple preference, for they both conflict with and are strongly tied to each other. We cannot say that for the sake of peace we must abandon social progress and the rights of nations to a free choice, not only because oppressed social strata and impoverished nations will never abandon the struggle for their interests but also because a world based on unfair principles cannot be stable and durable. Consequently, problems of social progress and national development can be considered only as organic components of the survival problem. The entirely real contradiction between these objectives can be eliminated by excluding the use of arms. In the face of global threats, all just objectives in the world must be achieved through political means.

However, contenting ourselves with this statement would mean stopping half-way and acknowledging, as was already pointed out, no more than the possibility of coexistence among countries which are hostile to each other by virtue of their nature. Such objectivized forced confrontation, although incapable of fully hindering the joint solution of global problems, makes this process extremely difficult and protracted. Meanwhile, mankind does not have a great reserve of time at its disposal and such a delay could prove fatal.

What are we to do? No social movement and political trend is about to abandon its ideology or its faith. Nor, however, is this necessary. Suffice it to remove the blinkers and take a close look at reality to realize how wrong and simplistic is the concept of pitting one social system against another.

"Classes exist, including antagonistic ones, and this is the reality," M.S. Gorbachev emphasizes. "However, the simple division of the global community into opposite class poles, toward which all other social and national differences and contradictions gravitate, no longer allows us to explain accurately and fully events in the contemporary world. The reason is not because both such events and the policies on which they were based were wrong to start with. Conversely, in the course of decades, after 1917, in both theory and practice, it was

precisely the class confrontation on a global scale that changed the world radically. However, the social consequences of this struggle, together with the scientific and technical revolution which began to spread over mankind like waves, one more powerful than the other, changed toward the end of the century both the nature and criteria of progress and the characters within it."

## II

Let us, first of all, ask ourselves the following: Is it accurate to speak of the contradictions between social systems, one of which was born within the other and is the product of its development?

One of the greatest discoveries made by Marx and Engels is precisely the idea that socialism does not come to us ready-made, from utopia, and cannot be shaped as a result of the insight displayed by a brilliant mind. It is a society which matures as a result of the progress of production forces and the aging of capitalist production relations. It is no accident that Marx's favorite metaphor, when discussing prospects for the appearance of socialism, was the image of natural birth. Revolution was considered not as the mother but the swaddling nurse, whose function is not to conceive and bear fruit but to help such a fruit appear into this world. In other words, the revolution can facilitate the birth of the new society but not nurture it if the proper material and spiritual prerequisites to this effect are absent. On the other hand (an equally important conclusion!), if for any given reason it is delayed while the time for a new order has come, such birth must mandatorily take place.

It is self-evident that in this case it is not a question of a one-time act but of a relatively lengthy historical process of maturing of social relations.

It was precisely this most fundamental Marxist idea that Stalin tried to reject, for it did not correspond in the least to the arbitrary and subjectivistic concept of coercing history, which he professed, and the confidence that one could do anything one wished with history, push it in any direction digging his spurs in it, as though it were the flanks of a horse, and trampling over anyone who was unfortunate enough to be in the way. It was thus that the thesis of the radical distinction between the socialist revolution and all preceding revolutions was dogmatized. The bourgeois revolution, Stalin claimed, appears from the ready-made forms of the capitalist system, and all it has to do is to make the power consistent with the economic base. As to the proletarian revolution, it must create a new socialist economy (see J. Stalin, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 8, p 21).

This is nothing other than pure subjective idealism in the application of the theory of social development. Above all, it is mistaken to claim that all the bourgeois revolution as to do is to "finish the job" exclusively in the area of political relations. In reality, it must accomplish a tremendous amount of work to "grind down" feudalism

and eliminate the vestiges of the previous social system. It was no accident, for example, that in France, after the 1789-1794 Revolution, the coups d'etat of 1830, 1848 and 1871 became necessary in order to bring the bourgeois order to a more or less suitable condition. Naturally, the tasks facing the socialist revolution are much broader and more difficult and require more time. However, this does not invalidate in the least the Marxist thesis of the objective preparedness of society to apply socialist principles, as V.I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized.

Does this mean that Stalin simply distorted the facts? The crux of the matter is that he did not. In general, he rarely dared directly to refute Lenin's thoughts, most frequently reiterating them like a student, taking them to the point of absurdity and thus distorting them in their essence.

That was precisely what happened in this case as well. The quotation we mentioned from the work "*On the Problems of Leninism*," includes an extensive excerpt from Lenin's Central Committee Political Report to the 7th Congress of the RKP(b)". Officially, Stalin followed the idea contained in the excerpt, using the same words. However, he deletes the main stipulation: V.I. Lenin emphasized the need for the socialist revolution to recreate matters not in general but in a **backward country**. The fact that this precisely referred to Russia and that in the case of other countries the situation was different, is confirmed by the following remark: "...The Soviet system, which is proletarian, does not acquire such relations ready-made without borrowing from the most developed forms of capitalism which, actually, apply to small advanced parts of industry and have affected agriculture very little" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 7). It is obvious that a socialist revolution made in an economically more developed European country would have a much higher level of preparedness leading to the socialization of the means of production. It is equally obvious that this level has at least not declined over the past 70 years.

Worth remembering in this connection is also Engels' view that "one could imagine that the old society could peacefully develop into a new society in countries in which popular representation holds the entire power, and where one could do anything which one wishes constitutionally, if supported by the majority of the people...." He included among such countries the democratic republics (France, America) and "monarchies" such as England, while sensibly pointing out that to proclaim something of the sort in the case of the then existing Germany (1891) where "the government is virtually omnipotent while the Reichstag and all other representative institutions have no real power... would mean to remove the fig leaf from absolutism and let it cover its nakedness by itself" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 22, pp 236-237).

Thus, Stalin distorted the essence of Lenin's thought by upgrading a specific conclusion pertaining to the socialist revolution in Russia to the level of a general law.

However, he did this, confident of his accuracy, for he had an entirely different interpretation of the concepts of "readiness for socialism," "presence of existing forms of socialist system," and so on. Indeed, bearing in mind the entire model of "authoritarian socialism" he had created, with features such as the virtually total absorption of society by the state, a command-pressure management system, a centralized and essentially equalized distribution of labor products, total spiritual control and mass repressive measures, naturally, the socialist revolution did not find such a ready-made system and the creation of it was in no way part of its task.

When V.I. Lenin spoke of the fullest possible preparedness for socialism, he had in mind, above all, the high level of socialization of production forces, the social nature of labor in large-scale machine production, a conscientious working class, trained in the collective conditions for such production, and the existence of democratic traditions (let us recall the following: "A victorious socialism is impossible without full democracy, and the proletariat cannot prepare itself for defeating the bourgeoisie without engaging in a comprehensive, consistent and revolutionary struggle," *op. cit.*, vol 27, p 253).

In this connection, I believe that Marx's idea to the effect that socialism appears in the world "with the birthmarks" of the old society has been essentially underestimated. This idea is applied to this day, quite frequently, to any kind of secondary negative consequences of the capitalist system of social life, crime above all. Yet, what Marx implied by "birthmarks" was, in my view, by no means that which was subsequently described as the vestiges of capitalism, but some fundamental features, organically inherent in capitalism, which cannot be removed within the socialist framework as part of the social system. This applies above all to commodity production and, consequently, the need for the existence of a market, combined with planning; distribution according to labor and, consequently, preserving the actual inequality although without the exploitation of labor; statehood and, consequently, preservation of political rule, although exercised by the majority over the minority and not vice versa. That is what socialism should genetically receive from its "ancestor."

In the view of the founders of our doctrine, this legacy is what constitutes the radical difference between the first phase of communism and the second, which no longer bears the "birthmarks." Profound historicism helped them to predict the impossibility of restructuring capitalism into communism without this intermediary stage of public structure. If they could be blamed for anything, it would be for the fact that the development of this stage was anticipated to take place much more rapidly than it actually happened. The reason is understandable, for Marx and Engels hoped that socialism would begin its march in the most developed countries and would be able to rely on the entire material and spiritual power accumulated by mankind.

Turning to V.I. Lenin, let us emphasize that his entire concept of building socialism on the basis of the NEP and the principle of peaceful coexistence was confirmed and strengthened by precisely this Marxist approach. Actually, it was precisely a question of making maximal use of the already existing forms of socialized labor, developing and intensifying them, and enriching their socialist content. Only thus was it possible to reduce to a minimum the losses which are inevitable with any revolutionary change, protect the valuable historical experience acquired by civilization and, at the same time, "develop" it in a socialist direction, giving it a new face, new features. Social practices confirmed the viability of this approach simply by proving the total groundlessness of the Stalinist "model."

The conclusion may be drawn that socialism inherits two basic elements of the social system, inherent in all previous socioeconomic systems with the exception, perhaps, of primitive communism, namely: commodity production in the economy and statehood in politics. Both institutions assume a different social content in the new society. Nonetheless, the socialist society preserves the continuity linking it with all previous developments which, in the language of ethics, should apply to its merits and not its shortcomings, for the rejection of exploitation, violence, social injustice and national discord has nothing in common with rejecting the gains of civilization, including economic, political, legal and moral standards.

The concept of the fatal contrast (and, hence, irreconcilable hostility) between socialism and capitalism is refuted, from our viewpoint, also by the changes which have taken place within the capitalist system itself.

According to Lenin, "the dialectical process of development indeed outlines, still within capitalism, the elements of the new society, and its material and spiritual elements" (*op. cit.*, vol 11, p 370). It is true that Lenin then proceeded to criticize those who were unable to distinguish between particles of the entity and the entity itself, saying that the socialists should aspire in their slogans to the entity and not to bits of it. This, however, does not change the essence of the matter. The founders of Marxism considered a "consumer union," local self-management and many others as elements of socialism within capitalism.

The statement we quoted was written in October 1905. Almost a century has passed since. The question is, could it be that during this entire time elements or "bits" of socialism within capitalism have not increased in virtually all areas but have remained in that same embryonic state? Had such been the case, we should admit that neither the Soviet Union nor the other socialist countries have had any influence through their existence on capitalist reality. At the same time, we should proclaim as futile the long struggle waged by the working class in the capitalist countries for its social and political rights.



But what did actually happen? As in the past, the faults of the capitalist production method, such as unemployment, the existence of marginal strata pushed on the margin of social life, a tremendous gap in the income between the monopoly bourgeoisie and the bulk of the population engaged in hired labor, remain in the West. The perennial "sin" of imperialism remains the gap between the former mother countries and the colonies, becoming one of the gravest global problems of our time.

Nonetheless, it is equally impossible to deny the radical changes which have taken place in the organization and functioning of the social mechanism. Many of its features are not only inconsistent with the classical concepts of capitalism, which were based on the study of the realities of the 19th century, but also no longer fit the concept of state-monopoly capitalism and demand an essential updating of our theory. This applies above all to phenomena which have taken place in recent decades, such as high wages for skilled labor, the system of social insurance, and the possibility of participation in politics, including access to information.

Whereas initially we simply preferred not to notice these things, for they did not agree with the concept of the inevitable decay and doom of capitalism, subsequently we began to resort to euphemisms, such as "capitalism was rescued by the scientific and technical revolution," and that it was "able to adapt to the spirit of the time." Yet such formulas only enhance the capitalist production method, for if it is capable to such exploits it means that it is a system with inexhaustible potential and almost has the right to claim eternal life.

Let us, however, think: **In what way and how** was the West able to "adapt" to our time? Above all, it was through planning, without which scientific and technical progress would be inconceivable; expanding the domestic market by orienting production toward mass consumption; significantly developing the social sphere, as a result of which it was able to reduce the stress of class battles. Were these not the Keynesian prescriptions for solving the crisis, which were adopted by Franklin Roosevelt and which subsequently became the essential canons of economic activity in the so-called society of plenty, or the "state of universal prosperity."

In other words, it is a question of the process of **socialization**. Whether we speak today of the elements of socialism within the capitalist structure or the development of the socialist ferment or else the use of socialist methods, in the final account, this is of no essential significance and everyone of us could hold on to formulas which seem to him essentially accurate and politically acceptable. The main thing is to understand and acknowledge the fact that Western society is experiencing major social changes which cannot be eliminated by fluctuations toward greater privatization of the economy and weakening of state interference (Reaganomics). They are no longer able to eliminate the fact that the

state has acknowledged its obligation not only to maintain the system in accordance with the interests and desire of the economically ruling class, but also to be concerned with meeting the basic needs of the entire society, by virtue of which it no longer is "purely" bourgeois but assumes new social features.

Actually, this conclusion can be supported by "visual" observations as well. Suffice it to look at Sweden or, let us say, Austria, and their effort to solve a number of social problems. The time has finally come soberly to look at obvious facts.

What prevents us from doing so? Above all, the concept that the development of socialism can only be the result of a violent coup d'etat and the denial of any other possibility of establishing a new society. Hence the extreme dogmatic statement: I see it but I do not believe it!

Another equally dogmatic standard of thinking is perceiving the social organism exclusively as a whole. We think approximately thus: socialism has certain features and if any one of them is lacking it means that there is no socialism. Yet reality is incomparably richer than any schemes, as was frequently pointed out by Lenin. It is not unusual at all to mix elements, parts and features which are typical of different social systems. In nature as well chemical elements are rarely encountered in their "pure" form; why is it impossible for one or another "alloy" to exist in social life as well?

### III

As a process, socialization should, in my view, be gauged on the basis of the following basic parameters: ownership and production, distribution, management, and social awareness. We see in all of these areas some progress, although quite uneven, with ebbs and flows, with different rhythms prevailing at different historical periods.

Given the objective nature of social evolution, its pace depends to a tremendous extent on the condition of socialist societies born of the revolution. It is no accident that the wave of conservatism in the West coincided in time with our period of stagnation. Perestroika, with its orientation toward democracy and self-management, economic efficiency, social justice and new thinking in international affairs, unquestionably enhances the importance of these values everywhere.

It is not the task of this article to provide a systematic comparative analysis of the strong and weak aspects of revolutionary and evolutionary ways. From the viewpoint of the interconnection between the two systems, however, a few key problems should be considered.

Above all, this applies to the form of ownership. Indeed, if we consider all other elements of production relations, there is nothing here which could essentially distinguish

one type of socialization from another and be a stumbling block in the course of their development into an integral international economic order. V.I. Lenin believed that the level of production socialization reached under imperialism is entirely consistent with concepts of its socialist organization. At the same time, he pointed out that it was both possible and necessary to make extensive use of the experience in the organization of labor in big capitalist corporations, without the "sweatshop systems."

Since that time tremendous changes have taken place in production organization in the West. On the one hand, it continued to expand in a number of sectors and, on the other, the arbitrary behavior of the monopolies became legally (antitrust legislation) as well as economically restrained as a result of the need which appeared to preserve medium-sized and small enterprises, and to balance them with the big corporations. A search for optimal forms of concentration, specialization and cooperation of production, rational deployment of production forces and perfecting economic management methods has taken and is taking place in the socialist countries as well. Today there are no tangible differences between them in what could be classified as the "technology" of the production process.

Its social content is a different matter. Long before Marx, in utopian works (and not only in them but, for instance, also in the works of J.-J. Rousseau) the idea was expressed of abolishing private property as a mandatory prerequisite for the creation of a just society. This requirement became the "alpha and omega" of the entire revolutionary labor movement and, as in the past, remains included in all documents of the communist parties.

The situation of the social democrats is different. Theoretical works in this area of political thinking do not deny that private ownership is the source of exploitation of man by man. With the exception of its left-wing, however, the social democratic movement has actually abandoned appropriation of private property on the grounds that "it makes no sense to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs." To a certain extent this conclusion was the result of the unsuccessful effort to nationalize a number of industrial sectors in the West, which frequently led to a drop in their profitability. So far no one has been able to prove that this was the result of putting one industrial sector or another under state management and not the effect of other factors, such as the assumption of power by conservative governments, bureaucratic management, domestic sabotage and hostility on the part of global capitalism, etc. This occurred, however, and with its familiar pragmatism, the social democratic movement deemed sensible to abandon the idea if not of ending private property forever, at least postponing it for the distant future.

We know that in passing his harsh sentence on private capital as an instrument for the exploitation of labor, Marx gave it credit for its constructive possibilities. Both

in its pursuit of profit and in the heat of competition, capitalism meets certain social needs. The anarchy which it introduces in the production process has been largely restrained, thanks to state control and, subsequently, the use of computers. It is impossible to ignore the extent to which the functions of capital have expanded under contemporary conditions thanks, among other things, to the fact that it is forced to share some of its profits with society, by virtue of which it must agree with other political parties (including those on the left), trade unions, public opinion, mass information media and, finally, the government which, in turn, cannot ignore the will of the people.

The nature of such transformations would be incomplete if we ignore the international factor. The "pride" of national capital and the results of its activities increasingly depend on reasons such as the condition of the monetary system, the credit-worthiness of debtor-countries, the latest achievements of the scientific and technical revolution (such as high-temperature superconductivity), the level of stress in East-West relations, the future of the arms race, and so on. In simple terms, all such factors are expressed in stock market fluctuations.

One of the clear proofs of how substantive have been the changes which have taken place in private ownership is the fact that today an increasing number of joint enterprises are being set up, with mixed capital contributed by socialist states and private Western companies and banks.

Naturally, none of this changes the class nature of private ownership or provides grounds for deleting the socialist demand for its elimination. However, the entire experience of the post-October period, as well as the entire reality of our time, lead to the conclusion that private ownership should be eliminated economically. This will take place after the optimal variant has been found for social ownership, which will make it possible to achieve higher results with lesser costs both to society and to nature.

The next question worthy of attention in the context of this topic is the **possibility of convergence between the two systems**. This once popular theory expressed by Galbraith, was pushed into the background as a result of the aggravated struggle between West and East. Of late, however, it seems to gain a second breath. Many theoreticians see its symptoms in the current process of strengthening confidence, joint steps taken to limit the arms race, the settlement of conflicts and the broadening of economic cooperation.

In my work "*The Fiasco of Futurology*" I cited arguments proving that convergence between the systems was impossible. Capitalism and socialism have different social natures and cannot converge any more than could geographic poles. They can exist only as they are. These are abstract characteristics which we apply to specific phenomena; if they start to come closer to each other,

they lose their initial features and, therefore, they no longer represent them in our awareness. In short, as Kipling wrote, West is West and East is East and the twain shall never meet.

Yet both Western and Eastern countries not only can but must come closer to each other and borrow from each other their best features. This is fully consistent with human nature and the rationalism of politics in the contemporary interconnected world. The best way to contribute to such rapprochement in the interest of all nations is to concentrate on specific tasks, such as how to guarantee the survival of civilization, how to improve the living standard of the people and secure human rights, how to upgrade the level of social justice and protect nature, how more efficiently to organize the use of scientific and technical progress, and so on.

This approach, it seems to me, eliminates abstract ideologizing which formulates reasons for pitting one system against the other. Furthermore, unwittingly the need to defeat the other side stems from endless ideological disputes. This makes the other side inevitably considered as hostile and priority is given not to the interest of the matter but to problems of rivalry. Yet, since the systems are identified with states, once again the division of the world is reproduced into opposite blocs, even after we have learned how to control our behavior in order to prevent a nuclear war.

Nonetheless, the best method for dealing with an enemy is to turn him into becoming our friend or, at worst, into an ordinary neighbor. In our interdependent world, threatened by nuclear, ecological and many other dangers, this approach becomes not only desirable but imperative, a condition for survival and development. Painters, masters of their work and athletes can and must compete against each other. The competition can include a comparison and choice of the best forms of organization of social life and political systems. I repeat however, that in my view the fixation that the struggle of the systems is the "axle" of social development must be eliminated.

But then what happens with the relative advantages of one system or another? I believe that, here as well, we must abandon the "general systemic" approach and see in the achievements of West and East, of one group of countries or another, or economic and political alliances, the result of the effect of a number of factors which have been superimposed on historical conditions. Whereas the Western countries are still ahead of the Eastern in terms of labor productivity, it is above all because they are in an area in which industrial development was initiated much earlier and a powerful scientific and technical potential was created.

Practical experience has repeatedly confirmed how erroneous are efforts to link any successes or failures exclusively to the social system. Thus, after the first earth satellite was launched, we wrote that "socialism is the

launching pad for the conquest of space." Nonetheless, even then it was clear that any country with developed science and industry could participate in this "space odyssey" providing that it had sufficient funds and deemed this consistent with its interests. Naturally, the characteristics of the social system influence, one way or another, all areas of social life and largely predetermine the choice of objectives, methods for achieving them, means of mobilizing resources, and so on. We are convinced that socialism has by no means brought to light its inherent possibilities and that this problem will be solved in the course of the development and comparison among its various forms and models, as a result of worldwide scientific examinations.

Western propagandists, who are trying to ascribe all the successes of their countries to capitalism, should be reminded that many of these achievements are owed to the existence of socialism. Without the Soviet Union and its pioneering example in the area of economic planning, and the extensive introduction of the social rights of the individual, and without the wave of the worker and democratic movements, raised by the October Revolution, naturally, the Western countries would not be today what they are. Furthermore, the liberation of the colonies and the dependent countries created prerequisites for a drastic expansion of the world market and thus provided new opportunities for the development of economic relations. Meanwhile, the development of the liberation process took place, to a tremendous extent thanks to that same impetus provided by the October Revolution and the subsequent systematic support which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries gave to the struggle waged by the peoples for their national independence.

Finally, the dynamics itself of a large group of countries taking the socialist path, with all its pluses and minuses, illumined for the world the nature of social progress in our time, clearly proving both the beneficial influence of socialization and the need for efficiently combining social, collective and individual principles. The results of our development could have been incomparably greater had it not been greatly deformed by Stalinism. Perestroika provides the opportunity of restoring in full the values of scientific socialism, enriching them with acquired domestic and global experience and, on this basis, creating a new, much more viable and efficient model of a socialist social system.

#### IV

Therefore, in terms of its social system, the contemporary world is in the stage of establishing a new, nonexploitative socioeconomic system, and in this sense the basic forecast of Marx and Engels proves itself impeccable. But they were not the only ones, for the same was predicted for mankind by Fourier, Owen, Chernyshevsky, and many other prophets.



The true development, however, followed a much more difficult path than any one of them could have anticipated. In assessing the most essential features of the current transitional state of society, in its global dimensions, the following problems may be raised for discussion:

To begin with, the **process of socialization** assumes a universal nature although it advances extremely unevenly, depending on its motive force (revolution or evolution), the level of economic development of culture, historical traditions, the correlation among class forces and many other factors. What are its horizons under the conditions of a continuing tempestuous development of the scientific and technical revolution (automation and intellectualization of the production process in particular)?

Second, the age during which the question of a progressive and just social structure was raised in individual societies (at best, on the scale of Europe), has been replaced by an age during which this question must be posed and solved on a global scale. Judging by a number of indications, we find ourselves at the very beginning of the stage of development of a new civilization, in the course of which the processes of internationalization and socialization become interwoven.

Now as to the conclusions which, in our view, follow from this statement, as applicable to the international situation.

Above all, it is necessary to eradicate from the social and political consciousness the thought of pitting countries against each other based on their affiliation with different social systems. We are indeed different but not opposite and, I repeat, the specific nature of the social system is not greater in terms of its importance than the one based on differences in the level of economic development or political systems.

Accomplishing this difficult but entirely possible turn in the awareness promises to bring tremendous benefits to mankind. The solution of global problems, strengthening reciprocal trust, settling conflicts and developing a new international order are things which, at the cost of tremendous efforts, we are trying to achieve faster and more thoroughly. The objective process of internationalization and integration, reducing the area of uncontrolled developments and upgrading the level of control over global affairs will develop in an incomparably more favorable ideological and political atmosphere. Naturally, all of this does not mean that in the blink of an eye the world will become a paradise of universal unity and concord. Inevitably, there have been and will be a variety of alliances among countries based on their interest, disputes, contradictions, and competition. However, this will take place without any blind intolerance but with an understanding and acceptance of the priority of universal human interests over all other.

The elimination of the "confrontation between systems" would also facilitate the solution of another historical problem by eliminating the grounds for the confrontation between the two main arms of the labor movement and creating prerequisites for extensive interaction and, in the future, the unification of left-wing forces.

Let us emphasize that a major step in this direction is the policy of perestroika adopted by the CPSU, the core of which is the combination of socialism with democracy. Glasnost, self-support of labor collectives, and real guarantees of political freedoms, along with the social rights of the individual and the radical reform of the political system, based on the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference and the laws passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1988, and the initiated process of harmonizing relations among nationalities have been widely acknowledged throughout the world. The development of a socialist state of law means the removal of one of the main reasons for differences in the ranks of the supporters of socialism. Major changes toward democratization are taking place in other socialist countries as well.

But this is not all. The point is that differences between the two basic trends of socialist thought and action, in addition to the attitude toward democracy, apply to yet another essential problem, i.e., the attitude toward the method of development of socialism.

Essentially, the contemporary social democratic movement has chosen as its theoretical credo and political concept the method of uncontrolled self-development of socialization with an extent of management which is more like guideline, as much as objective and subjective circumstances can tolerate this. The social democratic parties do not set in their programs the task of building socialism as a whole, on the basis of a predetermined plan, but formulate specific methods for reaching specific objectives. The weak aspects of this approach are obvious. They have been criticized by the left wing within the socialist movement itself.

The conceptual method for the development of society and giving preference to deliberate rather than uncontrolled development are the features which distinguish communist doctrine and policy. It is precisely the violation of these principles that explains the failure of efforts at reform which were made after the 20th Congress. The prerequisite for the success of perestroika is found in the comprehensive approach which covers not only economics but also politics, spiritual life and international affairs, which link urgent tasks with the prospect of revolutionary renovation of our socialist society.

However, as we note the strong aspect of communist doctrine, we must also see the positive aspect of the social democratic one. It is quite close to real life. It is more pragmatic and is aimed at achieving immediate results from a variety of social measures and political actions. The adoption of such positive elements by us, as

well as the acknowledgment of the very phenomenon of evolutionary socialization, would eliminate a major difference between communists and social democrats.

In discussing the possible consolidation among the supporters of socialism, while retaining the natural variety of views and approaches to one problem of social progress or another, we must take into consideration that the concept of an integral and interdependent world requires the development of the broadest possible social agreement at least on the key problems of social development. Prerequisites to this effect are developing. An awareness is taking shape of joint creativity and universal solidarity, based on values such as the rights and freedoms of the individual, concern for peace and for the natural and spiritual environment of man, help to the deprived and contribution to progress.

Understandably, in order to defend and implement the interests of mankind they must, first of all, become aware of their nature. This is impossible without joint investigation and without eliminating division in scientific knowledge. While in our country the adjective "bourgeois," as applied to the social sciences, meant that this could not apply to any science whatsoever but was pure magic or even charlatanism, "on the other side" the same meaning was invested in the concept of "Marxist." Both sides lost from this but the biggest loser was science itself, which is essentially one and indivisible and which exists objectively, for the sake of seeking the truth.

If we reject the intolerance which took decades to accumulate, the question remains: Is a single science possible, the subject of which would be located in the epicenter of the class struggle? The answer will be negative if we adopt sectarian positions, but unquestionably positive if we remember that the objective of socialism is the good of the entire society and that the interests of universal human development stand above all other interests. Having restored the rights of this basic Marxist-Leninist concept, the new political thinking opened the way also to the elimination of the "great divisions" in science.

Naturally, this does not mean rejecting the originality of the basic trends in contemporary social science—Marxist and non-Marxist—not to mention the various schools and trends which exist within both or in the "no man's land." The competition between ideas and concepts is a natural condition of science, without which it is doomed to sterility. However, this should be precisely a scientific debate and not a clash to death between warring sides, the purpose of which is to destroy each other.

We have briefly touched upon the most essential likely results of the elimination of the "intersystemic" political-ideological confrontation among countries and the transfer of existing differences from the area of intolerance and hostility to that of theoretical and political dialogue and interaction. Going back to the starting point of our considerations, let us emphasize that the

concept according to which the struggle between the two opposite systems is the pivot of global developments no longer reflects reality. This does not mean, however, that it should be simply rejected. The entire point is that from a **main confrontation** the competition between systems (let us repeat once again: not countries but systems) becomes **one of the contradictions** which give an impetus to the progress of mankind and which define its future.

In other words, an apt analogy in this case is the "absorption" of Euclidean Geometry by the Geometry of Lobachevskiy and Riemann and the mechanics of Galileo and Newton by Einstein's theory of relativity. The discovery of general laws did not void the individual ones but merely assigned them a more modest role and defined the limits of their effect.

All of this can be summed up and expressed as follows: East and West, as well as North and South, face the task not only of building bridges across the precipices which divide them today but also try to eliminate these precipices.

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**The Nationalities Issue: Deformities of the Past**  
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[Article by Viktor Dmitriyevich Zotov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences]

[Text] There has been no Stalin for 35 years. However, the dead are holding onto the living. "What was this?" Was the question asked in a PRAVDA article on 2 April 1988, on the events in Yerevan. "What happened?," we asked ourselves, shaken up by the pogroms in Sumgait. What occurred in Nagornyy Karabakh? What are the reasons for the aggravation of relations among nationalities in other parts of our multinational homeland? The most general answer is the following: it is the effect of the deformations of Stalinism, followed by the period of stagnation, in the realm of national and international relations.

What is the solution? Let us repeat after Lenin: Only one solution to the national problem is possible: consistent democracy. That precisely is the purpose of the resolution adopted at the 19th Party Conference on improving relations among nationalities in the USSR.

For many long decades the myth of Stalin as the main, even the brilliant theoretician of the party on the national problem and the closest fellow worker and, subsequently, loyal heir to the cause of Lenin in the building and strengthening of the Soviet multinational state was instilled in the awareness of millions of people. We are familiar with the expression that "Stalin means Lenin today," which later became the formula of the

"Leninist-Stalinist" national policy. Naturally, this formula had a certain meaning, i.e., the fact that the Leninist principles were being distorted precisely with Stalin's knowledge and on his initiative.

Particular praise was heaped on Stalin's article "Marxism and the National Problem," which was written in 1913. It was granted the status of a classical work which substantiated the theory and programmatic stipulations of bolshevism on the national problem. It is true that Lenin's reaction to it was positive (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 48, p 162). However, we must bear in mind that when that article was researched and written Stalin had the possibility to be in direct contact with Lenin and to use his advice and knowledge in this area. It was precisely at that time that Lenin himself personally worked on the national problem and recruited noted party personalities to work on this project. That same journal PROSVESHCHENIYE, which had carried Stalin's article also carried the article by P.I. Stuchka (written under the pseudonym Veteran) "The National Problem and the Latvian Proletariat." A major article against bourgeois nationalism had been written by S.G. Shaumyan, who was corresponding with Lenin. Therefore, Stalin's article was not an extraordinary phenomenon.

Lenin was the author of the most important bolshevik statements on the national problem, published internationally, in the pre-October period. He was the author of fundamental works such as "Critical Notes on the National Problem" (1913), "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" (1914), (The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Theses)" (1916), "Results of the Discussion on Self-Determination" (1916), and others.

In the first Soviet government formed by Lenin after the victory of the October Revolution, Stalin was made people's commissar for nationalities affairs, a position which he held until 1923. The "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" and the appeal "To All Working Muslims of Russia and the East," which proclaimed the principle of equality and sovereignty of the peoples of our country and the right to self-determination, including secession and establishing an independent country, were signed by J. Dzhugashvili-Stalin, as people's commissar for nationalities affairs, and by V. Ulyanov (Lenin) as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

This, however, is no reason at all to claim, even in terms of that time, that Lenin and Stalin held identical views on the national problem, in general, or problems of national-state building in particular. Stalin was, to say the least, insincere when he stated in December 1926 at the 7th Expanded Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee (IKKI) that "never have there been any differences on the national problem between me and the party or Lenin" (J.V. Stalin, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 9, p 65).

In the first years of the Soviet system, when the right of peoples and nations to self-determination became a political reality in our country, there were fears that the bourgeois circles in the national outlying areas could use this right for their own egotistical class interests. The following question was raised: Who should be granted the right to self-determination: the nation as a whole, i.e., the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the working people all of them together, or exclusively the proletariat, exclusively the working people? Why should the proletariat and the Soviet system grant the right to self-determination to a "despised" bourgeoisie?

In his speech at the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in January 1918, Stalin spoke out in favor of the "need to interpret the principle of self-determination as the right to self-determination not of the bourgeoisie but of the toiling masses of a given nation." At the 8th Party Congress (March 1919) Bukharin altogether rejected the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination. He said: "Based on the statement made by Comrade Stalin at the 3rd Congress of Soviets, as a member of the commission I suggest the following formula: self-determination by the toiling classes of each nationality."<sup>1</sup>

Lenin firmly opposed the motion of replacing the self-determination of nations with self-determination by the working people, pointing out that it was "unacceptable in principle" (op. cit., vol 38, p 162). It is possible to speak of the self-determination by the working people only when the proletariat, having realized that its interests conflicted with those of the bourgeoisie, will "separate itself" from the latter. This, however, does not exist in any country other than Russia, not in the most advanced capitalist developed countries nor, even more so, the backward countries where the feudal order prevails. "Each nation must be granted the right to self-determination and this will contribute to the self-determination of the working people" (ibid., p 161), i.e., initially there will be the self-determination of the nation and only then the self-determination of the working people, the self-determination of the nation for the sake of the self-determination of the working people. Such was the Leninist profoundly realistic formulation of this matter, without ostentation and "revolutionary" phrasemongering but, nonetheless, a strictly class-oriented formulation.

At the historical 10th RKP(b) Congress, in 1921, at which V.I. Lenin submitted a report on the political activities of the Central Committee and a report on replacing apportionment with tax-in-kind and on party unity and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation, and spoke on the trade unions and on the fuel problem, Stalin submitted a report on the next party tasks concerning the national problem. The theses of this report were published in PRAVDA 1 month before the congress. On the eve of the congress, in three PRAVDA issues (6, 8 and 9 March), the article by G.V. Chicherin "Against Comrade Stalin's Theses" was printed as a basis for discussion. At the congress itself the theses were also criticized for their



excessively general and abstract nature. They had ignored practical experience and did not define forms of Soviet building or the features of the class struggle and class relations in the national outlying parts of the country. In the course of the debates, V.P. Zatonskiy, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee, said that it was as though Stalin's theses "had been written outside of time and space," and that such theses could have been written both prior to the October Revolution and at different times after it. N.A. Skrypnyk, another delegate from the Ukraine, objected to the theses, stating that they "did not solve the national problem in the least." Stalin rejected the remarks of his critics but, as was to become clear in the 1930s, remembered them. Although Stalin's theses were adopted as a basis, the resolution of the congress on the national problem was drafted by a commission headed by Lenin.

The essential differences in the approaches taken by Lenin and Stalin to the problems of national-state building and relations among nationalities were clearly manifested in the course of the preparations for the founding of the USSR and were manifested, in particular, in the assessment of the so-called "Georgian Conflict." Last year, in a spirit of cleansing our history from major and minor distortions, this problem was described in sufficient detail in the interesting materials of two "PRAVDA Fridays" (8 July and 12 August) as well as in the meaningful article by Doctor of Historical Sciences G.K. Zhvaniya "For the Sake of Truth. On the Question of the 'National Deviationists'," which came out in ZARYA VOSTOKA, the Georgian republic newspaper (26 July), for which reason, regrettably, it is not well-known to the mass readership.

Let us only note that the address of the Georgian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee, headed by M. Mdivani, F. Makharadze and other comrades, opposing Stalin's plan for "autonomization" (according to which the Russian Federation was to become a single Union Soviet state while the other national republics would be included in it with autonomy rights), which discussed Georgia's participation in the USSR independently, bypassing the Transcaucasian Federation, did not conflict with the policy of unification of Soviet republics. It was dictated by the aspiration to strengthen the features of independence within the framework of the Leninist understanding of democratic centralism in a multinational state. Lenin gave Mdivani and his group his trust and support.

Stalin who, visiting Tbilisi in 1921, called upon the communists to "liquidate the nationalistic vestiges, to remove them with a hot iron," and to "strangle the Hydra of nationalism" in Georgia and the Transcaucasus, subsequently ascribed these faults to the leadership of the Georgian Central Committee, the position of which he defined as one of "national deviationism."

After studying all the materials and hearing out the views of many comrades, Lenin reached the conclusion that the concept of "autonomization" was radically wrong.

He suggested another solution to the question: the **voluntary** unification of all Soviet republics, including the RSFSR, in a new multinational form of state: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, based on their full **equality and sovereignty**. Lenin wrote the following to the members of the Politburo: "...We consider ourselves equal with the Ukrainian SSR and others and, together with them, are joining the new union, the new federation.... It is important for us... not to destroy their **independence** but to establish another **new level**, a federation of **equal republics**" (op. cit., vol 45, pp 211-212).

Stalin did not surrender immediately. In one of the articles we named, PRAVDA included a new document: an exchange of notes between Kamenev and Stalin, which took place at the 27 September 1922 Politburo Meeting, in Lenin's absence.

"Kamenev: Ilich was ready to fight in defense of independence. He asked me to meet with the Georgians. He refused even yesterday's amendments. I had a call from M.I." (Mariya Ilinichna—author).

"Stalin: In my view, we must show firmness in opposing Ilich. If a couple of Georgian mensheviks can influence the Georgian communists and, subsequently, Ilich, the question is where does this 'independence' apply?"

Nonetheless, the Stalinist plan for "autonomization" did not pass. Although assessing Lenin's position as "national liberalism," Stalin nonetheless did not dare to insist on his viewpoint and redrafted the entire plan in accordance with Lenin's understanding of the structuring of the USSR. Essentially, however, he did not amend his view. Here is the way Mdivani assessed the confrontation between Lenin and Stalin on the eve of and during the RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, which took place on 6 October 1922, where the question was discussed for 3 hours (because of his state of health Lenin was not present but was in written communication with L.B. Kamenev and several other party leaders): "Initially (without Lenin) we were treated like detainees and were abused. Subsequently, when Lenin interfered, after our meeting with him and after procuring detailed information, communist reason prevailed.... A voluntary and equal union was accepted in the matter of reciprocal relations, and as a result of all this the stifling atmosphere which existed against us vanished; conversely, at the Central Committee Plenum, it was the great-power supporters who were attacked in the statements by Bukharin, Zinovyev, Kamenev and others. Naturally, the plan was Lenin's. However, it was submitted in the name of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and others, who immediately turned matters around.... This part was given such a slap in the face that it will not dare re-emerge soon from the hole in which Lenin pushed it.... Yes, the atmosphere became somewhat clearer but it could darken once again" (see ZARYA VOSTOKA, 26 June 1988).

The "Georgian Conflict" was worsened by the fact that G.K. Ordzhonikidze, who headed the Transcaucasian Kray Party Committee, had a sharply negative attitude toward the views of the Georgian "independents." Unable to restrain himself, he hit one of them who had verbally insulted him (let us point out that neither side was restrained in its expressions: Ordzhonikidze called Mdivani a "speculator and innkeeper," and L. Dumbadze a "fool and a provocateur," and threatened K. Okudzhava, chairman of the Cheka, with the firing squad; in retaliation, A. Kabakhidze described Ordzhonikidze as "Stalin's ass"). In November 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo resolved to send to Georgia a special commission headed by F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, to take an urgent look at the developing situation. Somewhat later, Lenin expressed the view that the commission did not display the necessary impartiality in its investigation of the "Georgian Conflict."

One may consider that the conflict between the two party committees of the Transcaucasus was, naturally, bad and even very bad. However, it was a local problem and could not threaten in the least the all-Union situation. As to the case of manhandling, it was an ugly, unworthy and, finally, immoral act. In general, however, this was a trifle. Anything can happen when a person is excited, particularly among men with hot southern blood. One must, if not seek reconciliation, forget faster this unpleasant story, this "insignificant" incident, as Stalin was to say later.

Lenin's reaction was entirely different. He was indignant and demanded the "exemplary punishment" of Ordzhonikidze (which he considered all the more regrettable, for he personally considered himself Ordzhonikidze's friend). It is of interest to know that Lenin spoke not of Georgian but of **great power** manhandling by Ordzhonikidze, bearing in mind that, as representative of the authority in the eyes of all other citizens of the Transcaucasus, he also embodied in their eyes the central power.

The final document which Lenin dictated was dated 6 March 1923. Lenin wrote to Mdivani and Makharadze the following: "Dear comrades! I am following your work with all my heart. I am indignant by Ordzhonikidze's rudeness and Stalin's and Dzerzhinskiy's indulgences. I am drafting for you notes and a speech. Respectfully, **Lenin**." Alas, there were neither notes nor speech and Stalin, with his patience, administrator's zeal and hatred of the notorious "social nationalism" had his hands untied. Contrary to the spirit of Lenin's last letter, in December 1926 Stalin said that "deviationists" like Mdivani deserve a stricter response. They are a "corrupting faction of most overt opportunism" (J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 9, p 66). Subsequently Beriya went even farther. In his booklet "*On the Question of the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in the Transcaucasus*," he said that between 1927 and 1935 Georgian "national deviationism" "developed into a mercenary agency of fascism and an unprincipled and idea-barren gang of

spies, saboteurs, subversives, intelligence agents and murderers." For several decades Stalin's curse hung over the entire republic party organization.

Let us ask ourselves the following: "Why was it that during those days, on 30 and 31 December 1922, when he had not hours but minutes of life left (his physicians had allowed him to dictate 5 to 10 minutes at first and subsequently no more than 30 to 40 minutes daily), when Lenin's mind, scorning the weakness of the body, worked at full strength so to be able to leave the party and the people a political testament concerning the most important, radical and strategic problems of the building of socialism, **in the course of three sessions (!)** dictated his views in connection with the unfortunate "Georgian Conflict?"

The reason was that what Lenin saw beyond it was something which could threaten the entire cause of building socialism in the USSR and the international unity among working people of different nations and countries. The essence is revealed and the phenomenon is essential. Such is the dialectics. Abstracting himself from the "Georgian Conflict," Lenin considers a problem of tremendous historical importance: How to understand internationalism and nationalism and how to see the manifestations of either: not in the general and abstract formulation of the question "which is totally unsuitable," but as applicable to a big oppressing (or until recently oppressing) nation and a small oppressed (or until recently oppressed) nation.

The true internationalism of a big nation should, according to Lenin, consist not only of observing the formal equality among nations but of something much bigger: its ability, if necessary, to make concessions to "foreigners." Only thus can one remove the mistrust, hurt and unfairness which appear on national grounds. Lenin cautioned that a truly proletarian attitude toward the national question in our country will be of tremendous importance to the future of world history, particularly in the East, when the imperialist oppression of the people has been totally eliminated and when the decisive, long and protracted battle for their liberation will have started.

Lenin's testament on the national problem, an inseparable part of his political testament, is found in the note "On the Question of Nationalities or Their 'Autonomization'."

Lenin died in January 1924 and Stalin gave his familiar oath. Describing the alliance among working people of different nationalities in our country as the "second foundation of the Republic of Soviets" (the first being the dictatorship of the proletariat), he said: "Russians and Ukrainians, Bashkirs and Belorussians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Daghestanis, Tatars and Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Turkmens are all equally interested in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is not only the dictatorship of the proletariat

that saves these nations from the chains and oppression but it is these nations that rescue our Republic of Soviets from the intrigues and sallies of the attacks of the working class with their boundless loyalty to the Republic of Soviets, and their readiness to sacrifice themselves for it. That is why Comrade Lenin tirelessly spoke to us about the need for a voluntary alliance among the peoples of our country and the need for their fraternal cooperation within the framework of the Union of Republics.

"In leaving us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us to strengthen and broaden the Union of Republics. We swear to you, Comrade Lenin, that we shall honorably obey this order as well!" (J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 6, p 49).

As we interpret the past from the positions of the present, the historical facts which became public (obviously, only a small percentage of them) lets us claim that Stalin quite quickly forgot both Lenin's order and his own oath. There was no Leninist-Stalinist national policy. There was a Leninist national policy, which was distinguished by its greatest possible sensitivity, caution, conciliation in approaches to problems of national and international relations, and intolerance of even the slightest unfairness based on national grounds, a policy imbued with true internationalism and humanism. It was replaced by the Stalinist national policy with its administrative-command management methods, arbitrary decisions, mistrust, suspicion and cruelty shown toward people of different nationalities, and savage arbitrariness toward entire ethnic groups.

The term "Leninist-Stalinist national policy," which was created in the second half of the 1930s, was extrapolated from a historical past and reinforced in all possible ways. In promoting the theory of the "two leaders" of the October Revolution, the people who compiled Stalin's "Short Biography," managed even to apply the term "Leninist-Stalinist national policy" to the description of the pre-October and post-February (1917) period of activities of our party (see "Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. *Kratkaya Biografiya*" [Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Short Biography]. Moscow, 1948, p 60). It does not include even a single grain of historical truth.

It is indicative that the curriculum for the course on "History of National Communist Parties," for Soviet and party schools for the 1931/32 school year (it was the first time that this interesting and meaningful course was being introduced, before the time of the falsified "Short Course" of party history, written under the dictation and with the direct participation of Stalin) included a variety of formulations: "Leninist national policy," "Leninist line," "'Leninist principles' in national policy," and "national party policy." However, there was no "Leninist-Stalinist" national policy, although on a few occasions Stalin's name appeared alongside that of Lenin.

A pamphlet written by S.V. Kosior, head of the republic party organization, "For a Leninist National Policy" (excerpt from the political report submitted by the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee at the 11th All-Ukrainian Party Congress) came out in Kharkov in 1930. Stalin's name was not even mentioned in it! Five years later, the collection of articles and speeches by P.P. Postyshev, Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee secretary, already had a different title: "In the Struggle for a Leninist-Stalinist National Party Policy" (Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee Partizdat, Kiev, 1935). Here we already find numerous references to Stalin as the "great teacher, leader and manager." Such was the speed with which the leading party cadres were entrapped by the glorifications of the "cult" and, consciously or subconsciously, themselves became its propagandists.

Whether they had seen each other recently and had anything to say to each other on this subject remains unknown. What is known is that S.V. Kosior, VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Sovnarkom deputy chairman, and P.P. Postyshev, VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo candidate member and first secretary of the Kuybyshev Party Obkom, were transferred out of the Ukraine and executed by firing squad on the same day, on 26 February 1939.

Stalin's distortion of the Leninist national policy took place within the general line of distortion of socialism. Nonetheless, it had its own tragic story.

In the cycle of lectures "On the Foundations of Leninism," delivered in April-May 1924, Stalin discussed the national problem as well. In addition to general accurate concepts, we find in it views on "reactionary nations" (see J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 6, pp 142-143). This was based on references to the founders of Marxism.

Indeed, the founders of Marxism occasionally used the term "counterrevolutionary people (as did Engels in his article "Democratic Pan-Slavism," see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 6, pp 293-294). However, they referred not to the nation as a whole but to the position held by the ruling reactionary classes of that nation in terms of the revolutionary-liberation and democratic movement of other nations. We must point out that Engels' view to the effect that peoples such as the Checks and the southern Slavs, had allegedly exhausted their revolutionary potential by 1848 and, as part of the Austrian Empire, had become "counterrevolutionary," and sentenced to absorption by larger and more viable nations, was not confirmed in the course of subsequent historical developments. Stalin could not be unaware of this. Nonetheless, without any stipulations, he spoke of "reactionary" nations. Could it be that this was done less from strictly "theoretical" considerations than with an eye to subsequent practices?



In 1929 Stalin published his work "*The National Problem and Leninism*." Answering several comrades who had turned to him with a letter, in reasserting his concept, he referred less to Lenin than to his own works on the national problem. In this work, Stalin repeated his definition of what is a nation, which he had presented in 1913 in his article "Marxism and the National Problem," as a historically developed stable community of people, based on common language, territory, economic life and state of mind, manifested in the community of specific features of national culture (see J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 11, p 333). To this day the "Stalinist" definition of nation is still quoted. Without discussing this problem especially, let us merely point out that Stalin's characteristics of a nation may be found in much earlier works by Lenin (see op. cit., vol 1, pp 153-154; vol 2, p 207, vol 8, p 73; and vol 24, p 129). Lenin approached the features of a nation much more thoroughly and dialectically than did Stalin, without schematism and simplification. We believe that now, on the basis of the new thinking and the new sociopolitical situation in the country, changes could and, clearly, will be made in defining a nation. This will be helped also by what we describe as the "new interpretation" of V.I. Lenin's legacy.

It is noteworthy that, as we note the birth of the new socialist nations in the USSR, in the place of the old nationalities and ethnic groups, Stalin did not refer to Lenin at all, although it was precisely Lenin who was the first to introduce in Marxism the concept of "socialist nation" (op. cit., vol 30, p 36). Stalin expressed his views in detail and, one can sense, quite willingly, on the processes of the withering away of nations and the development of a single universal human language "during the second stage of the period of the universal dictatorship of the proletariat."

Such was the situation in theory, based on a distant historical future. In terms of practical affairs, 1929 was the year of the "great change" in the countryside. The historically necessary collectivization of agriculture was being carried out in a "Stalinist" way, through primarily administrative and, frequently, simply coercive methods. The line of struggle against the kulaks, accurate in itself, was interpreted so broadly that it affected a significant percentage of the middle peasantry. Yet it was precisely the middle peasant who, by then, had become the mainstay in the countryside.

The most important question of who was to be termed a kulak and who a middle peasant or a poor peasant was not considered scientifically. In Central Asia, for example, because of confusion in determining the features of the bay (kulak) farm, "a number of mass distortions of the party line concerning the middle peasants and even some part of the peasant poor were allowed to occur" (REVOLYUTSIYA I NATSIONALNOSTI, No 7, 1931, p 25). Millions of "unkulaked" people were shipped out to the North, to Siberia and to other remote uninhabited areas.

The topic of "Stalin and the countryside" is directly related to the national problem. Stalin had described at one point the countryside as the "repository of nationality" (see J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 5, p 49). In addressing the 12th Party Congress in 1923 with a report on the national features of party and state building, he defined the class nature of the national problem under the conditions of Soviet development as the establishment of proper relations between the proletariat of the former nation state and the peasantry, primarily the peasantry of the previously oppressed ethnic groups (ibid., p 240). Six or 7 years later, however, the Stalinist administrative-command system dealt such a terrible blow to that same countryside—Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, the Don, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia—that the consequences of which, starting with 1933, which doomed it to hunger and to withering away, are felt to this day.

Furthermore, Stalin began to mount a previously unparalleled struggle against anything which he could qualify as "local nationalism." In 1934, at the 17th Party Congress, raising the rhetorical question of what type of deviation—great Russian nationalism or local nationalism—was the main danger, he answered thus: "The main danger is the deviation against which we have stopped struggling and which, therefore, has been allowed to develop to the point of a threat to the state" (J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 13, p 362). He immediately proceeded to explain that in the Ukraine, where Skrypnyk and his group had "fallen from grace," the deviation toward Ukrainian nationalism had become the main danger. N.A. Skrypnyk, a noted party and state leader, was groundlessly accused of nationalism. Unable to endure the unfair accusations, he committed suicide. After his death he was accused of even bigger sins: that he had not only headed the national deviation in the Ukrainian Communist Party but had also protected spies and counterrevolutionary elements and fascist agents, with whom he maintained relations. As a result, Skrypnyk was proclaimed an "enemy of the people." The majority of other Leninist cadres in the leadership of the republic party organization, including V.P. Zatsonskiy, fell victim to Stalinist repressions somewhat later, in 1937-1938.

Stalin "noted" similar occurrences in the other national republics.

The thesis of the aggravation of the class struggle in the socialist society, the theme of which was heard in Stalin's speech at the February-March 1937 Party Central Committee Plenum, turned under the conditions of the national republics into repressive measures taken against all bearers of "local" "bourgeois" nationalism.

Let us note the mass nature of such repressions, something which clashed with Stalin's previous official statements. Thus, in 1929, in discussing the comprehensive aid given to previously oppressed and now revived nations in our country in the course of building socialism, he noted, among the various steps which helped

them to "restrain all those elements—albeit few (emphasis mine—author), who are trying to obstruct this party policy" (J.V. Stalin, op. cit., vol 11, pp 353-354). At the 17th VKP(b) Congress, once again Stalin asserted that the "national-deviationist" groups had been "defeated and dispersed" (vol 13, p 347).

But if such was the case, at whom were the mass repressions of 1937-1938 in the national republics aimed?

The flower of the local party-soviet cadres and the intelligentsia, which had been developed with such efforts in the postrevolutionary period, was destroyed in Central Asia. In **Uzbekistan**, at the 3rd Party Central Committee Plenum (September 1937) a special letter written by Stalin and Molotov was made public, in which the first secretary of the **Uzbek Communist Party (b)** Central Committee A. Ikramov was charged with political blindness toward bourgeois nationalists, and with maintaining relations with Bukharin and other "enemies of the people." Along with Ikramov, D. Tyurabekov, chairman of the party's central control commission, I. Artykov, the republic's Komsomol Central Committee secretary, and party obkom secretaries D. Rizayev, N. Israilov and others fell victim of false accusations. Repressive measures were taken in the **Turkmen SSR** against **Turkmen Communist Party (b)** Central Committee Secretary Anna Mukhamedov, Sovnarkom Chairman K. Atabayev, N. Aytakov, chairman of the Central Executive Committee, and the noted party, state and public personalities Ch. Vellekov, Kh. Sakhatmuradov, O. Tashnazarov, D. Mamedov and others. In **Tajikistan**, based on false charges, Central Committee secretaries U. Ashurov and A. Frolov, Sovnarkom Chairman A. Rakhimbayev, and Central Executive Committee Chairman Sh. Shotemor were arrested. Informing on party members became the norm in an atmosphere of universal suspicion and mistrust. It led to the fact that some rayon party organizations actually stopped functioning. Thus, the party organization in Komsomolabadskiy Rayon had only one party member and three candidate party members registered; Shulmakskiy Rayon had one party member and five candidate party members; Vanchskiy Rayon, had three party members and 10 candidate party members; and Nurekskiy and Rokhatinskii Rayons, had four members of the VKP(b) each. In the **Kirghiz SSR**, by the middle of 1938, many of the members of the party Central Committee, elected at the 1st Congress in June 1937, had been slandered and subjected to repressive measures.

The terrifying chariot of repressions rolled also along the steppes of **Kazakhstan** which, from an autonomous republic, became a Union republic. It hit all members and candidate members of the **Kazakh Communist Party(b)** Central Committee Buro, headed by Central Committee secretaries L.I. Mirzoyan and S. Nurpeisov, Sovnarkom Chairman U.D. Isayev, many Central Committee members, secretaries of oblast party committees and chairmen of oblast executive committees, and

almost all secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms. The victims included active participants in the establishment of the Soviet system in **Kazakhstan** U.K. Dzhandosov, Yu. Babayev, M. Ma San-chi, A. Rozybakiyev, A.M. Asylbekov and others. Repressive measures were taken also against noted public personalities and writers, including I. Dzhangugurov, B. Maylin, S. Seyfullin and others....

The "father of the peoples" and his closest circle—the active lay brothers in the highest power echelons (Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Malenkov), high government jurists, who had put the law in the service of lawlessness (Vyshinskiy, Ulrikh), master executioners (Yezhov and Beriia) and others sent to the camps hundreds of thousands of totally innocent people from different ethnic groups, as "enemies" of socialism. Many foreign leaders-internationalists, who had escaped from fascism and hoped to find sanctuary in the USSR, were also subjected to repressive measures.

All of these monstrous crimes against the people took place in the period after the elimination of the exploiting classes in our country and the victory of the foundations for socialism, as codified in the 1936 USSR Constitution, which was known as Stalin's Constitution.<sup>2</sup> The establishment and development of the bureaucratic command-administrative management system led to restricting the rights of Union republics. Gradually, year after year, the supreme authorities of the USSR increased the number of their legislative acts on problems which, in the sense of the 1924 USSR Constitution, were under the jurisdiction of Union republics. According to the 1936 USSR Constitution, legislation concerning the structure of courts and legal proceedings fell under the full jurisdiction of the USSR.<sup>3</sup>

On the very eve of the war, in 1939-1940, in accordance with the will of their peoples, Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia joined the USSR and so did the republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which restored their Soviet system. However brief the prewar period of socialist changes was in these areas, there as well the repressive machinery of Stalinism was able to leave its harsh marks and to continue its "work" after the war, in 1949-1950.

The Great Patriotic War was the harshest test of the strength of the Soviet multinational state. It was able to pass it, thanks to the powerful impetus of the October Revolution and thanks to socialism. At that time, Stalin said: "All nations in the Soviet Union unanimously rose to the defense of their homeland, justifiably considering the present Patriotic War the common cause of all working people regardless of nationality or religious belief" (J.V. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuz" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union]. Voenizdat, Moscow, 1948, p 118). However, already by the end of the war, because of Stalin's ill will, entire ethnic groups—Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks,

Karachays, Caucasian Turks, Kurds and Crimean Tatars—were expelled from their native areas and resettled elsewhere. They were deprived of civil rights and freedom of movement.

The claim was that many of them were traitors who had collaborated with the Germans. Yes, there were traitors but there also were people who were not, people who were heroes and who fought fascism. However, in his novel "Honor From One's Mouth," which was awarded the Stalin Prize in 1949, A. Perventsev depicted the Crimean Tatars as being, almost to a person, accomplices of the occupation forces. This accusation was immoral and chauvinistic. In the same way that there neither are nor could there be any "reactionary peoples," there are no "bad" ethnic groups. Incidentally, in terms of the then enemy Stalin was much fairer, noting, in reference to historical experience, that "the Hitlers come and go but the German people and the German state remain."

Stalin's deviation from the Leninist principles of national-state policy had a severe impact also on the process of the establishment and development of the global socialist system. Since the Yugoslav leadership, headed by Tito, refused to bend to Stalin's diktat in terms of the ways and means of building socialism, the Yugoslav Communist Party was accused of being "under the power of spies and murderers," and the country was exiled from the socialist system. Many noted party and state leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland and some other countries were subject to illegal and groundless repression. Stalin did not tolerate dissidents and, even less so, any opposition in his country or abroad.

The authoritarianism which stemmed from Stalinism and was based on dogmatism, rejection of alternate thinking and preservation of obsolete theoretical concepts and principles of organization and economic management and ways and means of political leadership, was revived in the 1970s and start of the 1980s and was the main reason for stagnation in Soviet society.

We are as yet to surmount entirely the consequences of the previous distortions of socialism, including theoretical ones.

The most important and truly crucial task of perestroika is the full theoretical and practical restoration of the Leninist concept of socialism with a view to the revolutionary renovation of our society and its enhancement to an essentially new qualitative status. This presumes the restoration and the Leninist principles of national policy, which were greatly distorted during the periods of Stalin's cult of personality and stagnation. "...It is only the systematic implementation of the Leninist national policy that is the only strong foundation for our development," the 19th Party Conference emphasized.

#### Footnotes

1. In this connection, the notes to the minutes of the 8th RKP(b) Congress, which were published in 1959, read that "Bukharin incorrectly presented the statements which Stalin made at the 3rd All-Union Russian Congress of Soviets." This formulation appears excessively categorical. The point is that Stalin's position was not clear: on the one hand he did not dispute the principle itself of the right of nations to self-determination, including their total separation from Russia; on the other, essentially he had reached the same conclusion that Bukharin had, rejecting this principle. Suffice it to compare Bukharin's "self-determination of toiling classes of each nationality" and Stalin's "self-determination of the toiling masses of a given nation." What was indicative was that Stalin himself, at the congress, did not react in the least to Bukharin's appeal to him and did not participate in the debates.

2. Of the 30 members of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the new Constitution, 16 were executed by firing squad between 1937 and 1940. This included N.I. Bukharin and K. Rabak, the authors of the main draft of the Constitution; V.Ya. Chubar, Central Committee Politburo member and deputy chairman of the USSR Sovnarkom, who had spent many years working in the Ukraine; A.S. Yenukidze, USSR Central Executive Commission Presidium secretary (until 1935); I.S. Unshlikht, secretary of the Council of the Union, USSR Central Executive Commission; D.Ye. Sulimov, chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom; N.M. Goloded, chairman of the Belorussian Sovnarkom; G. Musabekov, Sovnarkom chairman of the Transcaucasian Federation (until 1936) and other noted party and state leaders. Two committed suicide, including P.P. Luvchenko, chairman of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, after shooting his wife to death to save her from pain and torture.

3. In 1957 it was resolved to restore this section of the principle codified in the 1924 USSR Constitution. In this connection the 11 February 1957 USSR Supreme Soviet Law "On Transferring Under the Jurisdiction of Union Republics Legislation on the Structure of Courts of Union Republics and the Adoption of Civil, Criminal and Procedural Codes" was promulgated.

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#### Culture: Problems of Development

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[Article by Vasily Georgiyevich Zakharov, USSR minister of culture]

[Text] It is obvious to everyone today that so far the most tangible results of perestroika have been achieved in improving the moral atmosphere in society. Cultural life



has become the epicenter of the people's spiritual activities; the authority of the artistic intelligentsia, which has become aware of the real extent of its influence on the destinies of the country, has increased noticeably.

The 19th Party Conference reasserted the trend of restoration of the Leninist concept of the cultural revolution. From the very start of the struggle for the elimination of illiteracy, V.I. Lenin emphasized that "literacy alone would not take us too far. We need a tremendous enhancement of culture" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 170). According to Lenin, the task of the development of culture becomes decisive on the very day following the socialist revolution.

Unquestionably, our accomplishments on the cultural front, such as comprehensive literacy of the country's population, the accessibility, and democratic nature of the use of the most important sources of culture and the development of popular talent, were unquestionable. Nonetheless, the fact that today the "tremendous enhancement" in such a delicate matter as culture cannot be achieved through the simple mechanical increase in the number of books, motion pictures, and club space has become particularly strongly highlighted. Qualitative changes and serious and profound restructuring in all areas of the sociocultural sphere are necessary.

The post-April resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government stipulated a number of steps aimed at the priority development of sectorial culture. Specific prospects for its restructuring, accelerated updating of material facilities and substantial improvements in conditions promoting the activities of the artistic intelligentsia and the creative associations, were earmarked. Today the cultural workers are toiling in a largely unaccustomed and difficult situation: the enhancement of the role of socialist culture, as one of the most important instruments in the revolutionary changes, required of our area major changes in both its own mechanism and the forms of its influence on society.

Under such circumstances, it was quite difficult to initiate the conversion from the customary system of administrative-command management to the new ways, within the USSR Ministry of Culture itself and within the local state sectorial management authorities. Approaches essentially different from those of the past in terms of man's spiritual life and differentiation, as Lenin had predicted, in the ideological and spiritual areas called for abandoning many management habits of "influencing" the artistic intelligentsia, a revision in the nature and forms of relations with creative associations and collectives and enhancement of responsibility for assignments.

The solution of these problems, as we determined, rests on "three foundations":

Conceptual substantiation of the further development of the main areas of culture:

Profound and comprehensive democratization of internal creative processes as well as forms of "social consumption" of culture;

Improving the material and technical base of the sector.

Any whatsoever noticeable changes in spiritual life are impossible today without a profound reinterpretation of the strategy of societal cultural development. This process is an indivisible part of the elaboration of the concept of a new aspect of socialism, the need for the continuation of which was mentioned by M.S. Gorbachev at the January meeting with men of science and culture. Our new approaches are based, above all, on the rejection of the dogmatic and authoritarian methods of the preceding period, which caused great harm to culture and the arts and seriously obstructed the live creative process. Let us remember that even sacred concepts, such as idea- and party-mindedness and the national aspect of art were frequently used as instruments for ignorant prohibitions; closing down an "inconvenient" show or an exhibit of "illegal paintings" meant displaying "firmness." All of this not only deadened art and hindered its development but also triggered the opposite reaction: the effect of the attraction for the "forbidden fruit," particularly in youth circles, was invariably triggered.

Not only because of the old prohibitions but also as a result of the neglectful attitude on the part of our composers about the fate of the domestic theater, the natural vacuum was filled by low-grade music.

Let us frankly say that this situation caused us both esthetic as well as moral-political losses, for as bourgeois "mass culture" penetrated the country, the young people mastered, along with it, the alien morality of fashionable idols, the struggle against which, through prohibitions, became increasingly difficult.

By breaking with such a practice, we are firmly abandoning the administrative-command methods of governmental "influence" on artistic phenomena and efforts to divide art into "low" and "high" genres. It is pertinent to recall the objection which I.O. Dunayevskiy, the acknowledged master of Soviet popular music, had to "rating art by fictitious grades." As early as 1949, he wrote: "...I have always taken seriously all music and in all cases quality has been the supreme criterion of its rating."

Naturally, to an even greater extent today we could argue as to the nature of rock music, whether it is democratic and peace-making or a "satanic" phenomenon. However, no one has the right to ban it on the basis of personal or group tastes and biases. The widespread popularity which this music enjoys among young people makes it incumbent upon us not only to take it into

consideration but also to study it and to compare it with what we are actually offering the youth masses, and thus avoid putting our foot in it, as was the case in the past with jazz or the Beatles. I am also convinced that we should not pit one against the other, such as rock against classical and folklore, and so on. In aesthetic education all types and genres of music are important, for the main thing is the high artistic standard of a work and the professionalism of its performers. As to classical and folk art, we cannot fail to support them, for without such support the roots of our priceless artistic legacy will simply wither away.

Nonetheless, life has repeatedly taught us how dangerous it is to confuse a wish with reality, particularly in the spiritual area. Despite our best intentions, in the next few years we shall not be able, figuratively speaking, to set all children behind easels or put a violin in their hands. The reality is such that in secondary school, despite the reform, in the junior classes, as in the past, only 1 hour weekly is allocated to music and drawing, and none at all in the senior classes. In vocational-technical schools, lessons in esthetics have been reduced to the lowest level. As a whole, there are only 56,000 music and song teachers in more than 130,000 general education schools in the country.

Naturally, we can also cite many examples of successful work. This includes universal aesthetic training in schools in Leningrad Oblast, the many clubs attached to children's public libraries, the universal training of children offered by the museum in Ivanov, the children's amateur theater clubs in Belorussia and Armenia, the dozens of youth associations under the TYuZ and studio theaters, and so on. The USSR Ministry of Culture has set up an interdepartmental council which coordinates efforts in the dissemination of music and promotes the mass music and aesthetic upbringing of young people. We are doing everything possible to disseminate the experience in the development of a network of philharmonic orchestras for children and adolescents attached to the concert organizations in the country and have already organized more than 30 of them.

However, I am convinced that all of these efforts will provide only a superficial or one-time result unless we observe two most important prerequisites. The first is mandatory instruction in artistic culture for everyone, and developing a taste for it from early childhood, from kindergarten and primary and secondary school, in the same way that the children learn arithmetic, grammar and the natural sciences. The second is developing a continuing system of esthetic education which will include concern for cultural life through the entire nation.

The CPSU Central Committee supported our proposal of drafting a scientifically substantiated all-Union Comprehensive Program for Esthetic Education of the Population. Currently the USSR Ministry of Culture, together with 30 other departments and 60 different

organizations and creative associations, has already completed a draft for such a program. The draft was approved by the Scientific Council of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau On Social Problems and will soon be submitted to nationwide discussion. Nonetheless, how can we succeed in making good intentions not degenerate into the latest loud statement or remain on paper only?

I believe that, above all, we must take a sober look at the situation in our entire culture. For a number of years claims of the constant "cultural growth" of the people thundered victoriously. The number of people "engaged in amateur activities" was striking with its round figures: it was a though the entire country was involved in an unbridled round dance. However, ever more frequently clubs, libraries, museums and theaters stayed empty, regardless of whether such facilities existed on a "per capita" basis. The secret resided elsewhere, in the reduced interest in them and in their effect on society.

It became obvious that the very concept of the work of cultural and educational institutions had become hopelessly obsolete since the 1920s and 1930s. The standard club, which had been set up during the period of the elimination of illiteracy and the collective reading of newspapers, has remained to this day loyal to the traditions of an admonitory education and passive time use by participants. Artistic amateur performances are unquestionably an inseparable and organic part of a club or house of culture. However, let us be objective here as well: to begin with, the standards of such activities entirely depend on the existence of good organizing forces in the club and outside financial support; secondly, the model itself of the club excludes the mass participation of the population, for there is no such thing as, if you feel today like singing, drawing or performing on the stage, come and do it. There are no facilities in the clubs for such things; here, as in sports, they have their "champions." Ever more frequently semi-professional collectives are being created under the label of folk creativity. They become the permanent participants in prestige-oriented reviews and festivals and tours abroad, for which they sometimes are paid out of public funds. It is difficult to estimate to how many undiscovered talents they have blocked a path to great art!

The real solution of this problem is the development of active and mass forms of organization of the cultural recreation of the people. We selected an essentially new type of such a multi-functional institution, which we named recreation center. Its structure was given its final shape at the closing of the all-Union competition for the best standard project for such a center, which was sponsored by the USSR Ministry of Culture jointly with the Union of Architects. Yes the new centers are aimed above all precisely at the development of various types of active projects. This involves various games, tests and exercises for children and adults, using electronic calculators, computers and video equipment, special simulators and attachments for health improvement procedures, and workshops for various types of technical and

artistic creativity. Naturally, the centers include the traditional exhibition and motion picture halls, libraries, and youth discotheques. We are planning to build 200 such centers this 5-year period and reach a total of 900 by the end of the century.

Nonetheless, the cultural institutions must not stop even at such a radical reorientation. It is obvious that the essentially new possibilities provided by the recreation centers will create prerequisites for turning the mass recreation areas, not in words, as in the past, but in fact, into centers for political and educational work among the population and into channels for information on the activities of local leaderships and on problems affecting the population. Here as well we should try to avoid the categorical division of audiences into active "lecturers" and passive students, provide comfortable premises for debates, ensure the democratic manifestation of the will of the people concerning local and national problems, and make everyone feel at home in the recreation centers.

New plans and programs for further development are awaiting today all of our cultural areas. A great deal in the arts needs profound renovation. Here complex and sometimes contradictory processes are taking place. After the stormy congresses and plenums of the creative associations, which rejected the obsolete dogmas blocking the path of Soviet art and largely updated their leaderships, the artistic intelligentsia is now facing days of difficult work in exercising the long-awaited new creative rights and stricter civic obligations. Serious practical decisions were required also in the case of a seemingly theoretical problem, extensively discussed in the press, such as the new interpretation of our past domestic culture. This has been manifested particularly clearly in the attitude toward the Russian and Soviet vanguards of the 1900s-1920s.

A paradoxical situation had existed for a number of years. The best museums and famous Western collectors proudly displayed to the world paintings by artists of the new Russia, they had acquired, whereas in the homeland of Kandinskiy, Malevich, Larionov, Shagal, Goncharova and Filonov their masterpieces were embarrassedly, or even with open scorn, hidden in repositories. Foreign art experts wrote with admiration of the originality and uniqueness of the masters of Russian neoprimitivism, suprematism, futurism and constructivism, while the new generations of Soviet painters "studied" their predecessors only through the sarcastic references of prohibition critics or, the luckier ones, from foreign monographs.

Today justice has been restored and the best works of the domestic avant-garde painters and painters of other schools have become part of a general exhibit by the leading museums in the country, as an organic and legitimate part of Russian and Soviet art. It is as though the broad Soviet public began to discover for itself many interesting phenomena from the history of domestic

culture. Furthermore, priority was given in retrospective exhibits to such painters, first of all in their homeland and only then abroad, rather than vice versa, as was the case in the past.

Mentally turning back to the more distant and the very recent past, let us recall that banns, let us say, on the art of Kandinskiy or Dali originated not only in the heads of culture officials but also in artistic circles, in any case among those who had monopolized a single trend in art, and who instilled in all other people that it was precisely this that was most consistent with the principles of socialist realism. The study of letters to the editors of newspapers and journals and cultural institutions also indicates that frequently audiences and the readers themselves called for "removing" from spiritual life one work of art or another. In this connection, I am convinced that we must mandatorily develop in the people the "culture of disagreement," and teach them to respect other people's perceptions and the right of everyone to his own opinion.

For example, the youth exhibits which have been held over the past 3 years, in which the culture authorities and the Association of Painters gave the public the opportunity to see works in a great variety of trends and artistic styles, triggered a great deal of interest. Such a new approach to exhibits was socialist pluralism in action. Nonetheless, our support of creative quests by no means indicates esthetic omnivorousness and does not protect from critical evaluations painters who try to compensate for their lack of skill with fanciful subjects and artistic means. Naturally, in opening the doors to the old vanguard and the new trends in art, we do not have in the least in mind the other extreme, that of granting them monopoly rights in Soviet culture and abandoning the realistic achievements of domestic trends in the arts.

In solving, together with the creative associations, conceptual problems in the development of the arts, the ministry and the country's cultural authorities proceed from the fact that it is important to improve conditions which would enable painters to express their professional and civic views. Thus, having increased appropriations for commissioning and purchasing works of art by 50 to 100 percent, the USSR Ministry of Culture is allocating most of the funds to the individual republics, for concern for material aid to artists by the state is one of the unquestionable gains of socialism.

However, I do not agree with men of culture who, in the heat of today's polemics, no longer grant the state authorities the right to consider, sensitively but closely, the extent to which one painter or another is "liked by the people." One of the means of objectively considering the opinion of the viewers, in our mind, is promoting sales at exhibits. Despite the expressed fears, this will not lower the standards of the art but will take it even more closely to the viewer. And although by no means will everyone be able or willing to pay the price of a painting,



at least he would know its actual material price. Furthermore, such sales would obviously play a role in developing in the people a good taste for decorating their homes, and develop a new alternate mass culture.

Radical changes are taking place also in the concept of the country's participation in international artistic life. In the case of the graphic arts, no single creative area in our country has had such weak foreign contacts. Works by contemporary Soviet painters are rarely exhibited in world museums and poorly represented at foreign exhibits, although the interest of the world public in our masters has noticeably increased in recent years. Yet socialist art does not lose its progressive humanistic positions in the least and a great deal is being expected of it in the contemporary struggle for a new thinking.

Our tactics of promoting Soviet art abroad calls, in addition to extensive exchanges of exhibits, also participation in international auctions. The first sale of a number of paintings by Soviet painters of different schools already took place successfully in Moscow, managed by the universally famous Sotheby auctioneers. Unfortunately, not everyone supports this promising initiative. "Could it be," cautiously thinks some men of culture, "that a knock of a gavel may cost the fatherland the loss of works the brilliance of which the public will realize only tomorrow!" Naturally, we answer, one must sacredly protect the achievements of native culture but, at the same time, actively promote the live process of universal exchange of present spiritual values! In this area one cannot gain without giving something, and our museums have long and urgently needed a fresh influx of modern art works. No one intends to squander historical stocks.

The profound renovation of all aspects of the creative life by men of culture and progress is possible today only by democratizing the system of cultural management and improving relations between state authorities and creative associations and organizations. In this area as well something has already been accomplished in the post-April period.

Democratization in artistic life was manifested above all in significantly expanding the real and not simply the statutory rights and, respectively, the obligations of creative organizations. The main task was to help initiative-minded and dedicated work by all talented people in all creative associations and collectives, and to provide scope for their innovative search and civic actions. The creation of social groups, such as the Soviet Culture Foundation, the All-Union Music Society and the Association of USSR Theater Workers, became major features of democratization.

How are democratic changes practically developing in the creative area, and can one speak of real returns? Let us take as an example the complex experiment in restructuring the management of theatrical affairs, in which 115 theaters throughout the country participated in 1987. Its

distinguishing features were glasnost and increased creative and economic opportunities for the participants, and a fuller and more extensive consideration of public opinion. This experiment was a test of a number of new developments in the artistic, organizational and economic life of the theaters. The initial results have indicated that a number of collectives were able to increase interest in their performances by mass audiences, to strengthen the links between theaters and playwrights, enhance the role of material incentives in the lives of theater companies and, in the final account, provide favorable conditions for the manifestation of creative activeness by everyone. Together with the Association of Theater Workers, the USSR Ministry of Culture is closely following the development of events and recommending to other theaters features which have clearly proved their usefulness.

Democratization instilled truly a new life also in the theater studio movement. In recent years, the cultural authorities have actively supported this promising form of stage art. The studio theater, the backbone of which, as a rule, consists of young people, is not only a reserve of fresh acting forces but also an excellent school for new directors and an area for their creative development. Many outstanding masters of the Soviet theater began their careers precisely on the "small stage." The main social value of the studio movement, nonetheless, is that it feeds a vivifying stream into the creative world and leads to a variety in theater work. The great achievements of the classical stage should not obstruct the search for new models of acting. For that reason, forms so far unusual to us will become an organic part of the currently developed concept for the development of the Soviet theater, such as a theater without actors (with changing companies), a theater operating on the basis of self-support, single-topic theaters, and others.

The new regulation on the procedure for rating acting and artistic personnel in theaters, concert organizations, and music and dance collectives is also aimed at developing the democratic foundations in the life of actors and musicians and upgrading the autonomy of local authorities. Henceforth most of the rating will be done directly by the creative collectives.

As a whole, currently the very style of relations between state authorities and men of culture and creative associations is undergoing significant changes. The Ministry of Culture and the other governmental institutions are not only abandoning the practice of administrative interference in the creative process but have also adopted as their rule to implement many of their management and method actions and to discuss problems of the development of cultural sectors jointly with the creative associations. As a theater worker said, metaphorically, the cultural authorities and the creative associations are, under the new conditions, like the two hands of a single artistic body. In order to create this type of new atmosphere, however, a great deal has to be accomplished—a process which is still incomplete—changing the way of

thinking and durable habits of the leading apparatus itself and amending its functions. In particular, the steps taken by the ministry to annul about 1,100 of its regulations and instructions, which contained conflicting and obsolete stipulations and which excessively regulated all aspects of activities of sectorial workers, met with a great response.

I have frequently heard men of culture frankly admit that "who would have thought that learning democracy would be so difficult!" Yes, why conceal it, relations between the local culture authorities and creative collectives frequently developed in a conflicting way, above all because of the inability and unwillingness on the part of our personnel to work with the artistic intelligentsia in a truly new way, under the new circumstances. Actually, the state official is not always ready to part with his "rights."

But are the artistic intelligentsia and its creative associations themselves doing everything possible to ensure the triumph of democracy? Reality has proved that the old ills of stagnation frequently afflict very young social organisms. It was no accident that there was talk of a new clan of "bureaucracy of actors:" the public was able to notice elements of bureaucratization and most recent cliquishness in contemporary creative groups. Some members of creative associations are trying to strengthening their leading status by borrowing features from the state and trade union management structures. This is the same type of second-rate nature of state authorities in the development of the arts which they had already condemned as bureaucratic in their public statements. It was the Bulgarian comrades who pointed out the danger of such changes although, it is true, on their own grounds, in the course of the party and nationwide discussions which were held in Bulgaria on the problems and tasks of perestroyka in the spiritual area. They clearly voiced the idea of the need to free Bulgarian creative associations from some strictly governmental and trade union functions, which is a thought worthy of the closest possible attention in our country as well. Therefore, granting such rights to the creative organizations themselves, we believe, is the only proper way for the development of the artistic sphere. Meanwhile, the state authorities and the creative associations must, once again, define more profoundly and accurately their own areas of activity. It is only this type of approach that, clearly, will save both from bureaucratization.

We are pleased that, although slowly, many areas of creative life which had been totally inaccessible in the past are becoming democratized. For example, in the area of the graphic arts, now the state authorities, together with the Union of Painters and the USSR Academy of Fine Arts, are using the competition system in placing state orders and designing monuments and monument systems, much more extensively, in an atmosphere of openness and glasnost and organizing professional and public discussion of new works more frequently. Here is another example: a recent study of the

work of the State Committee of Experts for Graphic Art of the USSR Ministry of Culture showed that some noted men of culture had been members of the commission for most of their conscious life. Despite the great respect for and trust in such people, we cannot fail to see that such circumstances create grounds for the blossoming of subjective tastes and friendly biases and lead to close ties between such commissions and creative groups. For that reason, the ministry disbanded the expert commissions, so that they can be regularly restaffed, no less than once every 2 years. As a whole, a system is being developed which will ensure extensive information on works which are being purchased.

The opinion of men of culture and arts and the public on topical problems in the development of our sector is becoming a prerequisite for daily work by the personnel of the USSR Ministry of Culture. In face-to-face discussions, even the most hardened formalistic chief does not dare to approach sensitive problems from the position of dividing culture into "big" and "small." For a head of a small ensemble, who is defending his rights may occasionally have much better arguments than the director of a famous theater.

Equally inconceivable today is the possibility of solving a number of pressing problems and settling difficult situations in the area of interaction among national cultures without the live and close communication with people. We must take into consideration all specific suggestions on the strengthening of integration processes and the autonomy of Soviet nations and ethnic groups in the area of cultural developments. A special subdivision on nationality problems has been set up to this effect by the ministry as part of its structure.

In speaking of priorities, let me emphasize that it is difficult to find today another sector of cultural life in which so many unsolved problems have piled up as in the variety theater. Actually, in this case we must not separate it from general concert work, which requires a profound democratization. The old methods of managing musical life have virtually exhausted their possibilities. This tangibly effects the quality of concert work and contributes to the blossoming of bureaucratism in the creative collectives and in the attitude of various departments toward them. Lacking contemporary methods for intercourse with the general audiences, the concert organizations no longer play the role of centers for musical-aesthetic upbringing of the population. Consequently, the interest of the public in operas and symphonic and chamber music has declined in many parts of the country.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree On Improving Concert Work in the Country gave us, with the help of the Union of Composers, a program of specific steps for the democratization of this entire area and for strengthening its material and technical facilities. A few things have already been accomplished: the rights of philharmonic orchestras and

concert organizations in setting the wages of performers and planning the entire work have been broadened; a number of plan indicators which were burdening their activities have been eliminated. This autonomy will be intensified by transferring to the local areas other functions related to coordinating concert work.

As a whole, however, changes in musical life remain, for the time being, so insignificant and half-way that they have not brought about any whatsoever noticeable changes and are already clearly behind the real changes which are taking place in the creative world. In the past year, for example, the basic organizational principle, according to which all paid concert activities must be handled by the state concert organizations, which was included in the decree, has been virtually ignored. As a result, the number of self-styled "organizers" of concerts has been steadily increasing. In our view, such an arbitrary consumerist approach to creative cadres has nothing in common with the true democratization of proper services to the population and can only lead to anarchy in the organization of concerts throughout the country.

The ministry recently held an all-Union conference at which culture personnel, together with the masters of the art of music, comprehensively discussed and, subsequently, submitted to the USSR Gosplan a new Regulation on Concert Activities. We hope that the steps which were taken will enable us to eliminate many obstructions in the development of this important artistic and educational area.

The greater attention paid to our sector presumes also enhancing the responsibility of the ministry for the condition of the moral and psychological climate in the creative collectives. In this area everything is far from being as it should be, which is quite worrisome.

K. Yu. Lavrov, people's artist of the USSR and chairman of the board of the USSR Union of Theater Workers made the bitter admission that today the overall moral potential of the creative workers in the theater is inadmissibly low. They frequently lose qualities, such as an intelligent approach and a tactful attitude toward colleagues....

Yet intolerance, cliquishness and squabbling on art topics are tearing apart not only theater circles. It is obvious that the prime reason of such phenomena is the misinterpretation of democracy by the actors, musicians and painters themselves as well as their managers, who bear direct responsibility to society for developing creative personalities. This makes particularly important the principle-minded and active stance of party and trade union organizations and creative collectives.

Paying attention to the "personal aspect" in the life of an artist is, to us, above all an evaluation of the **personal** moral criteria governing his creativity, which are inseparable from the civic position of a painter, a writer or an

actor. When Svyatoslav Rikhter, guided by his conscience, makes a concert tour of dozens of small towns and settlements in Siberia, where in which even an oblast-level "star" is a rare guest, this is the act of an **individual**. But what motivates other considerably less famous musicians who concentrate their performances strictly in the West but then return to their native homes to recover and rest, rejecting even minimal performances for the local public? Where are the educational ideals and democratic principles of their great predecessors?

In considering such a difficult topic, one unwittingly turns to our art critique and modern journalism, which are the remarkable phenomena of perestroika. Why, however, when they attack so powerfully the institutions which were once considered impeccable (including the theaters), ministries and entire sectors, the journalists frequently do not single out individual bearers of negative trends? It seems to me that in this case the press falls into the opposite extreme compared with the past, fearing accusations of engaging in the "persecution" of personalities. The result is that it is possible sharply to "criticize" an entire creative collective but that criticizing a specific conductor, singer, painter or poet is no longer "in the spirit of the times." But what if that individual or, rather, his actions, are representative of an entire phenomenon which clashes with the ideals of perestroika?

Nor can I understand the views taken by some popular publications which, although publishing negative responses to their critical materials (which occurs extremely rarely), invariably attack those who disagree with such violence that they obviously kill any desire for further clarification of the truth. Could it be that such publications themselves become an area which is truly closed to public criticism?

Yes, the "tremendous enhancement of culture," as well as its entire role in social change require serious changes in understanding the role of the broadest possible circle of responsible individuals. How right V.I. Lenin was when, thinking of the fate of the Soviet state, he pointed out once that "what we are short of is clear: we are short of proper standards within the ruling communist stratum" (op. cit., vol 45, p 95).

Alas, in frequent cases people who determine to a great extent the destinies of big and small "centers of culture" lack such organic standards. I have frequently had the opportunity to hear from personnel in our sector: "There is order in our theaters, museums and philharmonic orchestras only when they are visited by the obkom (gorkom) first secretary himself."

Perestroika raises questions. Why is it considered normal and even reputable for a plant to maintain a soccer team while taking care of the needs of an oblast museum or theater is considered totally alien? Why is it that for years on end a rayon library must wait for shelves



ordered in another republic rather than have a local sponsor? Why is it that although club workers have the right to a 30 percent salary raise (paid out by their own sovkhozes and kolkhozes), farm managers pay them such sums extremely rarely, while the local party and soviet authorities tolerate this attitude? And why is it that to the local leadership a theater or philharmonic orchestra are extremely rarely considered prestigious and favorite offspring but instead, most frequently, as a critic aptly put it, a pain in the neck? How not to fear in this case that, under the conditions of the conversion of all enterprises, sectors and entire areas to self-financing and self-support, once again local culture will find itself at the very end of the table!...

The country's leadership had the resolve publicly to debunk the "residual principle" in financing the socio-cultural area and to allocate significant funds for building cultural projects this 5-year plan. Yet the local authorities have not found the strength to abandon the habit of looking a club or library through the lens of the durable stereotype of their own tasks and interests. The result of this has been that only one-third of the rayon houses of culture scheduled for completion last year were actually completed. Equally poorly implemented is the program for building concert halls, new theaters, museums, exhibition halls and libraries.

Naturally, all of these problems are not only of local but of national importance as well. Several important governmental resolutions have already been passed leading to the formulation of a basic program for strengthening the material and technical foundations of culture. The Ministry of Culture drafted for submission to the USSR Council of Ministers proposals on steps to provide our institutions with modern technical facilities and equipment. The current governmental decree, according to which 20 of the largest sectorial ministries are involved, for the first time, in manufacturing equipment for cultural institutions, was already passed. As to the role of the local authorities in the enhancement of culture, we could cite the recent fact of interested attention shown in the future of this sector by Moscow's city soviet which, together with our ministry and other departments, formulated a detailed program for the development of theater work in the capital until the year 2000. The program calls for increasing the number of theater seats by 50 percent. Unfortunately, the future of many obsolete Moscow museums, libraries and exhibition halls has still not been determined. As a whole, I believe, such a comprehensive solution of the problem should set the example in other areas.

Let us point out that the technical backwardness of the sector is closely related to the general neglect shown toward problems of the economics of culture. Lack of initiative, dependency and the inability of managers to "handle money" were a natural reaction to the system of prohibitions and restrictions which had been instilled for many years. It is only of late that a variety of paid

services to the population in the area of recreation has begun to be introduced. This has provided cultural institutions with additional development funds.

I am convinced that, as a whole, the economics of culture must undergo a gradual but extensive conversion to a system of contractual relations with creative workers and replace the obsolete forms of paying for their work with more flexible ones, including contracts. It is necessary firmly to abandon the system of subsidies, wherever they have become a passive form of financing culture, such as in concert work, which hinders its development. It would be expedient, for example, for all philharmonic activities to be financed in full by the state through the local authorities and local soviets, while entertainment performances to be converted to self-financing on the basis of internal cost accounting, or else to allow the creation of independent concert organizations.

I believe that in order to avoid the commercializing of culture, it is particularly important for the state authorities to supervise the development of the priority areas in concert activities. Above all, in addition to the work of philharmonic orchestras, this includes reciprocal exchange of works of national cultures and music propaganda, concert services to rural and remote areas and concerts for children and adolescents.

But what about the idea of extensively applying the principles of self-support in culture? Today we frequently hear suggestions of converting **all** culture to cost accounting. Personally, I believe that in our sector there truly are areas in which self-support could and should be applied. However, converting to full cost accounting "cornerstones" of popular culture such as theaters, libraries, museums and philharmonic orchestras, would be simply fatal in terms of the spiritual upbringing of the Soviet person and would undermine our principles of social equality in the use of culture.

Today such questions already go beyond the range of theory because of the tempestuous development of the cooperative movement and its application in the realm of culture. It is noteworthy that a cooperative which has decided to organize a concert or sell home-made music tapes, could, until recently, be created even by organizations totally unrelated to the arts, such as a shipbuilding yard or... a public bath and laundry combine. We are in trouble when a baker starts making shoes! Cooperative "impresarios," who organize instant performances and express concerts frequently take professional theater and stage workers away from planned performances and shows. Furthermore, state concert organizations cannot compete with the power of fees running into the many thousands of rubles, which the supporters of this system cynically describe as "healthy competition." Naturally, however, it is not a question exclusively of earnings. The most important thing is the artistic standard and the ideology of art. In this area, the members of the cooperatives have a single argument: "Let the market determine who is who!" This leads to the following thought:

whereas of late the USSR Committee for Peoples Control has shown an interest in hack work in the area of cooperative food trade, who can set straight incompetent amateurs who have undertaken to supply the people with spiritual food?

We are in favor of the cooperative movement but believe that in our area it should be developed above all in terms of material and technical supplies to culture and art institutions, repair and manufacturing of musical instruments, and so on. A cooperative could be socially useful also in working directly with artists, if it is organized by a state concert institution.

I expressed these views at the 11th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and, I believe, this met with the understanding of the deputies. Recently the USSR Council of Ministers issued a resolution allowing cooperatives to engage in promoting paid concerts, discotheques and creative meetings and entertainment programs only on the basis of contracts with organizations directly involved in such work.

I readily admit that my rather prejudiced attitude toward extremes in commercial experimentation is also related to my desire to restore justice for many thousands of conscientious and dedicated workers in our sector. So far, the average wage of rank-and-file workers in culture is one of the lowest set for specialists in the national economy and no more than half of the average wage for the country. Yet the material lack of amenities of the people seriously influences cadre difficulties in the sector, triggering a personnel turnover which now exceeds 30 percent of the culture and education personnel. Although culture institutes annually graduate some 8,000 specialists in culture and education, no more than 10 percent of club workers have higher training.

Such thoughts should not end on a pessimistic note, but here is yet another recent fact: with the application of the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) and the creation of labor collective councils, many enterprises have stopped appropriating funds for cultural construction in their city or rayon; yet there is no law on withholding such funds from their budgets for such purposes. So that now, in the period of the "second revolution of soviets," let the truth become obvious to all, as long as the local leaderships do not make the cultural area and its personnel targets of their profound concern, it will be difficult to grow a rich crop on the local field of culture. For without any cultural roots, without cultural development, as Academician D.S. Likhachev justifiably pointed out, we cannot develop a feeling of proprietorship or a citizen who is profoundly aware of his ties with his own people and history and with hopes for the future.

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## KOMMUNIST Roundtable on 'New Wave' Documentaries

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[Roundtable materials prepared by V. Kadulin and O. Kuprin]

[Text] "Comrades! What kind of 'perestroyka' do we have? Where can we see it?" Such is the beginning of a very angry letter sent to the editors of KOMMUNIST by V. Khokhlov, from Ryazan. We have chosen an area of our life in which perestroyka can be seen in the literal meaning of the word—the documentary. What has happened in that area in recent years could be described as an "explosion," a "leap," a "new wave," etc. Documentary motion pictures, particularly if shown on television, are discussed as heatedly as the sharpest articles in newspapers and journals. It is possible and necessary to argue about the artistic merits of documentaries, the accuracy and precision of the information they provide and the views held by their authors. What is unquestionable, however, is that in recent years documentaries have assumed a special role in our social life and become one of the vivid features of perestroyka or, in short, a serious social and political phenomenon.

There is no development without contradictions, debates and clashes of viewpoints, frequently totally opposite to each other. Not everything is going smoothly in documentary movies as well. However, the achievements which are gratifying to all of us and ills and problems which are by no means familiar to all of us reflect, to one extent or another, the general laws of the transitional period in the development of society and, in particular, the process of intensification and expansion of glasnost.

Let us introduce those who attended the meeting with the editors: I. Geleyn, motion picture director and secretary of the board of the USSR Union of Cinematographers; E. Kalinovskiy, screenwriter; V. Kuzin, director of the Leningrad Studio for Documentary Motion Pictures; B. Kustov, film director (Sverdlovsk); L. Makhnach, film director (Moscow); V. Novikov, director of the Central Studio for Documentary Films; A. Nuykin, deputy director of the Scientific Research Cinematography Institute; A. Pavlov, film director (Moscow); V. Ryabinskiy, deputy chairman, USSR Goskino; V. Semenyuk, film director (Leningrad); and A. Solovyeva, film director (Moscow).

The roundtable discussion was sharp, for different viewpoints were held by its participants on many problems. In no case could the atmosphere in which the discussion took place be described as calm.

### Expository, Cautious, Strange and Other Views

[I. Geleyn] Yes, today we have a new life style. The activities of the film worker are distinguished by economic, creative and organizational parameters different from those of the past. I would like to earmark the range of problems on which, it seems to me, we should exchange views.

The first problem is organizational. The Union of Cinematographers and Goskino have been engaged in serious work on the creation and introduction of a new cinematography structures for more than 2 years. This is based on creative associations, headed by artistic managers. More than 1 year ago a draft document to this effect was issued but no subsequent progress was made. Therefore anything which is taking place today in the area of documentary films is, to a certain extent, the result of our own initiative. This has triggered a mass of contradictions and arguments, for nothing in our area today is regulated on the basis of clear resolutions passed on the governmental level.

The second item is the making of films. The new wave of documentary cinematography was unexpected to many. This applied to us personally, the public and individuals involved, to one extent or another, in the management of the film-making process. Initially, we were so stricken by the fact that documentary films all of a sudden began to speak in the human language which is inherent in its nature, that for a while we paid no particular attention to the artistic merits of one film or another. Today one could say that films produced of late, in addition to their pure journalistic nature, are largely a phenomenon of art with the components inherent in our own art—drama, plasticity, graphic presentation, and so on.

The third question is the following: How are our films reaching the audiences, how are they perceived, what are their returns and how effective are they in society? This is the most difficult and most sensitive problem. "New wave" films remain inaccessible to the public, although Goskino has duplicated virtually all films in sufficient numbers of copies.

[V. Semenyuk] It is true that the outburst of the documentary motion picture is an entirely new phenomenon and, strange though it might seem, we too proved to be entirely unprepared for it. Totally unprepared was the structure of the industry. No one expected such a universal interest. But let us speak frankly: no circular could force the movie industry to present documentary films, not even a Central Committee resolution. We already had a resolution not one item of which was observed. Unless some new trends, which outstrip all resolutions develop, nothing will come out of it. Such trends are being manifested with every passing day. Therefore, in my view, the draft resolution prepared by the Union of Cinematographers, is already obsolete.

[V. Novikov] I would argue somewhat against the thesis that documentaries can, as of now, be considered as art form, with full justification. That which holds our attention to the screen is, most frequently, sensationalism, pursuit after the materials published in individual popular publications, and an attempt to follow in their footsteps. Personally, for the time being I see no serious economic, historical, political or social approaches to the problems. A number of films are created for instant consumption. Yes, it has become simpler to address

oneself to the events of 1937 or, in general, the prewar period. One does not have to have particular courage to create something on this topic. But what about today's affairs, perestroyka in its various aspects.... Such movies cannot withstand a comparison, in terms of depth, with shall we say articles by economists published in newspapers and journals. No, they cannot. Such movies are rather like sudden cavalry charges.

[A. Pavlov] Our Sovremennik Association made a film on the arrival of the noted theater director Yu. Lyubimov in Moscow: "Yu. Lyubimov. Five Years Later." Was this a charge? Was it sensationalism or thoughts about the complex problems of our lives? One should see, one should realize what kind of picture this is. We shall be making a film on the informal organizations. Is this also a charge or an attempt to understand a phenomenon which exists and which greatly needs a sober assessment? I believe that we should not be too hasty with our conclusions.

[V. Kuzin] Let us seriously talk about political journalism. Has the role of the documentary in society changed? Unquestionably, it has. But what were the reasons for its decline in the past?

Allow me, in the roundtable of a theoretical journal, to make a theoretical remark. In the mass awareness, reasons and consequences are frequently confused. In my view, there were three reasons for the crisis of the documentary, which we began to surmount with difficulty.

First, the social functions of motion picture journalism were distorted. Starting with the 1930s and until the 1980s, documentaries were used to serve the bureaucratic system. Our main audience, for a long period of time, consisted of officials. All of us depended on them and served them.

We know that Brezhnev was not at all indifferent to our genre and that his assistants became recipients of the highest prizes. The conditions in which we were put were as follows: you want to show a film, have a highly placed consultant, a "fellow worker." We gave him the title and he made it possible for us to show the film. I too have participated in such games. What were the results? We lost the mass audience, we lost feedback. This was second. People stopped trusting us, a crisis of trust appeared. Today we are gradually beginning to draw back the mass audiences. How to accelerate this process? That is the main question.

Finally, there was corruption in the movie itself, there was conformism. We lost our professional standards: in order to serve the officials no high skill was required. Our overall cultural standard, the scale of social thinking, declined drastically. This, however, is always related to a moral decline.



[V. Ryabinskiy] Nonetheless, the documentary motion picture did not stand aside from a serious discussion on most topical problems. This is a fact. There have always been and there will always be artists who would say: "This is our hurt. This is my hurt. Look how difficult this is, how horrible it is and what, from my viewpoint, should be done." Such artists may be recognized by their high standards of journalism and art. You may consider them what you wish, but these are artists. Unfortunately, however, there will always be another category of people who will start talking, whispering or bemoaning: "How bad it is here at home... and will keep on being so!"

Such groups may be found to this day. Increasingly, the passage of time brings to light the essence of the differences in their positions. Qualitative changes have taken place in the documentaries, dictated by the new situation in the country.

[V. Semenyuk] Let me add this: this is not exclusively the result of the new situation. In the past as well we made relevant motion pictures but that simple relevance existed within the framework of internal self-censorship. The "new wave" is an explosion of an accumulation of hurts, pain and shame. To one extent or another, perestroika was ripening within every honest artist. Incidentally, the birthplace of the first of the present successes in documentary movies is not Moscow but the periphery.

[V. Kuzin] ...Which, incidentally, is not bad at all. Moscow is the revolutionary capital of perestroika. However, history teaches us that a revolution which has been initiated in the capital and has not been supported by the provinces turns into no more than a coup. The fact that the new wave of motion picture journalism has gathered strength away from the Moscow studios indicates, yet once again, the scale and depth of the initiated changes not only in the movies but in life, in the awareness of the people.

[L. Makhnach] Moscow has been challenged and let us accept the challenge. In literature, the motion pictures and in our Central Studio, documentaries were produced in the past, many of which we would like to deny and forget. Our studio is special. It supported Stalinism and the times of Brezhnev.... This was natural, for a documentary is, perhaps, the most involved of all types of art and always serves its own time. This is inescapable.

But then the new wave of films came and did not bypass our studio. I believe that there is no need to guess for the reason. Times are different and this is the main thing. Pointed movies appeared, which brought to light a new layer of topics. Many of them not be on the level of true art. The road to the top demands time and serious preparations. The danger of a cavalry charge, which was mentioned here, is entirely real. Do all of today's "dare-devils" have the moral right to take up "sensitive" topics? I am not so sure. I am convinced, however, that the sharper the topic is the greater becomes the responsibility of the person who undertakes to deal with it.

Alas, occasionally it is responsibility that we are short of. In the mass attraction for the "blank (or black) spots" in history and our time, one should take one's time, wait, look around and calmly study the situation. In a word, the problem is quite complex.

[A. Pavlov] I do not have the feeling that one should "take his time." Naturally, there is nothing good in ostentatiously running ahead of a running locomotive engine or engaging in cavalry charges. In my view, however, "taking one's time is even more dangerous, for this may lead to a return to the old positions."

[A. Solovyeva] Nonetheless, one should have the right to make such movies. Not all the people who come to our studio have such a right. If we undertake to film something on an important topic, everything must be accurate and done competently.

[O. Latsis (KOMMUNIST first deputy editor in chief)] As a person who writes on economic topics, I too am familiar with this problem. Who has the right and who does not? Who has the right to give someone the right? When I read articles by some of my colleagues-economists, I occasionally stop with my mouth open, realizing that I am unable to argue with them, for we are talking in different tongues. However, such people are extremely popular. I am convinced that, ignorant of economics as they are, they are simply confusing a public which trusts them. Under such circumstances, to engage in a discussion means to sink to the level of a basic textbook in political economy and take the reader to a preparatory class. I find it embarrassing to assume such a role. Those about whom I speak, however, are clearly abusing the trust of people who are not trained to discuss serious problems. Therefore, should we forbid them to write? Who has the right to deprive someone else of this right? In that case anyone could be forbidden. Do you not agree?

[E. Kalinovskiy] The right belongs to those who tell the truth and can express such truth professionally. What other special rights are necessary in this case?...

[A. Solovyeva] Let us consider this problem with a specific example. For example, I shot a film about the India-USSR Festival. The script was written by an author who, it later became clear, was unfamiliar with India. We had to let him go. If you do not know the problem it means that you have no right to discuss it with the people. I invited someone else. He was young, 29, he was an expert in Indian affairs, a historian and a candidate of sciences. I was blamed for hiring a kid. But then this kid (and how can he be a kid!) knew India, had lived there. That is the type of right I mentioned. A right based on competence.

[O. Latsis] Which means that the person should, above all, ask himself: Do I have the right? This may be the answer to the question but is an answer of a purely moral

order, which pertains to the area of motion picture ethics and perhaps not motion picture ethics alone. This involves also strictly my feelings as a viewer.

Let us go back to the specific example. The motion picture "The Dam." As a viewer, I was enchanted with it. Emotionally this was a very strong movie. I also shared the view of the authors as the protectors of nature. However, as an economist, when I hear unqualified judgments on the role of the power industry in our national economy, can I possibly support this picture? It seems to me that the documentary movie lacks traditions and the standard of checking the facts, perhaps the same kind standard which exists in journalism. It is true that in our work as well, unfortunately, errors are made. Movie journalism must not only be passionate but also accurate. The documentary must be a documentary in the straight meaning of the term.

[V. Semenyuk] It seems to me that you have become too one-sided in support of journalism and the sharpness of political journalism has become if not the only at least the main criterion in documentaries. But is this criterion applicable to an artistic documentary cinematography? For such a cinematography does exist. Let us point out here the Georgian and Kirghiz schools and the "Leningrad wave." ...Unquestionably, political journalism has accomplished a great deal. No question about it. In my view, however, today in terms of movies it has exhausted the facilities which it had and which were generously manifested in movies familiar to us. It has also revealed a lack of artistic viewpoint. The ever growing interest in the works of the Leningrad Studio for Documentary Films is explained by us above all by the fact that it has been able partially to fill this gap. The artistic documentary must become the priority trend. Incidentally, this will expand the arsenal of motion picture publicism and make it less scholastic, which is something that occasionally happens.

[A. Nuykin] In the documentary, as in both art and journalism, there are different forms, different genres and different levels of presenting reality. Each of them has a right to life. There are facts which the maker of a film should, without any tricks or embellishment, simply present to the audience. Such facts "function" by themselves. This should not be considered a lack of artistry. Asceticism, brevity and real journalism, if you wish, also require mastery and good taste. Let me go beyond this: in political journalism pursuit of "imperishables" is like death. One should not be afraid of one-day films. There are outstanding films of this kind, created for the sake of the topic of the day: They burst out, they are heard, they shake the people up and... they die, having sowed their seeds in the human heart. It is there that they subsequently grow and blossom, which may include new, perhaps much longer lasting motion pictures created by other authors. Nor can I agree with the fact that motion picture journalism has exhausted its possibilities, that it is a past stage. It is too early to speak of this, not only because the direct and passionate interference of the

motion picture in the clashes of life will be always needed; we must not forget that to the mass audience the stage of upsurge of the documentary has virtually not even begun. This is an important minus point for our work and a great loss for perestroika.

I have in front of me a list of quite successful documentaries. They already number in the dozens. Let me name perhaps just a few: "Mariya," by A. Sokurov; "Pain," by S. Lukyanchikov; "High Court" by G. Frank; "Early Sunday Morning..." by M. Mamedov; "Islands" by R. Gevorkyants; "Kond" by A. Khachatryan; "Black Square" by I. Pasternak; "The Wide Sea..." by N. Makarov; "Bester" by V. Grunin; and so on, and so forth. Generally speaking, probably in each one of these which, in my view, are the best films, there may be some criticism of the artistic means used, composition, topic or linguistic excesses. I may mention them among professionals. For some reason, however, one is unwilling to do this in front of the broad public. For my own sake I have clarified the nature of this psychological puzzle. I was helped by drawing a parallel with literature.

Look at the criticism addressed today of works such as "White Clothing," "Children of the Arbat," or "Life and Destiny."... Sometimes such pictures are not simply criticized but harshly condemned for the failure of their authors to reach artistic heights! But it is clear that that is not the reason for which they are being criticized! This was simply a weapon with which writers who had actively taken the side of perestroika were being attacked: the attack was mounted against the ideological content of their works and against their social views. Without taking the risk of coming in the open, and fearing to find themselves in an embarrassing situation, they try to nip at the heels of such authors by discussing the insufficient esthetic refinement of works which have touched the readers. Characteristically, no one among such critics, either in the past or today, has been equally frank when it came to many totally untalented novels which, only recently, were being published in huge editions. That is the reason for which one is unwilling to address broad audiences about artistic shortcomings in new, pointed and overall successful, motion pictures. You may think: what a strange position. This may be so. But for some reason I am unwilling to criticize it. Perhaps because somewhere deep in me the conviction is growing that that which touches the heart, which makes people think and motivate progress cannot fail to be artistic.

#### Will the Documentary Become Profitable?

[I. Geleyn] There is one question which is essential to me: the existence of the documentary, based not only on full cost accounting but also on self-support and self-financing.

[V. Kuzin] I oppose the commercial motion picture and primitively understood cost accounting. Cost accounting, which is frequently professed in our creative association as a means exclusively of income, is unrealistic.

[L. Makhnach] Personally, I am convinced that, as a whole, documentaries could be profitable but that does not apply to all of them.

[V. Semenyuk] How much do we cost the state now? Is it 16 million?

[V. Ryabinskiy] Twenty-two million.

[V. Semenyuk] If a documentary has brought even a small yet real contribution, to preventing a repetition of Chernobyl, it has already redeemed its cost.

[V. Kuzin] I realize that today we cannot avoid a discussion about cost accounting although it would hardly be of interest to the readers of KOMMUNIST.

[O. Latsis] Arguments about cost accounting in the motion pictures should not be considered a strictly departmental matter. The spiritual area, paralleled by its material aspect, is quite extensive. Similar discussions are taking place on problems of the theater, publishing, and basic science....

[V. Kuzin] This is good. Naturally, the documentary must earn some money and, somewhat support itself. But grant me, as a head of a studio, all the rights stipulated in the Law on the Enterprise. Abolish the "gross output," and lift the financial and planning chains which bind each studio. Give us freedom to handle the funds. Neither I nor our collective are afraid of responsibility. We are ready to answer for everything. We have some ideas on the subject. You want something specific? Be my guest.

I have come to this roundtable straight from Helsinki. Despite existing instructions, we concluded a preliminary agreement with three Finnish companies. We are as yet to experience everything related to such an initiative. However, this is not the point. The Finns need our skill, our professionalism. They will supply us with equipment and foreign exchange. However, I do not have a foreign exchange account in the bank. If we work through Soyuzekspofilm, 7 percent will go to the studio while they will take the rest. Why do I need such a companion? The Finns will give the studio a 50 percent income, plus equipment and film. Under such circumstances we find international cooperation profitable. We shall accumulate foreign exchange, make the necessary purchases and give our experts the possibility of making films with the help of technical standards about which today we cannot even dream. This will also open new creative horizons.

I repeat, in my view, our documentaries must not be commercial. The state will remain the producer. Will our entrepreneurial activity be profitable to the state? I believe that it will.

[I. Geleyn] For decades we spent governmental money easily and freely, not thinking very much about returns or whether or not someone was watching the films which

we made. We lived according to a convenient system: everything was guaranteed. Regardless of the pulp we created, in the final account we went to the cashier and received money. The task of the new structure of cinematography, of the new model, as we describe it, is to make the artist dependent on what he does. Errors may be made, yes, but what matters is for the artist to know that he will receive only that which he has earned through his toil and his talent.

With your type of cost accounting, your commercial cinema will collapse

[I. Geleyn] However much you and I may be arguing, our discussions will be nothing but of history until we have checked our views against practical achievements. You are wrong by thinking that this is a matter concerning only directly Geleyn with a company of dilettantes. In particular, we have involved in our association, for work on programs, economists, sociologists, and jurists. Do not bury us prematurely. Allow us to try to do that which we have considered and, in particular, to put to practical test our methods for presenting this type of films to the audience. After all of this has taken place, let us then you and I sit down and at that point you can say: Dear (or, conversely, not so dear) Igor Geleyn, you were an adventurer and spoiled everything....

[O. Latsis] It seems to me that one should not so heavily emphasize the fact that cost accounting should be the work not of cinematographers but economists, sociologists, and so on. The first word here, nonetheless, should be yours, that of the cinematographers. The economists will provide the type of cost accounting which you will request. The motion picture is a specific industry which involves earning an income. Nonetheless, the economists must clearly know what it is that society expects of cost accounting in this case. If we wish for movies to be considered a purely production enterprise which makes money, this is one thing. But if we wish to consider the motion picture industry as a sector which creates works of art and plays, above all, an ideological role, at that point cost accounting may also be necessary but its task will be different. It will mean control by the consumer, control by the market which could vote "for" or "against." In this case many important aspects must be removed from the principle of profitability. Then cost accounting becomes a means of transferring the final power, and the decisive word not to the official but to the public. A motion picture could be losing in some cases. This must be anticipated and society must find the means of compensating for such losses, based on the ideological and social significance of a film or several films.

[E. Kalinovskiy] To continue the discussion on this topic which is of interest to us today in the language of an economist, in my view we should acknowledge the following: what has happened in cinematography is something which we oppose quite strongly the moment we mention the national economy: subordinating the



consumer to the producer. This seems rude when it applies to a spiritual production such as cinematography. Today the producer (the studio) is trying to impose upon the consumer (the viewer) the type of goods he likes to produce.

At this point let me shift from economics to our organizational and structural affairs. I believe that the Union of Cinematographers showed a certain haste. The studios decided to set up associations, each one with its own program. In itself, as the chess players say, this is a fruitful idea. But what are these programs? What is the idea behind them? For a long time the social order in our country was identified with the state order. Today we conceive of the social order as the order set by the people. It seems to me, however, that the voice of the people is not always taken into consideration in the programs which were formulated. Was the drafting of such programs preceded by any kind of study, any analysis of public opinion? I have not heard anything on this subject. May the two representatives of associations present here forgive me, but I have reasons to suspect that neither of them has met with some categories of future viewers and is familiar with their interests and needs or has determined the type of questions to which they would like to have an answer or to clarify with the help of documentaries.

In other words, in my view, in our sector no feedback whatsoever has been organized. That is precisely why I have dared to claim that the studios are continuing to dictate their will to the public. The Union of Cinematographers, which has set up a number of various commissions, deals extremely poorly (if at all) with the study of the opinion of the viewers and their demands. In my view, such a commission would be more useful than any other.

[V. Novikov] Let me cite yet another reason for which there are so few serious journalistic-style films. They have no proper themes or good foundation for scripts. There are no playwrights who can seriously deal with contemporary problems. Yet we have directors who believe that they can calmly deal with both jobs, i.e., be both playwrights and directors. I am convinced that this is a wrong viewpoint.

[V. Kuzin] We destroyed playwrights in documentaries the way we destroyed the kulak class.

[E. Kalinovskiy] Luckily, not entirely as yet. Here I represent a vanishing profession. It is still not included in the "Red Book," but, possibly, it may eventually be registered there. It is true that if tomorrow directors stop paying for literary scripts the profession of script writer will be revived quite quickly. I would like to defend not simply its prestige. As a rule, the directors who start writing scripts have no journalistic experience or sufficient time to study problems and phenomena in life. Analysis is replaced with habit and although it appears that the visual presentation is good, there is no depth.

Here is another question: that of the influx of new forces. The present structure, like the one yesterday, lacks the tool of objective assessment of offers. There is no true competitiveness. I am convinced that we need closed competitions for topics, scripts and even directing. It would be better for some "reputation" not to prevent us from selecting the best. I know that this idea is supported by many. Yet the results are nil.

[L. Makhnach] I like the interpretation given to the concept of perestroika as being a return to common sense. The situation which has developed in the documentary movies is, in my view, a destruction of common sense. Above all, I have in mind the automatic application of the new model. The fact that it is imperfect is very easy to explain and to understand: not everything can be taken into consideration in a new project. What is worse is something else. What has happened in this case is that an idea, without being adopted by the masses, has become a material force which has led to the destruction of studio work and of traditions. Based on the new structure, our Central Studio has six associations which do not have full autonomy (and that is perhaps their salvation); however, nor does it have a central artistic council, a brain center which would guide the movie-making process. There may be different structures in different studios, consistent with the specific nature and traditions of specific collectives. That is the way the majority of our people think. There are, however, all sorts of absurdities and conflicts break out.

[V. Novikov] To introduce a new model is, basically, not a problem. The Americans break down their structures in the course of a few weeks, when they realize that the existing system does not work.

[A. Pavlov] Yes, many people in the Central Studio are against the new structure. When they speak of perestroika, in general, everyone is "for." But when matters begin to affect the interest of specific individuals, they begin to detect losses, financial in particular, as well as losses of some benefits, positions or high patronage. That is related to the unwillingness of such people to accept the new situation, to assess it without feelings of insult and ambition, and to help others, on the basis of their own experience, to understand it. There has been a change in management. Many of those who left were respected people, known in the area of documentaries. They have their supporters. Naturally, in order to earn a reputation and a name, the young need time. I believe that this greatly explains the fact that the idea of setting up new associations and creative workshops did not meet with support in the studios and among a certain segment of the collective with an already acquired reputation. Yet this is supported by the young.

[V. Kuzin] What we must not do, however, is to consider the problems of Moscow as being those of all of Russia or of the entire Union.

[L. Makhnach] It is precisely you, in Leningrad, who support our idea. You have your own specific features and studios. You have a developed collective and you are unwilling to splinter it. This is right.

[V. Kuzin] The main thing is for our films to be socially significant. You in the Union of Cinematographers and the Central Studio give priority to the organizational problem and only then to the content of our cinematography and creative work. Let us nonetheless seriously consider the place of our motion pictures in the life of society.

### **'I Trusted Perestroika But...'**

[V. Ryabinskiy] What would you say if a currently popular journal or newspaper would be printed in only 20 or 50 copies? Who would be familiar with this issue? Like journalism, the effectiveness of the motion picture can be assessed by the extent to which it influences society. To the personnel of the motion picture industry (let me emphasize this) contribution to perestroika consists to a very great extent of applying maximum efforts in the dissemination of sharply publicistic documentary programs. This includes opening specialized movie theaters, which is always very difficult, and having special screenings. It is very important to include in this matter the currently developing club movement.

The most efficient channel, however, is television. It represents an immediate exposure to a huge audience, which triggers the active discussion of the problems raised in the films. Equally important is to develop in the people a taste for documentaries. Taking into consideration the pointed nature of the topics raised in many films, they could be shown as addenda to the "Perestroika Beacon" Program or else become a permanent feature shown at a specific time in the evening.

[V. Kuzin] Showing them on television would be socially significant. However, who would pay for it? The television system itself has its budget. Here everything is complex. We filmed "The Temple." It was successfully shown on television which subsequently sold it to 70 other countries, we believe, for foreign currency. Whereas we, the studio, took a loss of 30,000 rubles. Such are the harsh realities of our "economics."

[A. Nuykin] We could originate another 30 good topics and film hundreds of good pictures which, as it were, will remain filmed "for their own sake," and will not reach the public. It must be loudly stated that the existing system used in the film industry has still not become a channel which connects the makers of documentaries with the public and is not consistent with the tasks of perestroika.

[E. Kalinovskiy] Incidentally, no one is seriously engaged in providing the type of information which is part of today's documentaries. This is yet another thing for which our creative association and Goskino are to be blamed.

[I. Geleyn] Of late, in my view, a trend has appeared which greatly leads to the idea of returning to the bad old traditions which we are trying to abandon with such difficulty. What do I mean by this?

In its best manifestations, the documentary is directly related to shaping public opinion. Recently, and to a certain extent, it has been able to prove this. This is perfectly realized by those who, either deliberately or by inertia, are opposing the perestroika process. Hence blocking sharp motion picture journalism as an important and powerful weapon in the struggle for perestroika. For a while this took place on the level of the republic motion picture committees. The Union of USSR Cinematographers struggled for such films and they were granted a right to life and reached the audience. Today films are being blocked on a different level. Instead of holding normal discussions with the cinematographers or the motion picture industry or else simply with the public, some party obkoms apply the obsolete system of prohibitions. This is confirmed by the film produced by Bores Kustov, who is present here, "Secret Vote," which dealt with the election of delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference in Sverdlovsk.

Today differences on many problems have come up at this roundtable. This is normal, for progress is never smooth and the clash of viewpoints is something natural. The evaluation of the trend which I mentioned would hardly trigger differences.

[A. Pavlov] A festival of nonfiction films for Siberia and the Far East was held in Tomsk. The local authorities were not very helpful in ensuring the widespread showing of such films in motion picture theaters.

[A. Solovyeva] We filmed special movies on the party conference. One and a half months later, after the movies were ready, pressure began to be applied on us. Many of us felt that, once again, the administrators deemed to have the right to dictate to the artists what to change, what to insert and what to delete. Essentially, directors who were party members were accused of political immaturity and tendentiousness in presenting the material. I do not deny that we may have erred here and there. However, no one was willing to listen to our arguments. I asked to be properly understood: I am speaking now not of special releases but of the style and methods of art management. We have already begun to reject diktat and mentors.

[V. Ryabinskiy] The interrelationship between cinematographers and the local authorities has drastically changed in recent months. In the past, when we wanted to close down some regional documentary studio for the

sake of making more films, I recall the objections: "Absolutely not! We shall not allow this!" Today everything is different. Why? Is it only because we have started talking honestly and openly on the screen?

[V. Kuzin] With the help of perestroika we were able to surmount the protracted crisis in our art. Now symptoms of a new crisis have appeared and need interpretation.

[V. Semenyuk] I too believe that the current situation is one of crisis. The unsympathetic attention on the part of various authorities is now being felt by many documentary makers. There are constant reviews.... No interest is shown in what excites us, or what hinders us. The talks that we are having are, I would say, in the nature of interrogations. You are familiar with the story of Lenin-grad Movie Chronicle No 18, which depicted the dispersing of a demonstration.... Subsequently, this subject was shown on the screens. But we lived in great fear, and while the film was already being duplicated, efforts were made to change one sentence.

[B. Kustov] In the film "Secret Vote" I found myself in a situation which, honestly speaking, was surprising. I did not assume that there could be a tap for glasnost: turn it on or turn it off, as you wish. I have had great faith in perestroika and in the fact that one could discuss everything and anything with the people....

The film on the final stage in the elections for the party conference dealt with the obkom plenum. However, I filmed it against the background of the stormy events which were taking place at that time in Sverdlovsk: meetings and demonstrations.... In other words, I filmed it against the background of life in the city. Initially the film was accepted by both the Russian and the Union Motion Picture Committees. Then the film was seen by comrades from the party obkom. This took place (as was the case with the Moscow special issues) one and a half months after the conference. Opinions differed but one thing prevailed: that the events had been presented one-sidedly and the overall picture was not objective. Not everything which had taken place at the plenum had been reflected. However, I had not filmed a chronicle on the plenum. This was not a motion picture of the proceedings but a film in which, yes, I showed my attitude toward events. If the people are worked up, I believe that it is the duty of the party leaders to go the people and not to pretend that nothing is happening, for otherwise the leadership could be seized by individuals of questionable reputation. Such people were filmed and they openly expressed their views. I do not agree with them but I did not engage in sticking political labels on them.

I repeat, although different views were expressed at the obkom, it was only one, the negative view, that reached the USSR Goskino. We received a cable from Moscow: The main administration cancels the order for making copies of 'Secret Vote.' Please submit all materials to the Moscow Copy Factory without delay." In other words,

this amounted to house arrest. This was not terrible, for such things have happened in the past as well. But then, there was a new cable: "In connection with the instructions of the management of USSR Goskino, document No 155, the documentary 'Secret Vote' is hereby canceled."

I immediately telephoned Goskino. It was explained to me that I should begin by making the necessary corrections, as requested by the obkom, after which they would accept the film. But then by removing the basic materials, they made corrections impossible, even if I were to agree to make them.

Meanwhile, what was taking place in Sverdlovsk? The people there realized that Goskino was suppressing that picture and started a "revelry of democracy." I had not time to attend all the meetings to which I had been invited. I spoke at the party obkom and in other institutions, and always on the subject of this film. In short, this was pluralism of views. However, there was no question of showing the film to the ordinary public! All of a sudden, various objections were raised.... The result was that it is allowed for some to consume a given product while others are not mature enough to consume it. I consider this situation intolerable.

[A. Nuykin] These as well as other accumulated cases of prohibitions, restrictions, delays and discrediting of some films or directors, I think, allow us to classify this trend quite clearly as another attack on perestroika. This is clearly manifested in the likes and dislikes of the motion picture industry and the television management concerning some films.

[V. Semenyuk] However, the motion picture industry should not be presented as something which is united and hostile to us as a whole. We were visited by motion picture theater directors and a great deal of our discussions with them proved unexpected. They showed an active interest in documentaries. However, there is a certain stratum separating us from the directors of theaters who would like to show our films, a stratum which prevents us from doing so. For example, we discussed the motion picture "The Temple." Movie theater directors have told us that if allowed to lease the movie for 2 months they would pay us 30,000 rubles. In other words, we would recover all losses by showing the film in a single city. The studio would like to establish direct contractual relations with the movie theaters. However, this is not allowed by the bank, claiming that it has the right to do so....

[I. Geleyn] We are speaking of glasnost, democratization and the establishment of a state of law. In particular, this means that the artist must have the right to produce one film or another. Today we have somehow avoided the question of the fact that documentary makers are virtually not allowed to film some subjects.... This has



affected enterprise, oblast or rayon managers. "Aha!" They say. "Movie chronicle makers have come. You have come to criticize us." Then they slam the door.

Comment: They take us to the militia, as though we were arrested!

Comment: They hit us! They simply hit us! And they do not release us!

[I. Geleyn] We need a law on glasnost which would formulate the rights of documentary makers as well. Like everyone else, we must work within the law. If an artist has misrepresented the facts and harmed the rights of citizens or organizations, let the full severity of the law be applied. All the rest is a standpoint, his artistic vision of a given problem and his arguments. Many components in creative work could be assessed differently.... Let us discuss. Let us determine whether a criticism included in a film is consistent with the truth. Why is it that before any kind of discussion, prohibitions are imposed?

That is why the impression develops that we are returning to the old traditions. One may criticize a house building manager but not a minister. People who operate within the permitted limits are labeled political illiterates. And this is after the resolution on glasnost, which was passed at the all-Union party conference....

[V. Kuzin] You are mentioning this for the sake of the readers of KOMMUNIST. All of us are familiar with this. Alas, these are elementary truths and indeed there is no reason to argue about them.

### **Equivocal Democracy**

Comment: What should we discuss?

[V. Kuzin] The work style of Goskino and the Creative Association. We should discuss democracy, pluralism of opinion.... Works, words.... Both the association and Goskino have that same bureaucratic apparatus....

[V. Novikov] Pluralism of opinions, in my view, is a good thing. But pluralism in decisions leads to chaos. When the associations were created the principle of their total autonomy was professed: creative and, above all, of personnel. The board and the director of the studio were assigned the role of coordinators and, above all (!) organizers of the production process. However, even I who, for the time being at least, am the only director of a documentary studio elected by the collective, I am not allowed to organize my work. Who is preventing me? Strange though it might seem, the Labor Collective Council and the party committee. The Labor Collective Council without batting an eyelid, is interfering in the

very core of activities of the association, the management of the studios. It is involving itself in petty supervision and thus confusing what is right with what is wrong. How can we demand of association collectives to make independent decisions with such obstacles?!

It seems to me that mechanically granting to a movie studio a fully democratic authority such as the Labor Collective Council has unwittingly led to a distortion of democracy. This, at least, is what happened with us.

[A. Solovyeva (To Geleyn)] Did you ask for our opinion when you set up the associations?

[I. Geleyn] The secretariat of the association and Goskino are frequently accused of arbitrariness. I categorically disagree. We are implementing the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Association of Cinematographers. The creation of new cinematography structures was not the idea of the secretariat of the association or of Goskino but the implementation of the resolutions of the congress. The board was elected by the congress. We are not some kind of "assault group." All members of the association could have participated in discussing the new structure. It was discussed in many places! Decisions were made collectively. The final basic model was unanimously approved at the plenum. The fact that it does have some errors has become obvious today. However, to say the least, it would be unfair to speak of the arbitrary behavior of the secretariat.

[A. Solovyeva] But you did not allow us to choose the artistic managers of the associations. You appointed them, jointly with Goskino. Was this correct? Was it democratic? It was not. Hence the chaos which exists in our studio. We are falling apart. Would you consider me behind the times? Yes, I am a member of the generation which is preventing you from living. I, however, was raised with Slutskiy, Medvedkin, Karmen, Kristi....

[V. Semenyuk] You must not say that.... There is between Kristi and Karmen, and the glory which was earned by the Central Studio, since it was also a front-line studio, and the present, the dark period of stagnation and everything else, when the studios did virtually no serious work and when you, to put it bluntly "emigrated to a foreign country." You were unwilling to varnish our economic, social and moral decline as it existed then. That is why the objective of the director was to go abroad to film. Perhaps this was a kind of "honesty:" it was morally easier to film life abroad, with which few people were familiar, than to film false images of our reality, which everyone could see or was familiar with. We nonetheless filmed it and the Central Studio was particularly successful in doing so.

The changes which are occurring today in the Central Studio for Documentary Films, against the background of the recent past, look like a great accomplishment. However, when we criticize our present creative association, we should not ally ourselves with everything

belonging to the past, indiscriminately, for it is quite disparate in value. I agree, however, that appointing artistic managers and creating associations were based on the arbitrary decision of a narrow circle of people. Nonetheless, in the case of the big studios this could provide a creative impetus which would yield positive results.

[A. Solovyeva] Still, the activities of the secretariat of the association greatly contributed to the anarchy. (To I. Geleyn) You are a creative organization. For God's sake, deal with creative problems. Why are you sliding into the state apparatus? This is the equivalent of a studio director issuing an order which must be signed by the party committee secretary.

[I. Geleyn] It is not like this.

[A. Solovyeva] Obviously, some restrictions must apply. The motion picture studio is, nonetheless, a state organization and its management should be that of a state organization.

[A. Pavlov] Yes, many people in the studios are opposed to the new structure. In art, however, (and not only in art) the truth does not come up with a vote. Yes, the elections of some managers at joint sessions of the Collegium of the Goskino and the secretariat of the association worried some people: this was too much like the olden times, like *diktat*. No, today a great deal has become different. Other people have become artistic managers, thanks to the support of our creative association. There is greater independence. I do not understand what is bad in this. Why is it that whenever a public organization is mentioned which, in my view, is quite progressive, is it necessary to bad-mouth it? Why should it be blamed for persistently dealing with programming questions for the entire motion picture department throughout the country? Are there people who are dreaming for a return to the old system?

[V. Kuzin] No, let us admit that one can no longer operate with the old methods. Yet it is precisely such methods that the artistic managers of the associations are asked to apply. This immediately led to quarrels and squabbles.... The main error is that both Goskino and the secretariat of the association have turned a basic model into a standard, a mandatory one.

[I. Geleyn] This may seem to indicate that in the past there were no squabbles. Squabbles were simply suppressed by the power of the Goskino with the help of the association's secretariat.

[V. Semenyuk] A more serious approach should be adopted to the new realities. We recently sponsored a festival of our Leningrad documentaries in Riga. There were meetings and demonstrations in the city and we also saw anti-Russian slogans. Yet every day our hall was crowded and we were given an excellent reception. We thank the people of Riga who restored our faith that the

artistic documentary cinematography has its audience. We also took a different look at our studio affairs. Latvia is setting up a studio based on the principle of companies managed by a council and hired managers. Regional and national features of studios must not be ignored.

[V. Kuzin] Regional and national specifics are quite a serious matter. The Union of Cinematographers must be structured on the federative principle. We must have Russian, Latvian, Georgian and other federations, operating on the basis of total autonomy. The same rights should be extended to the Leningrad department. That is what the creative association should be dealing with.

[I. Geleyn] We do not draw away from this. We shall consider at the plenum that which affects you. Currently, together with the secretariats of the republic associations we are developing new possible structures. Not everything can be accomplished immediately. The question of a federation was blocked for many long years by the previous management of the association. (To V. Kuzin) You, unquestionably, are right: not everything should be standardized. No one forces the Leningrad studio to operate separately. But if you have a director with an interesting program it would be wrong to obstruct his work.

Today we have paid a great deal of attention to the Central Studio. However, its problems reflect above all all the difficulties and contradictions of documentary cinematography. As long as irreconcilable viewpoints exist, the situation will remain conflicting.... You say that the secretariat of the association and Goskino have violated democratic procedure by imposing their candidates for artistic managers, and so on. Naturally, let us not look at the past, when studio collectives for decades obeyed without complaint all directives issued from above and kept silent.

Today they are no longer silent. This is very good. But let us honestly admit that for many years corrupt groups had developed within the big collectives in the arts. To this day they are having a substantial influence on the moral climate in the collectives.

Under these circumstances, the secretariat of the board of the Union of Cinematographers and the USSR Goskino Collegium have deemed it expedient to provide a definitive solution to the question, which may not coincide in all aspects with the decisions of the studio collectives. One should not be complaining about violations of democracy, particularly on the part of people who, for decades, were its main persecutors. All that this conceals is an irrepressible love of power and the desire to control everything and to bury perestroika in cinematography. Today everyone in the newly created association, every artist, is offered the full possibility of proving himself without petty supervision or attempts to dictate the rules of the game. The young people are making splendid use of such rights. Obviously, such a difficult transitional period has its faults. However, should rocks

be thrown at us so persistently on this subject? Would it not be better for all of us, with a well-wishing attitude, to correct entirely possible inaccuracies and errors in this initiated process of renovation?

Nearly 4 years of perestroika have passed, less in the motion pictures. A few things have settled down. Others remain difficult. The work must be done and we must argue only about strategic matters and not sink into pettiness. The main thing today is to make it possible for the makers of documentaries to express their views and to help the perestroika process.

[V. Semenyuk] Naturally, we are pleased by the upsurge of documentary films. However, we have received many bumps in this turbulence! The facts, however, are still facts: the Union of Cinematographers was and remains on the brink of the precipice. Honestly speaking, the majority of meaningful pictures were released thanks to its support. Despite our present discussions and the criticism addressed at the secretariat of the association, its activities are, and I shall not fear to use here lofty words, of a historical nature to cinematography in general and to documentary motion pictures in particular.

**Editorial note:** This talk was held in the biggest editorial premises, around the big oval table where every week the editors discuss materials for the future issues of the journal. Unexpectedly, at the very peak of the discussions, there was a long distance telephone call. It was the secretary of the Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom. He informed the editors of the stand taken by the party obkom concerning Boris Kustov's film "Secret Vote." It was as follows: the plenum in the course of which elections were held for delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, had not been covered fully. No attention had been paid to the questions which had been asked in the course of the plenum or the answers to them. The electoral process had been shown one-sidedly. Essentially, the main characters in the film were the heads of the informal organizations. However, the obkom was leaving the question of the future of that film open.

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### Experience in Socialist Self-Management

180200091 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 3, Feb 89 (signed to press 3 Feb 89) pp 112-117

[Review of the article "Yugoslav Communist League and Socialist Self-Management" by Stipe Suvar in *RABOCHIIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR* No 5, 1988, pp 3-26]

[Text] In this article, which was written for the journal *RABOCHIIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR*, Stipe Suvar, chairman of the Yugoslav Communist League Central Committee Presidium, makes a comprehensive study of the contribution made by the party of Yugoslav

communists to the building of socialism, based on self-management. Singling out the individual stages in the history of the development of the Yugoslav Communist Party (the Communist League since 1952), he emphasizes that, starting with 1928, the YCP independently worked among the peoples of Yugoslavia, earmarking the strategy for the revolution and implementing it. All social changes which have taken place since then have been on the initiative of and under the guidance of the party headed by J. Tito.

Without the YCP-LYC, the author notes, no socialism would have existed in the country and there could not even have been a question of theory, practice, or prospects for building a new social system.

During the period of the people's liberation struggle, the YCP developed mass forms of self-management. However, it was only in 1950, with the introduction of workers councils, that the principles of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia were formulated. Essentially, they may be reduced to the following: no bureaucratic apparatus can build socialism. Socialism can develop only through the steady intensification of socialist democracy and with the correct guiding role of the proletarian party: having taken the first step—control over the means of production—one must go further by daringly turning state socialism into an "association of free producers;" the moment the proletariat assumes power the state begins to wither away and the workers party must be separated from the state apparatus, so that it may assume the duties of organizer and become a most active participant in political, cultural and economic life and assume control over all areas of social activities; an enterprise cannot exist without commodity output and turnover, which it has inherited from the past, and which will remain in the course of the entire transitional period from capitalism to communism: the producers themselves must control the use of the added labor and its proper distribution.

Referring to the stipulations contained in the party's documents, the author describes the way the basic principles of socialist self-management took shape and the manner in which its content was enriched. In particular, he ascribed great importance to identifying the historical position of socialist self-management, as formulated in the materials of the 10th LYC Congress (1974). The self-management system was characterized in these materials as a transition from capitalism, through the initial stage of socialism, to communism, as a system which contains the elements of both capitalism and socialism.

The study notes the manner in which, as early as the 6th Party Congress, in 1952, the demand was formulated of making the role of the Communist League consistent with self-management conditions. The exercise of power on behalf of the working class and control over the state, the party forum noted, under a one-party system are fraught with the danger that the party may turn into a



kind of instrument of bureaucratic power. That is precisely the reason for which the policy of separating the LYC from the state and allowing it to act as the ideological guide and mobilizing force within the class itself was adopted, thus converting power on behalf of the class into power by the class itself.

However, the author states, so far the LYC has retained power functions, and this trend will remain as long as socialism continues to exist as a state system. Since 1950, and to this day, the League of Communists has asserted itself as a force which formulates the theory and directs the practices of socialist self-management. Frequently, however, that which was proclaimed was not carried out. Nonetheless, there were obvious successes which could have been even more impressive had it been possible to go beyond the implementation of the programmatic stipulations, by establishing production control over the sum total of the social added value and its distribution and consumption. As long as this has not taken place, because of the state-oriented relations and the domination of technocratic-bureaucratic monopoly in society, the status of the workers as hired labor will be reproduced and the social added value will remain under the control of that monopoly, and so will the class division based on technocratic-bureaucratic control over the added labor of the worker.

Some 15 years ago, the author reminds us, party thinking in Yugoslavia rejected the possibility that the elements of the old society may strengthen or the fact that matters may lead to a crisis in socialist development, although the beginning of such a crisis was becoming apparent. It was manifested in the weakening of the class orientation, phenomena and trends of monopolizing the management of labor conditions and means, in the reproduction of the old and establishment of new relations of ownership, the insufficiently decisive struggle against the increasingly obvious offensive mounted by the opponents of self-management and socialism, and the sallies of liberalism and other ideologies alien to socialism. The LYC was unable to defend its positions in the battles for a change in social relations.

In explaining the reasons for this, the author writes that already at the initial stage of socialism, when the state was distributing the entire added value, this situation began to be eliminated in Yugoslavia by organizing workers councils at enterprises and economic associations and abolishing the administrative management. Simple reproduction was put under enterprise management while, as in the past, the state made decisions relative to expanded reproduction. The shifting of such functions from the hands of the state to self-governing labor collectives and associations was made possible with the adoption of the 1963 Constitution. The implementation of the economic and social reform was undertaken in 1965. The elimination of statism outside the plants was required, i.e., the elimination of state control over society as a whole. In the 1970s, however, this merely led to the fact that the Federation no longer had

control over the funds used to form capital. A credit system developed instead of a market. The banks subordinated the production process to themselves without bearing any responsibility for its development. The enterprise, which had been granted a certain autonomy in terms of the state, established relations with other enterprises with a view to creating sectorial and territorial monopolies. There was no competition on the closed market: demand exceeded supply. To this day, the production organizations solve their problems above all by raising prices. Virtually no producer could or can go bankrupt, for unsold goods are paid for with loans. A powerful technocratic-bureaucratic monopoly has been established in enterprises and associations, and on the "enterprise-creditor" and "enterprise-state" levels based on monopoly rule.

In order to solve this problem, the concept of unifying labor and labor means by stimulating the production of material and spiritual values was formulated. Its purpose was to ensure the true implementation of socialist self-management, i.e., to go beyond the first stage at which self-management was essentially carried out at factories inherited from the state and was reduced to letting the producer make decisions exclusively in matters of simple reproduction.

The change in the role of the Federation pertained essentially to giving it "freedom" from collecting and distributing accumulations (to a certain extent it continued to do so subsequently as well, in the case of the fund for the development of economically less developed areas). However, this did not bring about the elimination of statism in the handling of public funds ("social capital") on the level of republics, krais and even municipalities. The technocratic-bureaucratic monopolies became "territorialized" and "nationalized," which substantially strengthened state-bureaucratic nationalism and disturbed interethnic relations.

The creation of a new political system of socialist self-management and the theoretical work aimed at its development, as well as the Regulatory-Institutional Reform of 1971, according to the author, did not change the course of events, for no real struggle was waged for the unification of labor and for relations based on broad and profound economic principles. The new political system was no more than a facade for already established relations. In the course of the processes which were primarily uncontrolled and the strong intervention of the state, a specific price structure developed (found nowhere else in the world): inflation, and domestic and foreign indebtedness increased. The splintering of the domestic market worsened and it became even more closed in terms of the foreign market. The lack of a strategic orientation toward developing production for export and lack of protection from foreign companies led Yugoslavia into a condition of economic and technological stagnation and to lagging in the development of production forces and in their structure in the 1980-1988 period.

The author discusses extensively the need for observing the law of commodity production and obeying the imperatives of the market, the role of which has been theoretically emphasized ever since the system of socialist self-management was introduced. It was precisely commodity production that was its historical foundation. The LYC programmatic documents stipulate that under socialism commodity production must develop not on the basis of capitalist profit but of the public ownership of means of production, i.e., the trend of socialization of capital and labor, and the elimination of the status of the worker as hired labor. Otherwise the market cannot contribute to the development of socialism and to socialist self-management.

The unification of labor with the means of production, the author emphasizes, is not a hindrance but, conversely, a prerequisite for commodity production and a market under socialism, unless it is state socialism in which the state, as a power acting outside the production process, exercises comprehensive monopoly over the conditions and results of public reproduction and appropriates and distributes the entire social added value. It is precisely because there was no true unification between labor and means of production that so far the appropriation of the added value of material production has been able to reach such a point that the material foundation for self-management, development and organization of joint labor turned out to be virtually eliminated. The production facilities do not have even a minimum of their own funds which they could contribute to the expansion and organization of the market. State planning is only of an indicative nature and planning based on self-management does not have the funds handled by the producers themselves. Nor do banks control the production process.

The reduction of economic policy to a credit policy, with a noticeable lack of financial discipline, the forced additional emission of money and the development of the system of promissory notes without normal credit relations, when the labor organization can essentially "print" its own money without any true commodity cover, are pushing the Yugoslav economy into the precipice of inflation, from which it cannot come out even with the intervention of the state and state control. What is needed, the author states, is a strict financial discipline which, however, will be achieved not by a strict government but by the market: let enterprises which work poorly go bankrupt. In this case, if the workers are not to blame, they should not be left unemployed. All such major shortcomings in the economy are causing a great deal of concern. Their elimination is based on the long-term program for economic stabilization which was adopted in 1983; it is true that a great deal has changed for the worst since its adoption, which calls for correcting the measures which had been contemplated.

From the 1980 (1980) Yugoslav LYC documents, it can be seen that the LYC documents are not a revolutionary document. It can be seen that the LYC documents are not a revolutionary document. It can be seen that the LYC documents are not a revolutionary document.

the workers engaged in physical and mental work, by maximizing income, concentrating material and mental efforts on the production of commodities suitable for export, rejecting imports of obsolete technologies and halting the brain "drain" by establishing ties between science and production; upgrading labor productivity, changing the economic structure, eliminating the production of underprofitable goods and becoming part of the international division of labor not only by maintaining low prices for labor but, above all, as a result of low production costs. All of this must be implemented through the redistribution of manpower, and by providing jobs for the unemployed, whose number in Yugoslavia exceeds 1 million, not by lowering of the living standard of the majority which can subsist only through its labor but by increasing additional income and implementing a social policy which softens the blow at the well-being of the working class, the retired, and all socially deprived strata.

The role of the state, the author believes, should be reduced to setting the limit, on the one hand, by eliminating statist regulatory agents which restrict the freedom of the producer in organizing the production process, control over the market and earning a high income and, on the other, strengthening its role in equalizing economic management conditions, and encouraging trade with other countries. Each labor organization and its employees must proceed from their possibilities and results of economic management, pursue its own program for stabilization and base its development not on self-isolation but on establishing relations with other. Self-management must apply to all working people, who must not be separated from the decision making process, which is its opposite.

The article stipulates that the sociopolitical formations, from municipalities to the Federation, must restrain consumerist trends. As to republics and krajs, parochialism has been noted in them and fear of the existence of people who may appropriate the results of their work. This leads to the triumph of narrow interests, destroys the single market, preserves low labor productivity and slows down the development of one and all and of the country as a whole.

We in Yugoslavia, the author concludes, lived above our means. We continue to waste more than our production forces and the results of our economic management allow us to do. Today we must take into consideration the level of development which has been reached and live in accordance with our own possibilities. It is not the system of socialist self-management that should be blamed for the difficulties but the rejection of the system or its reduction to a political screen which conceals the fact that the working people have still not taken matters into their own hands, that it is not they who determine the development of society and that their forces are paralyzed by the tremendous power of the technocratic-bureaucratic monopoly of social and production relations.

Achievements along this path would have been greater had the League of Yugoslav Communists pursued more actively its role in accordance with what it had proclaimed. The author notes that so far the LYC remains trapped in the power system of early socialism and under the influence of the social forces which, with the development self-management, should have lost their inherited or acquired social privileges and more favorable position in the class structure. The League set its own programmatic task of penetrating as profoundly as possible within the working class and promoting within it organizational work so that, as the main productive class of society, it could independently make decisions concerning the conditions and results of its labor and, while transforming society, at the same time change itself, becoming a class which combines labor with management. In the final account, it is precisely this class that would encompass all members of society engaged in socialized labor. Thanks to technological progress and the increasing intellectualization of social labor, it becomes an intelligentsia in the unified material and spiritual production of life. The circumstances which hindered the fast and qualitative development of production forces in Yugoslavia also held back the process of transformation of the working class. For that reason, it predominantly consists of workers engaged in hard and routine labor, using obsolete technologies in sectors without a future.

The Communist League has had shortcomings in developing the type of class awareness which would reflect the status of the class not as the target of concern of "others," "from above," but as a subject concerned with its own situation, and which can influence social progress. Unfortunately, the author writes, strata have remained within the League itself displaying the old statist awareness with its inherent command, control and administrative role played by the party.

In assuming power and, until the establishment of a socialist self-management, acting as a promoter of revolutionary statism, subsequently as well, by inertia, the LYC supported the mechanism of decision-making related to the state, as a result of which to this day it remains the prisoner of statist practices. It also retained for itself the political monopoly on many problems, which is incompatible with socialist self-management.

The Communist League is not able to display its ideological and political initiative and capability to an equal degree when there is a conflict between specific and historical interests of the working class. Socialist self-management must be in fact founded on the pluralism of self-governing interests as they develop within a suitable political system (which is not set once and for all). Such interests are frequently conflicting and partial, which inevitably leads to numerous conflicts, sometimes impossible to solve. Communist work must be aimed at coordinating and synthesizing interests or else selecting the direct and specific interest consistent with the historical interests of the working class. In practice the

communists and their organizations and leading authorities are all too frequently trapped by specific interests which can be justified from the viewpoint of individuals, groups or local and national circles, institutions and organizations but do not coincide with historical interests. Mechanical cohesion and blind discipline have never been the ideal of the communists and whenever they nonetheless appeared, under certain circumstances, they did not contribute in the least to the communists' vanguard role.

The author notes that the weakening of overall Yugoslav statism in socioeconomic relations was not paralleled by a weakening of republic, kray and municipal statism but that, conversely, it even intensified on these levels. Matters did not reach the level of transferring social capital to producers' associations, organized on the basis of self-management. There was essentially no instrument with which to convert social means to the principles of self-management controlled by the producers. As a result, the role of an intermediary, played by the state in reproduction relations, not only did not weaken but strengthened substantially. The Yugoslav Constitution grants the republics and krays the right to handle their natural resources and public funds; it also stipulates that all peoples and ethnic groups must handle the added value of their own republic and kray autonomy. The combination of labor and means, based on the principles of profitability were considered the way through which the socialist self-management system could ensure expanded reproduction with a unified Yugoslav market and eliminate boundaries separating republics, krays and municipalities. However, statism comprehensively hindered and took over self-management, which meant that social capital, as a result of statism and the appropriation of the added labor, essentially on the level of republics, krays and even municipalities, still operates as state capital, i.e., it is used, invested and spent in accordance with the logic of statist aspirations and interests rather than the logic of the producers' interests.

Today, the author concludes, along with union statism Yugoslavia has particularly strong republic and kray statist formations, which clash with each other on the subject of the territorial distribution of funds, based on the interests of peoples and ethnic groups, under the conditions of an uneven distribution of resources and differences in the structure and standards of economic development. In emphasizing the power of such statism displayed by republics and krays and rejecting the favoring of union statism, the author believes that one should not question national equality, which is a great gain of the Yugoslav socialist revolution which established six republics and two krays (within Serbia). None of this is subject to revision, for a revision would threaten the existence of both Yugoslavia and its socialism.

The union state, the author writes, has not concentrated within it or distributed state capital over the past 20 years, although to this day it handles the vestiges of so-called anonymous capital. The union budget is a



different matter. It is formed on the basis of the agreement of all republics and krays (by consensus). The Federation has decisive rights in the formulation of decisions relative to economic policy, the making of which is also based on consensus. In practice, however, this principle was extended also to the exercise of already approved policy and the passing of legislation. Since republics and krays still retain capital ownership rights, they are handling funds on the state level, thereby developing a typical closeness, in the economic or any other area, which is a factor hindering and harming social development. In order to surmount this contradiction, according to the author, Yugoslavia needs a self-management integration which would take away the power of the various polycentric statisms and will make it possible for all national-territorial formations to develop, pursuing a policy of cohesion with the less developed among them, thus avoiding the danger that they may seriously fall behind as a result of the transfer of funds, which the market always redistributes in favor of those with higher labor productivity. This does not threaten national equality but, conversely, strengthens it, contributing to the exercise of the rights of peoples and ethnic groups to the development of all aspects of their national autonomy.

The author particularly emphasizes the need to reduce the remaining elements of the political monopoly held by the League of Communists. The revolution historically solved the problem of political pluralism in Yugoslavia: the bourgeois social parties broke down and abandoned the public arena. The LYC was established as the only party. The orientation toward socialist self-management itself was governed by the development from a one-party to a nonparty system, i.e., toward the withering away of the party (as was confirmed by changing the name of the party to a league). However, the League of Communists was largely unable to eliminate the practices and behavior of a political monopoly holder.

Naturally, it is not a question of restoring the multi-party system, the author points out, although supporters of this concept may be found. The multiplicity of competing parties in the field of power would mean a historical regress precisely because socialist self-management is a more advanced form of dictatorship of the proletariat, which leads to the withering away of the state and, therefore, of the political power exercised with the help of the state.

Nor could it be said, the author notes, that there is an excess of socialist democracy in Yugoslavia, for it is still too little. Also largely problematic are the freedom and opportunities granted the working people and the citizens in defending their vital rights and interests from bureaucratic and technocratic forces. Meanwhile, there is a great deal of fictitious democracy and democracy for a variety of prophets who predict a catastrophe, for nationalistic ideologues, and slanderers who defame the revolution and all of its historical achievements.

Needed, instead of fictitious democracy, is true democracy in the society, in all respects. The League of Communists has the greatest possible responsibility for the further development and implementation of the stipulations of social and legal standards in terms of true self-management and respect for and enrichment of human rights and freedoms.

It is precisely the frequent and serious violations of the principles and standards of socialist democracy, the author explains, that explain the formulation of demands by certain circles demanding its elimination and a return to a bourgeois society. In this case, however, they ignore the main thing: socialist democracy encompasses all achievements of bourgeois society in the areas of rights and freedoms and, on the historical level, develops them further. Criticism of the shortcomings of socialist democracy is manifested also in demands for so-called civilian society, and for the prevalence of the law and acknowledgment of spontaneous activities and various alternate movements, and so on. Such criticism is partially justified. Nonetheless, it is unacceptable in the part leading to the conclusion that the socialist self-management system should be replaced. At that point the demand is formulated for applying in the immediate future the ideas and forms of life of bourgeois society which would lead to its "advancement" and modernization. To us, the author states, it is a question not of "modernizing" something obsolete but of processes leading to a communist society and socialism as a transitional level.

The author describes as essential and very urgent prerequisite for the further democratization of the entire society the elements of political monopoly held by the LYC. For the time being, it is manifested also in its attitude toward the working class itself. The LYC frequently operates as an outside dictating force, considering the working class its target, instead of acting within the class in its interests, transforming its class awareness into an awareness of "class for itself."

This is quite clearly confirmed by the increased number of strikes or work stoppages. Not one of them has included the demand of abolishing the self-management system or the policy of national equality, or else changing the direction of foreign policy. The workers do not question the social system. Nonetheless, they still consider their situation as one of hired labor and do not truly feel themselves as participants in self-management. That is precisely why the LYC, together with the trade unions must side with the workers in all cases when they oppose violations of self-management and the principles of distribution based on labor results, the poor organization of labor, the incompetence of economic authorities and bureaucratic actions. However, they must have the skill and power to oppose frequently unjustified demands.

The League of Yugoslav Communists still all too frequently assumes the unsuitable role of arbiter "from the

outside and from above" in terms of the self-management forces. In frequent cases it makes advance decisions on various matters or simply sanctions those which have been made, regardless of the fact that they are the prerogative of other organizations. On this basis, the author notes that the communists must listen much more carefully to the criticism voiced by the "nonparty people." Socialism in Yugoslavia can develop only if it is based on the power of the majority, which accepts it in its daily life and, through its activities, contributes to it. In that sense the main choice for the LYC is not whether to be a party of regulars or a mass party but whether or not it is maintaining its image as a party of revolutionary action, open to anyone who fights for socialism and organizes them without violating its program.

In its daily practices the League must take a different attitude also toward the state and its executive-managerial authorities. Currently, as a rule, the LYC considers in advance problems which are within the competence of the government and assumes responsibility for their solution: it behaves as the party of power and the party in power.

The LYC does not show suitable openness toward socialist public opinion and, for the time being, is unable to struggle for it in a new fashion; it continues to resort to secretive policies and does not wage a sufficiently open and substantiated struggle for its positions and policies; it does not provide proper rebuttal to anticommunist and antisocialist statements and actions.

The monopoly of the Communist League in cadre policy is, presently, the most obvious manifestation of its remaining monopoly status in politics as a whole which, however, it can no longer preserve under the conditions of the development of the socialist system. There is no longer any major need for the leading authorities and organizations of the Communist League to have to bless in advance any cadre decision. Such problems must be the concern of the workers, of the working people, of all citizens: let them control those whom they appoint and choose, let them evaluate their work and determine their responsibilities.

The further socialist democratization of society, the author notes, largely depends on the democratization of relations within the League itself. The insufficient democracy of relations within the LYC is manifested in disparities between the necessary and the actual struggle of opinions and freedom of discussions within its organizations and leading authorities. The increased frequency of cases of removal from their position and the punishment of those who express "erroneous views" (although they obey the majority), and facts of suppression of criticism if they are addressed not at leadership and managers in general but at specific individuals and authorities. There are frequent manifestations of cliquishness and account settling, alienation from the outside world, "paper" contacts, etc.

The author of this article believes that the social role of the League of Communists in the implementation of the socialist revolution and its historical objectives consists of combining ideological with practical actions and theory with practice. It is only thus that the LYC can become a real material force which can change the existing situation in a progressive direction and be able to identify today the shoots of the future and, as a revolutionary vanguard, steadily convert this material force into socialist action through its impact on the minds of the masses.

By virtue of its nature, socialism is the revolutionary reorganization of capitalist into communist society, and socialist self-management is one of the stages of this process, with its specific laws which must be discovered with the help of theoretical work, and which will adapt to them revolutionary activities of subjective factors. With its initiative, creativity and programmatic concepts of the ways and means of developing socialist self-management, the League of Yugoslav Communists must successfully apply the Marxist understanding of the revolution and its historical objectives, according to which communism is not some kind of doctrine but a process. To the communists it is not one type of philosophy or another that is the premise but all previous history and its results.

S. Suvar writes, in conclusion, that the development of socialism in Yugoslavia encompasses a number of contradictions today, which are tested through historical results and the revolutionary strength of the Yugoslav communist movement. Any contemporary socialist revolution—and the Yugoslav one is no exception—does not end with the seizure of political power and socialist industrialization, but continues as long as the entire power, wielded on behalf of the working class, has not become the power of the working class itself and until the rule of some people over other has not disappeared, so that all of them can jointly manage their affairs.

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#### **New Thinking: What Can UNESCO Do?**

18020009m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 89 (signed to press 3 Feb 89) pp 118-120

[Letter to the editors by A. Tursunov, doctor of philosophical sciences, director of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies]

[Text] The time has come to elevate to a suitable spiritual standard the universal moral-ethical norms and ideals which can unite within a single historical entity people living in different geographic latitudes and with opposite political orientations and ideological convictions. In speaking of international cooperation and of strengthening reciprocal understanding and trust among politically and ideologically divided people, we turn, and not as a last resort, to science and culture, which are the

most universal manifestations of the human spirit. Even in the darkest years of the cold war, when the thick dust which rose from the field of fierce ideological battles stood like a wall separating nations, science and culture continued to fulfill their lofty humanitarian mission, although with a great deal of difficulty and with annoying interruptions.

Until World War II, professional contacts among scientists from different countries—albeit on a rather limited basis even for that time—were organized by the International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. After the war, when the need for international cooperation in the scientific and humanitarian areas became a truly historical necessity, the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) was founded. Today it has become a truly universal organization which organizes and coordinates international cooperation within a wide range of scientific and humanitarian activities. In slightly more than 40 years of existence of this specialized United Nations institution, despite all obstacles, a great deal has been accomplished to strengthen the intellectual and moral cohesion among people of different races, nationalities, religious faiths and ideologies. At the present crucial stage in global developments, this noble international activity becomes particularly significant and profoundly meaningful.

In this connection, let us particularly emphasize how difficult, one could say virtually impossible (and hardly necessary) it is to draw a clear demarcation line between the strictly humanitarian and the political tasks of this organization (the struggle for peace and security which, incidentally, has henceforth become indivisible and equal to all and, by this token, has assumed a clearly manifested ethical coloring). That is why, fully in accordance with the spirit and letter of its bylaws, UNESCO, for example, must contribute to broadening possibilities of conducting research in the social and humanitarian sciences, which affect problems of disarmament, with all interrelated aspects including the reasons for and consequences of the arms race. Equally obvious is the universality of problems of universal peace, development and ecology.

The fact that UNESCO (which now deals also with problems of communications and the information industry) does not directly deal with practical problems of promoting peace among nations is a different matter: it has the well-known channels for dealing with such problems. In particular, the theoretical study of factors (cultural in particular) which contribute to maintaining and strengthening peace as the highest and truly universal human value is unquestionably one of its sacred tasks. The ethical-humanistic mission of international organizations of an intellectual nature, UNESCO above all, lies in general cultural foundation under the system of comprehensive co-operation. The purpose of such organizations is to promote in the world a moral climate in which

the arms race and the increased threat of war, militarization of society and social awareness will be conceived as challenges to universal human standards and ideals.

Having spent last summer at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris, I had the opportunity directly to observe the functioning of the working mechanism of that organization. It is true that I became thoroughly acquainted with only one area in UNESCO's comprehensive activities—the organization of international cooperation in science. However, I can say that this gave me a clear idea also of the scale of the work being done in the other areas. I shall mention merely a few projects (already under way or contemplated), which act as centers for concentrating international cooperation in the social and humanitarian sciences.

Currently, with the help of outstanding scientists in the humanities from all continents, and with the financial, intellectual and technical assistance provided by UNESCO, work is being done on an entire range of multiple-volume scientific works, the purpose of which is to provide a summed-up scientific analysis of the history of culture as a whole and of individual nations and regions. Intensive work is taking place on a new draft of a *"History of Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind,"* which has already been rated highly by the scientific community. UNESCO is cooperating with a number of international intellectual organizations, which specialize in the study of regional and subregional cultures. For example, it is giving financial support to the International Association for the Study and Dissemination of Slavic Cultures, which has undertaken a major interdisciplinary study of the role which the Slavs played in the history, science and culture of Europe and Asia.

The International Association for the Study of Civilizations of Central Asia, created in its time on the initiative of Soviet scientists, is continuing to implement its scientific plans with active UNESCO support. The organization provides comprehensive assistance in the implementation of another Soviet suggestion: writing a multiple-volume *"History of Central Asian Civilizations."*

The "Universal Decade of the Development of Culture (1988-1997)" promises to become a major landmark in UNESCO activities. This decade was adopted at the 41st UN General Assembly. In particular, a long-term study will be made of the development of world culture, with particular emphasis on the scientific interpretation of developments and changes at the beginning of the 21st century in the way of life and way of thinking of people and their attitude toward culture in general.

As was emphasized at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, until recently Soviet diplomacy had not fully realized the opportunities which were appearing for achieving great reciprocal understanding among nations. I believe that one such lost opportunity was work in the



UNESCO which, had there been any political desire, could have become much more active and purposeful. Actually, such a somewhat sluggish attitude toward UNESCO affairs during the period preceding perestroika was based on the then overall Soviet approach to international affairs, when problems of a humanitarian nature were actually pushed into the background or not discussed at all.

In particular, difficult artificial barriers had been erected (and, to a certain extent, still remain) on the way to international intellectual and cultural exchanges, not only of a strictly bureaucratic nature but dogmatic-ideological as well. Suffice it to say that for quite some time even internationally famous UNESCO journals such as *CULTURES: DIALOGUE AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD*, *IMPACT (SCIENCE AND SOCIETY)*, *PERSPECTIVES (PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION)*, and others were not accessible to Russian-language audiences. Materials of a number of scientifically significant international scientific symposia, roundtables of men of culture and conferences held by UNESCO experts are to this day not being made available to the Soviet creative intelligentsia, not to mention basic works sponsored by UNESCO and published in the main European languages. It is particularly annoying that the *"History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind,"* written by a highly skilled international group of authors and considered by the international community as a noticeable phenomenon in world science, has not been translated into Russian.

The USSR Commission On UNESCO Affairs and the USSR UNESCO Mission (in Paris) have contributed a great deal to the organization and coordination of international activities. However, bearing in mind current prospects, this entire work must be enhanced: we need not only new ideas and initiatives which could bring fresh elements in projects already under way but also new organizational decisions affecting the working status of such Soviet institutions. It seems to me that the fact that they lack the necessary rights to engage in independent and efficient action and the observance of the old procedure of endless coordinations occasionally delay the solution of topical problems unjustifiably long. The expansion and strengthening of international and internal influence of the USSR Commission On UNESCO Affairs (of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) would be helped by reorganizing it as a USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers. This suggestion is based on the idea of creating a more flexible and efficient nondepartmental organization, structured on a democratic basis and relying on broader circles among the scientific and creative intelligentsia.

It would be very expedient and fair to broaden the range of academic institutes to be included in international scientific cooperation through UNESCO, by involving republic research centers which can formulate and solve problems on the basis of worldwide standards. Their forms of participation in international projects could be

quite varied. In particular, in addition to what we already said, the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies could actively participate in the UNESCO series *"Collection of Representative Works,"* for its extremely rich stock of Persian-language manuscripts makes it possible to draft respective anthologies and collections of poetry from the classical artistic legacy of Iranian peoples.

Broadening the intellectual and geographic horizon of the USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs is only one of the ways leading to the democratization of this organization. Another and no less important one is to abandon the established practice of deciding essential problems which require thorough scientific expertise behind closed doors. Without such unsuitable practices, our scientists could participate in the very promising comprehensive "Silk Way" Program, which has just been started, and add to it new ideas and make the necessary corrections. How can we explain the silent refusal by Soviet representatives to participate in this scientific project which deals with the history and categories of Islamic culture?

Finally, we should also consider the broadening and strengthening of the publishing facilities of the commission.

Clearly, in the course of the now initiated process of reassessing the significance of the United Nations and all of its specialized agencies, the wave of renovation will affect UNESCO as well. It is natural to consider as the pivotal trend in its activities the question of the fuller and more efficient use of the intellectual and moral energy of world culture for the benefit of all mankind. In this light, the formulation of comprehensive long-range programs which would reflect the latest trends in the development of science, technology and culture, both individually as well as in terms of their internal interconnection, will be an important trend in updating and enhancing UNESCO activities. Work in this area is being done by experts and national commissions of United Nations members. On our side, we would like to suggest two major programs. The first, entitled "Regional Conflicts: Ethnocultural and Confessional Context," does not need any particularly thorough substantiation, for the protracted bloody clashes which have taken place in a number of parts of the world, speak for themselves. The other comprehensive program is based on a longer-range idea which I would formulate as follows: "Establishment of a Single Human Civilization: Origins, Problems, Trends." The tremendous theoretical and applied significance of such a broad problem is quite clear.

It also seems to us that some older UNESCO decisions must be revised, for they are not in the spirit of the priority trends in its activities. Thus, all major humanitarian problems of the organization were formulated, which was quite accurate and far-sighted, from the viewpoint of the dialogue among cultures and, as such,

aimed at increasing their reciprocal understanding. For that reason, we can only be puzzled by the interruption (although for understandable financial reasons as well) of the publication of the journal *CULTURE*, which was an important international UNESCO printed organ, which earned deserved popularity not only among the world scientific community but a broad readership as well. We are even more puzzled by the fact that such a decision was made on the eve of the world decade of the development of culture, which is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of dialogue among the peoples of the world.

In emphasizing the need for strengthening the scientific and intellectual principle in UNESCO we, naturally, realize that UNESCO is an intergovernmental organization and not an international association of men of science and culture. It is a question of something else: of the fuller and more efficient use of the mental and moral energy of world science and culture: UNESCO's programmatic objectives and tasks and its priorities and future must be formulated and amended by the best minds of our time. UNESCO's headquarters must become a real rostrum for the intellectual vanguard of the planet, where scientists, men of literature and the arts and leaders of creative associations, unions and clubs would meet regularly.

As we near the end of the second millennium, an entirely new situation, unique in terms of historical significance, has developed: no local and regional human societies that show a tendency toward locking themselves in an impenetrable shell of narrow egotistical objectives and interests can survive as a matter of principle! Under those critical conditions it is insufficient simply to call for peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems. In its present understanding, this principle presumes a higher level of international political activeness compared to the past. Furthermore, it is very important and necessary for it to be paralleled by comprehensive humanitarian activities. It is only if it is morally inspired and firmly founded on the principles of universal human morality that world politics can hope to achieve mutually acceptable solutions of most difficult problems which face the international community in their full magnitude.

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#### **Effort to Rehabilitate a Shameful Act in Science**

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[Article by N. Grigoryan, doctor of medical sciences, and M. Yaroshevskiy, doctor of psychological sciences]

[Text] Stalinism wrote sinister pages in the chronicles of Soviet science in the postwar years. One of the most shameful among them was the 1948 VASKHNIL Session, which assigned T.D. Lysenko the role of infallible leader in Soviet biology.

Stalin was behind Lysenko. This was his usual style of managing science and in organizing so-called scientific discussions. With his typical hypocrisy, Stalin said the right words to the effect that no science can develop and prosper without a struggle of opinions and freedom of criticism. Everyone knows, however, what befell many scientists who opposed Lysenko's "opinions" and who engaged in the "freedom to criticize" his views.

After biology, Stalin took up physiology. Reliable testimony exists to the effect that it was precisely Stalin, the "honored academician," who set himself in the "position" of a great scientist of all times and nations, who initiated the discussion of physiology. In July 1950 *PRAVDA* reported that "the formulation of the question of the further development of the scientific legacy of Academician Pavlov... we owe to Comrade Stalin, the greatest scientist of our days, and the flag bearer of Soviet science."

It was decided to hold a discussion in the summer of 1950 at the joint session of the two highest scientific institutions in the country: the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences. However, such a meeting had been planned by Stalin earlier, soon after the notorious VASKHNIL Session.

The memoirs of Colonel General Ye.I. Smirnov, who was then USSR Minister of Health, are in the archives of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the History of Natural Sciences and Technology. They show that in the summer of 1949 (or 1 year prior to the "session of the two academies") Stalin summoned him to his dacha in Sochi, where he started talking about the need to discuss problems of physiology or, more specifically, Pavlov's theory; corresponding instructions were issued to G.M. Malenkov and A.A. Zhdanov. Finally, one of us had the opportunity to study Stalin's personal notes made on the text of the main report to be presented at said session, one of the actual authors of which was Leningrad Physiologist E.Sh. Ayrapetyants (K.M. Bykov was listed as the official author). Unlike linguistics, Stalin did not publish anything in the press on problems of physiology. He limited himself to general views according to which there was only one right theory, which was Pavlov's, and which opposed all Western science which was under the influence of an ideology hostile to us, and that that theory had enemies (many of them hiding as its supporters), that they should be exposed and deprived of their positions, and so on.

K.M. Bykov and A.G. Ivanov-Smolenskii, who were not among Pavlov's best students, willingly assumed the role of prosecutors. Their reports contained a greatly simplified and historically inaccurate presentation of Pavlov's theory. Suffice it to say that Bykov began his report with the following idea: "We shall divide all physiology into two stages: pre-Pavlovian and Pavlovian." All possible proofs were provided that Pavlov had absolutely no connections with the West. Any acknowledgment of the

international nature of science was considered a manifestation of cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, in 1935, at the 15th International Physiological Congress, it was on the initiative of Western scientists that Pavlov had been awarded the title "Elder of World Physiologists," which was the only such title ever awarded in the history of that science. The erroneous understanding of the originality of domestic science, which reflected Stalinist concepts, led to its separation from world science, which was inconsistent with historical reality and, in practical terms, was extremely dangerous. The other Stalinist stipulation was taking an "oath" of loyalty to Lysenko, which was the only thing compatible with Marxism and communist party policy.

On this matter, I. A. Orbeli, Pavlov's closest and favorite student, took an independent position. As academic secretary of the department of biology, among others he was not present at the notorious VASKHNIL Session, for which reason he was removed from his position and persecuted. This triggered the protest of noted world scientists. Thus, in September 1948, Nobel Prize winner H. Dale addressed a letter to S. I. Vavilov, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in which he wrote that "my old and respected friend Orbeli, an outstanding neurophysiologist and follower of the school of your great Pavlov, has been removed from his position as secretary of your academy's department of biological sciences. All we know is that a geneticist who was encouraged by Lenin is now forbidden to profess his political philosophy, which is considered alien. With deep regret I submit my resignation as honorary member of your academy." Orbeli became the main target of attacks at the "session of the two academies." He was proclaimed "anti-Pavlovian," and an idealist, a metaphysicist promoting "Mendelian-Morganic petty ideas." Things went so far that Orbeli, unfairly accused of agnosticism, was put on the same level as those who "undermine the cause of the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism." Speeches aimed at other outstanding Soviet physiologists sounded like denunciations. The session, which was advertised as a "scientific discussion," essentially turned into an ideological and political trial. It caused tremendous harm. The primitive combination of some views of the theory of conditional reflex became a "book of quotations," and anything which did not agree with it was recorded in the "conduct-book" kept by a group of mediocre physiologists, the so-called "Scientific Pavlovian Council" (which, fortunately, broke up soon afterwards).

Physiology is most closely linked to the practice of medicine. Whatever area in which research and the treatment of patients may be conducted, those who did not conceal themselves behind phraseology drawn from the materials of the "session of the two academies" were classified as having deviated from the party line. The session had a corrupting influence on an entire generation of physiologists who were raised, for many years, in the spirit of a dogmatic attitude toward scientific ideas.

There were also direct organizational consequences which affected many scientists on different levels. Let us mention only the best known among them. Academicians L. A. Orbeli and I. S. Beritashvili were dismissed from all their positions, and so were then member of the Academy of Medical Sciences P. K. Anokhin, and N. A. Bernshteyn. USSR Academy of Medical Sciences corresponding member who, shortly before the session, had been awarded the Stalin Prize. Every single one of these men was at the head of an entire scientific school, with students and dozens of collaborators. Efforts to correct this situation were initiated soon after the 20th Party Congress. At the 1962 All-Union Conference on Philosophical Problems of Physiology of Higher Nervous Activities and Psychology it was pointed out that the session which had been held in the spirit of Stalin's cult of personality had distorted the situation in physiology and the very principle of scientific criticism. In 1963, in his work "The Authority of Facts," V. V. Parin, the outstanding Soviet physiologist and academy member, described the damage which had been caused to science by those who considered themselves the right students of Pavlov: "...The great physiologist-innovator... could not imagine that his works would be converted into some kind of hybrid of a prayer book and a stick for threatening dissidents." In his view, many progressive trends in physiology, without which its progress is inconceivable (in particular, electrophysiology and physical-chemical research methods) were condemned by mediocrities who had assumed leading positions in that science based on the authority of personalities rather than that of the facts.

In an article on the "Pavlovian" 1950 Session, Professor V. Ya. Aleksandrov, the noted biologist, described accurately and briefly its role and consequences to Soviet science as the routing of physiology, justifiably classifying it alongside the 1948 VASKHNIL Session and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Session on O. I. Lepeshinskaya's "theory" (1950). In October 1987 the journal VOPROSY ISTORII YESESTVOZNANIYA I TEKHNIKI sponsored a roundtable on the consequences of the so-called "Pavlovian Session," attended by noted physiologists, psychologists, philosophers and historians of science, a total of 23 people. They unanimously assessed the session as having had a disastrous influence on the development of domestic physiology and medicine, and compromising the true historical contribution which Pavlov has made to world science (some materials of this discussion were published in said journal). It seemed that the situation was clear. The "Pavlovian Session," held on the basis of Stalin's scenario, was properly rated. However, we must point out that today, when truthful and accurate knowledge about our past is assuming such a sharp ideological, educational and moral significance, there are historians of science to whom this truth does not appeal.

It is with great amazement that we read the very recently published book "Fiziologicheskaya Nauka v SSSR: Stanovleniye, Razvitiye, Perspektivy" (Physiological Sciences in the USSR: Origins, Development, Future)



(Nauka, Leningrad, 1988), in which the Stalinist act in the area of physiology, condemned by the scientific public, is presented as an overall positive phenomenon in the development of that science. "In the reports which K.M. Bykov and A.G. Ivanov-Smolenskiy presented," the authors of the section on this notorious session, K.A. Lange and E.N. Svetaylo write, "the activities of a number of research collectives and some leading physiologists were assessed critically. Recommendations were formulated aimed at the further development of I.P. Pavlov's scientific legacy

"The discussion which developed at the session was sharp and lively. Eighty-one of the 209 registered speakers took the floor to discuss the reports. Let us note that the majority of the participants in the discussion supported the view on the errors made in the development of various areas of physiology, contained in the featured reports" (pp 161-162)

The resolution "included a critical evaluation of individual aspects of the scientific activities" of Shtern, Beritashvili, Orbeli, Speranskiy and Anokhin (p 162)

What a touching bucholic picture! Men of science had gathered. They critically evaluated their work. The considered how to improve it. They discussed the area in which physiology was to advance. This is the normal life of a scientific community, and how remote was this ideal from the speeches of doom, the atmosphere of suspicion and fear and political slander of those who were the pride of Soviet science and who were deprived of their chairs and laboratories. How did the authors fail to notice that Anokhin's theory was condemned at the session as a "form of manifestation of subservience to foreign science and cosmopolitanism," as a revision of Pavlov's theory "from the rotten positions of pseudoscientific idealistic 'theories' of reactionary bourgeois scientists" and orchestrated by laughter and mockery. Academician I.S. Shtern was described as a "notorious individual who had defamed our science for an entire quarter of a century," and that Pavlov's student, the world-renowned Polish Academician Yu. Konorski was described as having slid into the "swamp of Sherringtonian idealism," while the classic of physiology, and Nobel Prize winner Sherrington was described as an ideologue of imperialism, or else that it was demanded of the physiologists to develop Pavlov's teaching in the Lysenkoist spirit and in the spirit of the "great Stalinist linguistic theory?"

As depicted by Lange and Svetaylo, the session was of a practical science nature. "The study of the materials of the session," they write, "leads us to conclude that both the featured speeches and the statements by most scientists, as well as the resolution provided a scientific evaluation of the achievements of domestic physiology, noting the need to strengthen ties between theoretical research and the tasks formulated by practical developments in health care, education, physical education and animal husbandry. The topics of scientific works and

physiology, recommended in the session's resolution, virtually coincide with the topic of research, the insufficiency of the development of which was pointed out 5 years later at the 8th All-Union Congress of Physiologists, Biochemists and Pharmacologists. For the sake of objectivity, let us note that in the resolution of the session of the two academies there was no mention of stopping or reducing work in the various areas of physiology. The people spoke of the need to pay particular attention to a number of problems the development of which until 1950 had seemed insufficient to the participants in the session. We must also acknowledge that the results of the 1950 Session played a significant role in the development of the governmental network of physiological institutes, laboratories and university departments in the 1951-1962 period

"Therefore, one could speak of two aspects of the influence of the scientific session on research in physiology: the overall positive influence which the session had and which determined an essential quantitative development of research collectives and scientific works in the various areas of physiological sciences, and which contributed to the strengthening of creative contacts among physiological research and sectorial collectives.... Second, let us note the adverse consequences of this session, which were manifested less as a result of the resolution passed by its participants than in the process of its implementation. Occasionally, elements of bureaucratic administration, which were introduced in this process, which replaced scientific discussions with formal resolutions were not consistent... with the interests of the development of domestic physiology" (pp 163-164)

The section entitled "The USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and Development of Problems of Human and Animal Physiology Problems Between 1945 and 1962" (authored by Yu.P. Golikov, T.I. Grekov, K.A. Lange and V.A. Makarov) reads as follows: "Let us note that the decisions which were made by the participants in the scientific session which was held in December of 1950 had a substantial influence on the development of physiological research by the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences between 1950 and 1954...." Again, what an idyll! It was as though the notorious "scientific Pavlovian advice," was not used at the session to persecute outstanding scientists, to mock them, forcing Orbeli and Beritashvili to acknowledge their errors and to revise and reject their entire former scientific work

It was as though there had not been sinister articles in the central press, which clearly bore the mark of political denunciations against noted physiologists in the country.

One of us (M. Yaroshevskiy) is mentioned as a member of the group of authors of this book. He indeed wrote several pages on the development of physiology in the 19th century. However, it is a strange tradition that in recent years the organizers of collective works have not deemed it necessary to inform all the authors of the

content of the entire manuscripts. It comes out that they too share in the responsibility for the published work which contain concepts clearly unacceptable to them.

The concept of the "significant influence" which the session had and its "overall" positive role in the development of Soviet physiology is also systematically promoted in the monograph by B.I. Tkachenko and K.A. Lange "K.M. Bykov" (Meditsina, Moscow, 1987, pp 77-82). Apparently, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences member K.V. Sudakov, a student of P.K. Anokhin, who recommended it for publication, agrees with the "exposure" of Anokhin's hostile, idealistic and anti-Pavlovian concepts at the session.

Therefore, the "study" materials of the 1950 Session, which are totally void of productive ideas and decisions (as confirmed by the entire subsequent development of physiology) are groundlessly proclaimed "scientific," and the "overall positive influence of the session" is seen in the "increased number of scientific collectives." The authors fail to mention the routing after the session of world renowned collectives and the promotion to leading positions in the new institutions of those who had distinguished themselves by exposing the "anti-Pavlovians."

Academician V.V. Parin, who had a sharply negative assessment of the influence which the session had on the fate of physiology in the USSR, wrote: "...The problem of the struggle against dogmatism, the proper attitude toward scientific legacy and maintaining a healthy and truly creative atmosphere is not a physiological or biological problem but a general problem.... True creative thinking... must be based on high ethical principles and scientific integrity."

Unfortunately, these principles have been violated by the historians of physiology who, instead of providing an accurate and documented study of one of Stalin's ideological actions, have undertaken to justify, without proof, the positive influence on the development of our physiology, ascribed to that session. It is even more annoying that such groundless assertions have been included in a book which has come out in a period when society feels with particular urgency the need for impeccably truthful knowledge of the past, including that of our science.

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#### Returning to the Reader

180200090 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 89 (signed to press 3 Feb 89) pp 124-126

[Article by G. Sobolev, doctor of historical sciences, head of the History of Soviet Society Department, Leningrad University]

[Text] One of the reasons for stagnation in our social sciences is the total neglect or deliberate exclusion from the realm of knowledge of many most interesting works

by Russian and Soviet scientists, documentary materials and memoirs of previously noted personalities, dealing with Russia and the Soviet state. In my view, Goskomizdat and the central publishing houses have shown a very good initiative by drafting a "Long-Term Plan for the Publication of the Works on Domestic History, Noted Russian and Soviet Philosophers, Economists and Jurists, Which Have Not Been Published in Our Country for a Long Time" (see KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE No 38, 1988).

The picture presented in this work captivates the imagination and we would like to hope that this plan will not become yet another characteristic monument of our unattained aspirations. Considering the present sharp interest shown by the public in domestic history, reprinting the works of Russian and Soviet historians is simply necessary. One can only be pleased that the contemporary reader will acquire the possibility of looking at the history of his homeland through the eyes of V.O. Klyuchevskiy, M.N. Pokrovskiy, S.M. Solovyev, N.M. Karamzin, N.M. Druzhinin, V.N. Tatishchev, M.N. Tikhomirov, S.F. Platonov and others. It is regrettable, however, that this plan, which will cover the period until the year 2000, will not include the works of Russian historians, such as A.Ye. Presnyakov, A.S. Lappo-Danilevskiy and P.N. Milyukov. Familiarity with the variety of views and positions held by noted representatives of Russian and Soviet historical science is a mandatory prerequisite for training a dialectically thinking generation of historians. The science of history has paid a very high price for vulgar interpretations, intolerance of dissidence, and group prejudices.

As a specialist in the history of Soviet society, who has frequently had the opportunity to speak to mass audiences, it saddens me to admit that the trust of the public in the works by contemporary historians has been justifiably undermined. This has led to the appearance of erroneous concepts concerning even a key event in domestic history as the October Revolution. This, in particular, was described in KOMMUNIST by P.V. Volobuyev (No 16, 1988). I believe that acquainting the broad public with historical research, documents and memoirs which were published in the 1920s could play an important role in correcting such views. In my view, furthermore, the long-range plan should significantly expand the section dealing with the history of prerevolutionary Russia, starting with the end of the 19th century. The reprinting of sources such as "The Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Minutes of Interrogations and Testimony Given in 1917 to the Extraordinary Investigative Commission of the Provisional Government" (Leningrad, 1924-1926, vols 1-7), "The Monarchy and the Eve of Destruction. 1914-1917" (Moscow, 1927), "The Bourgeoisie On the Eve of the February Revolution" (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), "Memoirs" by S.Yu. Vitte (for some reason included in the plan in the section on the history of the October Revolution), "The Final Days of Imperial Power" by A. Blok (Petrograd, 1921) and others, would

make it possible for the contemporary reader, if not to obtain an answer at least to start thinking about how realistic were the chances that Russia would take the path of reformism.

It is gratifying that the section on the history of the October Revolution begins, in the plan, with N.I. Bukharin's *"Selected Works,"* which was already published by Politizdat in 1988. However, the hopes of the readers were justified only partially: this volume did not include works which are important in understanding Bukharin's views, such as *"The Global Economy and Imperialism"* (1915), *"Class Struggle and Revolution in Russia"* (1917) and *"From the Dictatorship of Imperialism to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"* (1918).

Reprinting the works of noted personalities of the Bolshevik Party is of major importance in eliminating simplistic concepts on the theoretical preparations for the October Revolution, the formulation of the Leninist concept of the socialist revolution and the party's strategy and tactics on the way to the October Revolution. Along with the works by V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, P.Ye. Dybenko, A.F. Ilin-Zhenevskiy, A.M. Kollontay and A.V. Lunacharskiy, included in the plan, the following books unquestionably are worthy of attention: *"Flames. Events of the Days of October"* by K.S. Yermayev (Moscow, 1928), *"In the Days of Sturm und Drang"* by A. Lomov (G.I. Oppokov) (Moscow, 1929), *"1917"* by M.S. Olminskiy (Moscow, 1926), *"Kronstadt and Peter in 1917"* by F.F. Raskolnikov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925) and *"The Path to Bolshevism. 1917-1918"* by D.A. Furmanov (Leningrad, 1927).

One can only welcome Politizdat's intention to put back into scientific circulation a unique publication of the 1920s, such as *"The Year 1917"* by A.G. Shlyapnikov, who was a member of the Russian Bureau of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee in 1917 and people's commissar for labor in the first Soviet government. The value of this publication lies above all in the numerous documents appended to it and the vivid, albeit occasionally controversial commentaries and testimony of this active participant in the February and October Revolutions. I am astounded, however, that for some reason the work *"On the Eve of 1917"* (parts I-II, 1920-1922), which is a part of that work, has not been included in the plan.

I believe that we are now able independently, without the help of interpreters, both domestic and foreign, to understand what L.D. Trotsky wrote, prior to his exile from the USSR and subsequently. It would be hardly proper to keep on pretending that there is no such thing as his *"History of the Russian Revolution,"* which was published in New York in 1932-1933, and the many volumes of documentary publications from his files, which were published abroad. However, even long before that Trotsky had been able to publish a great deal, such as *"The October Revolution"* (1918), *"Between Imperialism and the Revolution"* (1922), *"War and Revolution"* (1922), vol 3 of his works which deals with 1917 (1925),

and *"Lenin"* (1925). Nor would it be bad to acquaint the readers also with the views on the revolution expressed by G.Ye. Zinovyev, whose volume 7 of his works deals exclusively with this problem (1925), as well as his book *"The Year of Revolution"* (1926).

I am convinced that against the background of an objective consideration of the legacy of such disparate leaders of the Bolshevik Party, the outstanding contribution which V.I. Lenin made to the theory and practice of the socialist revolution in Russia will become even clearer. It would be suitable, in this connection, to reprint the 4 volumes of memoirs *"On Lenin,"* which came out in 1924-1925, and which were authored by many of the leader's fellow workers, who were subject to repressions in the 1930s.

I am convinced that more than 70 years after the October Revolution we still know very little about the way the members of the different social groups and classes in Russia lived, what they thought and what they aspired for at that time. The letters and diaries of contemporaries are particularly valuable in understanding the period of the October Revolution. In addition to widely known diaries and notes by men of literature and the arts, in my view, attention should be paid, in particular, to the book *"From the Diary of the Revolution"* by R.V. Ivanov-Razumnik, whose profound observations on the development of moods and sociopsychological state of mind of the Russian intelligentsia between February and October 1917 would be of interest to the readers.

I deem justified and even necessary to acquaint the general public with documents, studies and memoirs of non-Bolshevik origin, as promised in the plan (such as *"Notes On the Revolution"* by L. Sukhanov, which until recently could not even be quoted as a reference). The plan also includes the works by General A.I. Denikin, although his *"Essays on the Russian Disturbances,"* are, in my opinion, by no means the most valuable among the writings and publications of those who belonged in the camp of the Russian counterrevolution (we could mention here the memoirs by A.I. Verkhovskiy, V.A. Maklakov and others). Naturally, documents from those times are particularly valuable. I do not consider it an exaggeration to say that reprinting sources such as *"State Conference (12-15 August 1917). Minutes"* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930), *"The Bourgeoisie and Landowners in 1917. Private Conference by Members of the State Duma"* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1932) and A.I. Shingarev's diary *"The Way This Was,"* which he kept at the Petropavlovsk Fortress from 27 November 1917 to 5 January 1918 (Moscow, 1918), will be welcomed by the readers.

In order to establish more clearly the origins of the one-party system, it would be useful to reprint the minutes of the session of the Constituent Assembly of 5-6 January 1918, which came out in 1930. By then the positions of the various political parties had become clearly defined. The unprejudiced reader, who will



become familiar with the speeches of the Mensheviks, the right-wing S.R. and the representatives of nationalistic parties, will agree with the view of the Bolshevik Party speaker I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov at that session: "Citizens sitting on the right, the break between us took place a long time ago. You were on one side of the barricade, with the White Guards and the cadets; we were on the other side of the barricade with the soldiers, the workers and the peasants.... We have broken with you totally. You live in one world, with the cadets and the bourgeoisie; we live in another world, with the peasants and the workers" ("All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Minutes," Moscow-Leningrad, 1930, p. 7).

Knowledge of the sources coming from the camp of the Russian counterrevolution is necessary also in answering yet another question of interest: Could Russia have avoided the bloodshedding Civil War? Today, however, in discussing this topic without prejudice and taking into consideration the views of the opposite sides, we must bear in mind the conclusion reached by Lenin, based on the experience of the October Revolution: "Our revolution, more than any other, has confirmed the law that the power of the revolution, the power of pressure, energy, resolve and the triumph of its victory also intensify the forces of the opposition provided by the bourgeoisie" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol. 40, p. 244).

Unfortunately, the list of reprints, recommended in the plan for the local publishing houses, is very short. These publishing houses lack their own program. Yet interesting work is being done in the local areas. Thus, Lenizdat is preparing to reprint a journal series which includes the once popular "The Past," "Red Chronicles," "Hard Labor and Exile," and a planned 20-volume series of memoirs and documents entitled "Features of the Portrait of the Times," as well as other useful ideas.

Taking local initiative into consideration, the expressed suggestions and additions in reprinting works on domestic history could play an important role in surmounting simplistic concepts and broadening the historical outlook of the Soviet people. As to the philosophical, legal and economic sections of the plan, I believe that in this case as well substantial additions are possible on the basis of extensive discussions by specialists. As a whole, the plan provides valuable prerequisites for the further restructuring of social awareness in line with the new thinking and exposure to the huge layers of domestic culture.

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**Economic Statistics: Follow the Path of Glasnost**  
18020009p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3,  
Feb 89 (signed to press 3 Feb 89) pp 126-127

[Article by A. Ulyukayev, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The radical economic reform is based on the autonomy and self-management of labor collectives.

This presumes a much higher level of their economic competence. Lack of knowledge and simply extreme economic illiteracy are major obstructions on the path of perestroyka. Increasingly, the making of important economic decisions are becoming the direct project of the working people, for which reason the latter must be provided with the best possible information.

The closed nature of a high percentage of socioeconomic information during the period of stagnation was one of the reasons for the alienation of the broad popular masses from management and for the growth of dangerous departmental-bureaucratic trends.

Thus, many demographic data were for official use only: data on natural population dynamics, life span, and dynamics of professional diseases. The most important ratios of foreign economic activities, data on the functioning of the financial system, materials on the situation of the consumer market, the living standards of the population on the social and regional levels, price changes, and volumes of grain production was kept secret. The list could be extended further. Hiding behind the "official use only" stamp, the economic personnel kept the population of this huge country on short information rations. There was an actual "rationing system" in statistics.

Restructuring in the information-statistics area presumes the solution of pressing problems. In 1988 the USSR State Committee for Statistics prepared and published for wide distribution the following collections: "The USSR and Foreign Countries," "Capital Construction in the USSR," "The Population of the USSR," "USSR Agriculture," "USSR Industry," "Labor in the USSR," and "Material and Technical Procurements in the USSR," the content of which was previously exclusively for official use only. These collections come in two variants: the large, which will be of interest essentially to specialists in the national economy, and the short, which comes with illustrations, diagrams and charts, which significantly improves the clarity of the information aimed at the broadest possible readership.

Plans for this year call for the publication of 12 other collections (again in two sizes), which would include "Public Education and Culture in the USSR," "Environmental Protection," "Technical Progress in the National Economic Sectors of the USSR," and "The Agroindustrial Complex in the USSR." It is planned for several of the collections to be annual publications while others will be published once every 2 or 3 years. For the first time in the past several decades a collection has been prepared including previously restricted data on living standards. A great deal has been and is being accomplished. However, in our view, for the time being there is no reason for the personnel of the State Committee for Statistics, the Finansy i Statistika Publishing House and the book trade to relax.

To begin with, the size of the collections, particularly those for the mass readership, is clearly inadequate to quench the thirst for information. I am confident that data in the collections will benefit any propagandist or anyone participating in the political or economic training system. There are millions of such people in our country. Or could it be that, as in the past, we consider our readers to be "lazy and incurious?" It is not enough to say that statistical information is now accessible to all. This must become a fact.

Second, there is a serious problem of comments accompanying statistical data. In itself, figures are frequently considered in an abstract way or, in general, ignored. For example, is a 130-billion ruble foreign trade much or little? What does increased volume of output mean? Does it mean that we already have an acceleration in economic development? What is the meaning of production cost indicators? The reader needs help in understanding the figures. The USSR State Committee for Statistics plans 3 collections for this year, which will include not only figures but also comments and an analysis of economic realities: "*New Quality of Economic Growth*," "*For the Good of the Soviet People*," and "*Economic and Social Development of the USSR and Union Republics in 1988*." In our view, however, this is not sufficient.

Furthermore, the collections which are being published as part of this series are not free from shortcomings. Thus, the lack of international comparisons greatly impoverishes the collections "*USSR Industry*," and "*USSR Agriculture*." Understandably, in a number of cases such comparisons are by no means in our favor. However, today we need not half-truths but the full truth, however bitter it may be.

Finally, as in the past, the reader is unable to obtain a great deal of information such as, for example, data on the dynamics of price indicators. Yet such information is particularly needed by the people, for a large number of speculations and rumors are being disseminated concerning price increases. Perestroika calls for expanding glasnost in statistics.

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#### **Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors**

18020009q Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 89 (signed to press 3 Feb 89) p 128

[Text] A meeting was held between KOMMUNIST personnel and propagandists from Kuntsevskiy Rayon in Moscow. Topical problems of the development of the Leninist concept of socialism and the democratization of Soviet society were discussed.

Representatives of the editorial board met with the ideological aktiv of Krasnogorsk, near Moscow. Particular attention was drawn to topical theoretical and

practical problems of the current stage of perestroika and, in particular, the new concept of socialism, the struggle against antiperestroika forces, and the situations which arise in the course of the initiated electoral campaign for USSR people's deputies.

A delegation of Humanist International is visiting the USSR on the invitation of KOMMUNIST. It includes its vice-presidents, Thomas Hirsh, chairman of the Chilean Humanist Party, and Isaiah Nobel, national secretary of the Argentine Humanist Party. This international association, which was founded at a meeting of representatives of Humanist parties of 39 countries in Florence at the beginning of January, has as its objectives the promotion of social change through nonviolent means, establishing and maintaining democratic procedures and the observance of human rights.

The delegates had a talk with Academician I.T. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee member. The guests held meetings at the Association of Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, the Committee for Solidarity With the Peoples of Latin America, and the Social Commission for International Cooperation in Humanitarian Problems and Human Rights. They studied the work of the Peace and Progress Soviet Public Radio Station, the journal NOVOYE VREMYA, and the APN. Talks on a wide range of international problems and on problems of perestroika in the USSR were held in the premises of KOMMUNIST. The representatives of this new international association provided information on the objectives and tasks of the Humanist International.

The editors were visited by members of the Argentine Communist Party Central Committee A. Cohen and E. Dushatski. Various aspects of perestroika in the Soviet Union and its influence on the development of international relations and the cause of social progress throughout the world were discussed.

In connection with the opening in Moscow of an agency for the F. Ebert Foundation (FRG), the editors visited H. Schumacher, its permanent representative in the USSR. He shared his plans for organizing the work of the mission in various areas, and holding symposia and seminars on a wide range of problems of cooperation between the FRG and our country. The discussions also covered possibilities for the development of already traditional relations between KOMMUNIST and NEUE GESELLSCHAFT, the journal of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

The editors were visited by R. DeVeerd, special correspondent for TELEGRAPH, the Dutch newspaper. The talk dealt with vital problems of the economic and political reform in the Soviet Union.

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